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THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE: BETWEEN PITFALLS AND
PROMISES A PATH TOWARD A NEW HUMANISM

“一带一路”倡议：
在陷阱和希望之间找到通往新人文学研究之路

Stephan Rothlin 罗世范

When we look at the sheer size and multiple dimensions of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its related projects we may often wonder how it is possible to come to grips with such a complex beast: Six new land corridors of the “Road” and the Maritime “Belt” throughout the seas, with new spaces around the globe getting more and more connected with each other. Beyond the vast expanses, what could turn out truly as innovative when the BRI was launched in 2013 is the call for reciprocity, peace and cooperation, mutual learning and mutual benefit within it. The most recent BRI summit which took place in Beijing in April 2019 insisted on the aspect of “openness and inclusiveness,” described in Mike Thompson’s opening essay, as a source of inspiration despite growing criticism from a number of countries related to a supposed “debt trap diplomacy” and an overreliance on environmentally harmful projects. Looking beyond such criticisms, our view of the BRI will focus on its spiritual nature or perhaps better the spiritual promise of the BRI. As Yang asks: what are the conditions for fulfilling the promise of a genuine “openness and inclusiveness”? He points toward a common ground of key values and institutions reflecting the Confucian principle of reciprocity (in Chinese “shu”, 恕), a principle that is at the core of mutually beneficial business relationships and technology transfers, which should benefit all stakeholders. So far 125 countries have signed 173 agreements with China in the period between 2013 through 2018, with a total Chinese investment into BRI projects of about \$90 billion (*People’s Daily Online*, 2019).

There is a host of reasons why some countries are still cautious about involvement in this process. The legal uncertainties need certainly to be taken into account as Lo Shiu Hing’s case study on police cooperation in the fight against cross-border crimes along the BRI makes evident: Does the law of the People’s Republic of China apply or the law of the Republic of China when drug dealers, smugglers, organ harvesters operating from Taiwan are caught and put behind bars in Mainland China? How can a genuine “open access” of all possible stakeholders be guaranteed if different legal systems contradict

each other? As there is no clear definition of the BRI, it is reasonable to ask: What are the different stakeholders ultimately aiming at? There have been loud voices even among potential beneficiaries who point out the legal uncertainty that is inherent in the BRI process, who fear that in cases of conflict China would be favoured as the stronger party. The legitimacy of this fear is as old as the law of the jungle. I am reminded of the famous Melian dialogue by the Greek historian Thucydides in which the powerful state

Looking beyond such criticisms, our view of the BRI will focus on its spiritual nature or perhaps better the spiritual promise of the BRI.

of Athens disregards the legitimate rights of the small island Melos and imposes law as the right of the powerful. Alternative to the cynicism of “might makes right,” Yang Hengda explores the spiritual principles that support the different forms of cooperation that are indispensable for bringing about a humanistic development in the BRI. His principles also reflect the lessons of history: “Humanism” properly confirmed with institutional economics “propagated ways of conduct or manners, that allowed reciprocity norms to work effectively, thereby limiting vulnerability to moral hazard which during the 15th and 16th century kept the returns from long distance trade low.... [S]ocieties which set incentives for information sharing and public debates in which rules secure open argumentation have a comparative advantage in the evolutionary process” (Krug 1998, p.7). Adhering to universal humane values is not only the right thing to do, it is also the likeliest strategy for success in the long run.

Progress in reaching common legal ground must rest on relationships of mutual trust and a willingness to reach compromises after truly listening to each other. In the midst of

看到“一带一路”倡议（BRI）及其相关项目的庞大规模和多重维度，我们常常会想，如何才能应对如此复杂的问题：通过“一路”的六大全新陆上经济走廊以及穿海而过的海上“一带”的联结，全球各地间的相互联系愈发紧密。在广阔的领域之外，2013年“一带一路”倡议提出以来，真正具有创新意义的是其中倡导的互惠、和平合作、互学互鉴、互利共赢。正如盛迈堂（Mike Thompson）在开篇文章中所讲，在一些国家对所谓的“债务陷阱外交”和过度依赖对环境有害的项目批评之声不断高涨的同时，2019年4月召开的最新一届“一带一路”国际合作高峰论坛坚持“开放包容”是一种力量源泉。在这些批评之外，我们对“一带一路”的看法将聚焦其精神实质，或者更确切地说，其文明承诺。正如杨教授（Yang）所追问：实现真正的“开放包容”需要什么条件？他指出一个反映了儒家互惠原则（“恕”）的关键价值观和机制的共同之处，即所有互惠互利的商业关系和技术转让的核心原则，应是使所有利益相关者获益。到目前为止，已经有125个国家在2013年至2018年底这段时间内与中国签署了173份合作文件，中国企业对“一带一路”沿线国家直接投资超过900亿美元。（人民网，2019）

一些国家仍对参与这一进程持谨慎态度，原因有很多。法律上的不确定性当然需要考虑在内，正如Lo Shiu Hing对“一带一路”沿线警方合作打击跨境犯罪的案例研究所表明：如果来自台湾的毒贩、走私者、器官采集者在中国大陆被逮捕入狱，那么是中华人民共和国法律适用呢，还是中国台湾法律适用呢？如果不同的法律体系相互矛盾，如何保证所有可能的利益相关者都能真正“开放获取”利益呢？鉴于“一带一路”尚未明确定义，我们有充分理由提出下面的问题：不同利益相关者的最终目标是什么？甚至在潜在的受益者中，也有人发出了响亮的声音，他们指出，“一带一路”进程存在固有的法律不确定性，他们担心，在发生冲突的情况下，中国将作为较为强大的一方获益。这种恐惧的合法性和丛林法则一样古老。我想起了希腊历史学家修昔底德著名的《米洛斯对话》。在对话中，强大的雅典无视小岛屿米洛斯的合法权利，将法律作为强国的权利。但是杨恒达不是发出对“强权即公理”的嘲讽，而是探讨了支持“一带一路”人文

发展的不同合作形式的精神原则。他的原则也反映了历史的教训：真正得到制度经济学确认的“人文学研究”，“繁衍出行为方式或礼仪，使互惠规范得以有效发挥作用，从而限制了面对道德风险的脆弱性。这种道德风险在15至16世纪使远距离贸易的回报保持低下水平……为信息共享和公共辩论设置激励机制、在辩论中有规则保障开放论证，这样的社会，在发展过程中具有相对优势”（Krug 1998, p. 7）。坚持普遍的人文价值观不仅是正确的做法，也是长远看来最可能成功的策略。

在这些批评之外，我们对“一带一路”的看法将聚焦其精神实质，或者更确切地说，其文明承诺。

在达成共同法律基础方面取得进展必须建立在相互信任的关系和真正听取对方意见后愿意作出妥协的基础上。在当前美中经贸摩擦和简单的排外政策在世界各地日益占上风的背景下，“一带一路”强调道德和精神维度，这一点和完全信任中国朋友的利玛窦（1552 - 1610）表达的真正开放精神一脉相承。利玛窦慷慨地分享了他的自然科学知识，及其对被钉死在十字架上并复活的主的信仰。对中国语言和文化的深刻了解使利玛窦和其在中国的后继传教士成为“智者”，他们在与中国进行真正对话的过程中开辟了新的领域，并愿意充分分享西方科学在数学、几何和地图绘制方面的优势。同样，今天，培养“开放包容”的态度和行为，需要我们培养跨文化技能，以实现对中国文化的类似尊重，并相信冲突最终可以通过相互承认的争端解决程序和对话得到解决。罗德里克·奥布莱恩（Roderick O'Brien）的文章向读者介绍了不同文化中的模范人物，他们应该被视为探索这种迫切需要的人文学研究的先驱，因为他们超越了既定的边界，即使遭遇挫折和阻碍，也坚持分享核心价值观。

利玛窦和其他传教士通过真诚友谊所取得的独一无二的突破，至今仍在中国社会

the current trade war between the United States and China and the apparent growing success of simplistic xenophobic policies in different parts of the world, it may be crucial that the moral and spiritual dimensions of the BRI highlighted in this issue express the genuinely open spirit of Matteo Ricci (1552-1610) who fully trusted his Chinese friends. Ricci generously shared his knowledge of the hard sciences as well as his faith in the Crucified and Risen Lord. A profound knowledge of Chinese language and culture made Matteo Ricci and his missionary successors in China “wise men” who could break new ground as they engaged in a genuine dialogue with China and were willing to share fully the advances of Western science in mathematics, geometry, and cartography. Along similar lines today, cultivating an attitude and behaviour of “openness and inclusiveness,” will require us to develop cross-cultural skills in order to achieve a similar respect for Chinese culture, trusting that conflicts can ultimately be solved through mutually recognised dispute resolution procedures and dialogue. Roderick O’Brien’s essay introduces readers to exemplary figures in different cultures who rightly should be considered as forerunners of the much-needed humanism, as they go beyond given boundaries in sharing core values even in the midst of setbacks and obstacles.

The memories of the unique breakthrough through genuine friendship by Ricci and other missionaries still resonate in many layers of Chinese society. Michelle Andersson deepens our exploration of this dialogue in the art created in China by the Jesuit brother and court painter from Milan, Italy, Giuseppe Castiglione S.J., who was a privileged friend of three Emperors of the Qing-Dynasty. The gaze of the artist on different features of court life including the Emperors and their wives and concubines, as well as the beautiful objects that surrounded them, certainly left a wonderful mark on China’s cultural history. All his amazing artistic achievements would not have been possible without the constant support and care of dear friends in high places. As these missionaries were among earlier travellers along the ancient Silk Road, we need to recognise in the BRI an amazing opportunity to learn from

past successes in merging Western elements with Chinese elements, a fresh chance to develop a web of interaction and bonds of friendship with Chinese people.

Dwelling on such memories of the ancient Silk Road should not distract us from the fact that dialogue with China needs to be oriented to the future. Rather than evoking nostalgic feelings, the main challenge of the BRI is whether such massive economic and financial projects can be developed in a sustainable model of growth: As Mike Thompson explains, the BRI’s goals can be achieved only if economic growth is based on mutually shared values of honesty, reliability and integrity. We may consider that a BRI lacking a commitment to ethical values has the potential to end up in a criminal abuse of the environment, and a brutal disregard of human dignity and human rights.

A key litmus test for this approach to “social” innovation is the way BRI participants view the religions along the different roads and belts which cut through large areas which are home to Islamic communities. It is not uncommon that this religion which may count roughly as many believers as Christianity all too often is regarded as a threat to security due to some extremist groups and their increasing visibility in other cultures. Dennis McCann’s essay on “Islamic Business Ethics” may help allay such fears, by suggesting not only the religious integrity of Muslim morality, but also the way in which Muslim business norms seem to resonate well with Confucian values: there seems to be a wealth of experience and insights concerning a communitarian approach to finance and trade from the point of view of Islamic ethics. Rather than just reaping benefits for privileged groups, Islam’s witness of faith in *Allah*, who is invoked in prayer five times a day, is intended even to benefit the larger society. A distinctively Islamic approach to the acquisition of wealth and financial transactions resists widening the gap between the rich and the poor and seeks to unite all stakeholders together in a common attempt to restrain dishonest and unfair practices which harm the disadvantaged. It is crucial to recognise a chance to learn from different wisdom traditions,

的多个层面引起共鸣。米歇尔·安德森(Michelle Andersson)通过耶稣会士、清初三朝皇帝青睐的宫廷画家朱塞佩·伽斯底里奥内的艺术创作进一步深化了这一对话。艺术家对宫廷生活特色的关注,包括皇帝和他们的妻妾,以及环绕其左右美轮美奂的物品,在中国文化史上留下了美妙的印记。如果没有身居高位的朋友们持续不断的支持和关心,他不可能实现如此惊人的艺术成就。这些传教士正是古代丝绸之路的早期旅行者之一,我们也需要认识到,“一带一路”是一个与历史学习如何成功融合中西方元素的绝佳机会,是一个与中国人民发展互动网络和友谊纽带的新机遇。

沉浸在对古代丝绸之路的回忆中不应使我们忽视这样一个事实,即与中国的对话需要面向未来。唤起怀旧情感之外,“一带一路”的主要挑战在于,如此大规模的经济

反对扩大富人和穷人之间的差距,并寻求团结所有利益相关方,共同努力制止损害弱势群体不诚实和不公平做法。在不同的智慧传统中发现学习机会至关重要,这是在“一带一路”整体发展进程中实现精神成长的机遇。

儒家、佛教、道家和基督教等不同的智慧传统不几乎一致认同尊重每一个人尊严的重要意义。人的尊严的核心是认识到每个人的内在价值和诚信。然而,尊重人的尊严并不限于个人。弗兰西斯·恩瓦舒库(Francis Nwachukwu)关于“一带一路”在非洲的论述提醒我们重视整个非洲大陆的需要。自1978年中国经济开放以来,与非洲在各个层面的合作都最为活跃。中国企业和政府机构与非洲伙伴之间的特殊友谊纽带,体现了独特的务实和商业化精神,是西方对非洲“发展援助”的一种替代选择。中国没有将非洲伙

坚持普遍的人文价值观不仅是正确的做法,也是长远看来最可能成功的策略。

和金融项目能否在可持续增长模式下得以实现:正如迈克·汤普森所阐释,只有经济增长建立在诚信、可靠、正直等共同价值观的基础上,“一带一路”的目标才可以实现。我们可以认为,如果缺乏对伦理价值观的承诺,“一带一路”最终可能导致对环境的肆意破坏,以及对人类尊严和人权的残酷漠视。

这种“社会”创新方式的一个关键试金石是“一带一路”参与者看待宗教的方式。“一带一路”贯穿伊斯兰社区所在的大片区域。由于一些极端主义团体及其在其他文化中的影响力日益增加,伊斯兰教经常被认为和基督教一样信徒众多,并常常被视为一种安全威胁。丹宁思(Dennis McCann)的文章《伊斯兰经济伦理》可能有助于减轻这种担忧。文章指出,不仅穆斯林道德具备宗教完整性,而且穆斯林商业规范似乎以某种方式与儒家价值观形成共鸣:伊斯兰伦理为社群主义视角下的金融和贸易研究提供了丰富的经验和深刻的见解。伊斯兰教对安拉的信仰——每天五次虔诚的礼拜,不是为了给特权群体谋取利益,而是为了造福更大的社会。在获取财富和金融交易方面,伊斯兰

伴视为受援国,而是革命性地将其视为商业伙伴。如果交易成功,双方都是赢家;出现失败则提醒双方,其商业模式需要修正或彻底弃用。从儒家伦理的角度看,非洲共建“一带一路”提供了一个发展其务实主义的机会,同时因为关乎整个非洲大陆,也凸显了尊严的社群主义维度。

但是,除非不尝试遏制合作伙伴商业活动中普遍存在的不同层次的腐败,否则非洲贫富之间的巨大差距很可能将继续扩大,只有一小部分社会将从中受益。没有对非洲当地文化、法律和习俗的全面认识,中国也有可能被视为殖民统治者,就像在非洲占领土地的欧洲先行者一样:统治者和被统治者的关系可能会重建,不管其中涉及多少物质利益。因此,“一带一路”在非洲和其他地区面临的挑战可能最终会开拓一条新路,证明利玛窦的方法同友谊与商业互惠的相关性——只有“一带一路”合作伙伴成功建立起相互理解和信任的真正基础,期待中的可持续的商业成功才可能实现。正如恩瓦舒库所指出,这种对相互学习和欣赏的高级承诺似乎完全不存在。正因为如此,如果“一带一路”旨在造福更大的社会,杨恒达提

as an opportunity for spiritual growth in the whole dynamic of the BRI.

The different wisdom traditions such as Confucianism, Buddhism, Daoism and Christianity seem to agree on the importance of respecting the dignity of each human being. The core of human dignity is to recognise the intrinsic value and integrity of each person. However, respecting human dignity is not restricted to the individual. Francis Nwachukwu's discussion of the BRI in Africa alerts us to the needs of a whole continent in which China on all levels has been most active since the opening of its economy in 1978. The special bond of friendship between Chinese companies and government agencies with their African counterparts features a distinctively pragmatic and business-like approach which is an alternative to Western approaches to "development

may come about. Therefore the challenge of the BRI in Africa and elsewhere may finally open a new way to demonstrate the relevance of Matteo Ricci's approach to friendship and reciprocity for business—namely that the best hope for sustainable business success may be realised only if the partners of the BRI manage to establish a genuine basis of mutual understanding and trust. As Nwachukwu suggest, this advanced level of commitment to mutual learning and appreciation often seems completely absent. For that reason, the Spiritual Principles for BRI Construction, outlined by Yang Hengda, seem truly indispensable and practical, if the BRI is to benefit the larger society. But does Yang appear just as a lonely voice crying in the desert? What can be done to ensure that his proposals become truly transformative?

Adhering to universal humane values is not only the right thing to do, it is also the likeliest strategy for success in the long run.

aid" for Africa. Rather than consider Africa as an aid recipient, China revolutionised an approach to its African counterparts as business partners. If the business deal is successful, both sides win; a failure reminds each party that something in their business model needs either to be fixed or altogether abandoned. From the perspective of Confucian ethics, the BRI in Africa offers a chance to develop its pragmatism while also highlighting the communitarian dimension of dignity as it relates to a whole continent.

But unless there are no attempts to curb different layers of pervasive corruption in the partners' business practices, it is most likely that the enormous gap between the rich and the poor in Africa will keep widening and that only a small fraction of society will profit. Without a comprehensive recognition of African local cultures, laws and customs it may also be likely that the Chinese will come to be regarded as colonial Masters, much as their European predecessors were as they grabbed territories in Africa: The Master and Slave relationship may be recreated, no matter how many material benefits

The main ethical challenge for the partners in the BRI process seems to be whether they are willing share basic common values such as dignity, honesty, truthfulness, reliability and integrity. In order to bring about a sustainable business model based on reciprocity and fairness, we at the Macau Ricci Institute believe the wisdom traditions of China have a decisive role to play. In the midst of unprecedented business opportunities and sometimes a cut-throat culture of business competition Buddhist voices seem to be perfectly tuned to Christian, Muslim, and Daoist insights which advocate cultivating genuine solidarity and compassion. Benoit Vermander offers an inspiring view of the achievements of Christian Cochini who devoted his whole life to becoming a true friend of Buddhists while opening new ways of dialogue with them. The careful analysis of his last book on 50 Masters of Buddhism describes fascinating journeys in search of wisdom, individuals leaving behind their comfort zones and becoming gradually transformed by encounters and insights from a culture that radically differed from their own. The itineraries

出的“一带一路”建设的核心原则就不可或缺、切实可行。但杨只是“在沙漠中独自哭泣”吗？我们可以做些什么来确保他的提议真正具有变革性？

“一带一路”合作伙伴面临的主要伦理挑战在于，他们是否愿意分享尊严、诚实、真实、可靠和正直等基本共同价值观。澳门利氏学社认为，为了建立一个基于互惠和公平的可持续的商业模式，中国的传统智慧将发挥决定性作用。在前所未有的商业机会、有时甚至是残酷的商业竞争文化中，佛教的声音与基督教、穆斯林和道家的洞见完美契合，它们均提倡培育真正的团结和同情。魏明德（Benoit Vermander）对高照民神父所取得成就的看法令人鼓舞。高照民一生致力于与佛教徒成为真正朋友，同时开辟了与他们对话的新途径。他的最新一本详尽分析50位佛教大师的著作描述了寻找智慧的奇妙旅程。大师们离开舒适区，在与自己截然不同的文化中的被一次次的邂逅和洞见逐渐改变。这50位大师的智慧和同情之旅或对“一带一路”的利益相关方有所启发。他们不仅有机会成为技术和经济进步的伙伴，而且也有机会以佛教大师为榜样，将其一生致力于照顾病人、弱势群体和穷人。在“一带一路”建设理念的启发下，由企业家精神驱动的团结项目将转化为公平贸易和商业机会，让所有尊重法治的人都能平等参与。

在这种情况下我们应该重视经济学家玛吉特·奥斯特罗（Margit Osterloh）和布鲁诺·S·弗雷（Bruno S. Frey）提出的建议，他们赞成用创新的方式应对移民危机，建议出台政策使移民可以合法进入欧洲国家，并向他们提供快速就业机会。奥斯特罗和弗雷提出的另一个与“一带一路”制度化高度相关的关键概念是“FOCJ，即功能覆盖型竞争性辖区”，这一概念回应实际的社会问题，并以有效和包容的方式处理相应的问题。这与在已有民族国家的基础上建立欧洲联盟有很大的不同。“一带一路”建设不能单纯依靠中央政府，经济和精神层面的洞见是否有助于构建符合各方合法利益的架构并带来相应的理念转变，无疑是一个关键问题。

各方一致认为，将“一带一路”建设局限于经贸联盟是短视的。毫无疑问，基督教团结、互助、学习等价值观以及对共同利益的追求深刻地塑造了欧洲内外各种文化的团

结。欧盟不同成员国基本实现和平共处及其先进的社会保障制度，反映了一种几百年来受基督教社会价值观念影响的文化，其显著特点就是对弱势和贫困群体的照顾。一种精神价值观正在中国觉醒，我们有理由期待，通过正直和诚信的共同价值观的塑造，“一带一路”可以造福更大的社会。

如果“一带一路”沿袭“只注重经济增长、忽视环境”的旧模式，可能会带来非常严重和破坏性的后果。作为“一带一路”建设的主要推动者，中国有机会从一味关注经济增长，忽视水、土壤、大气污染等生态灾害风险所带来的负面影响中吸取教训。因此，对“一带一路”建设的关键考验在于，“一带一路”能否在始终如一地致力于经济可持续发展的同时，致力于建立必要的法律和制度框架。



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Translated by 翻译: Zhang Xi 张希

of these 50 Masters in their search for wisdom and compassion should be inspiring for stakeholders in the BRI process. They have the opportunity not just to become partners in technological and economic advances but also to consider the example of Buddhist Masters who devoted their lives to taking care of the sick, the disadvantaged and the poor. The project of an entrepreneurially driven solidarity, inspired by the ideals invoked for the BRI process, would translate into fair trade and business opportunities which give equal access to all those who respect the rule of law.

In this context we should value the proposal by the economists Margit Osterloh and Bruno S. Frey who argue for a new and innovative approach to the immigration crisis as they suggest a policy for enabling the migrants to enter into countries in Europe in a legal way, and to offer them quick employment opportunities. Another key concept from Osterloh and Frey which may be most relevant for the institutionalisation of the BRI is the “FOCJ, i.e. Functional, Overlapping and Competing Jurisdictions” which respond to actual social problems, and are organised to deal with the corresponding issues in an efficient and inclusive manner. This differs considerably from the project of building the European Union on the basis of pre-existing nation states. As the BRI process cannot solely rely on central governments, it is certainly a key question if economic and spiritual insights may be helpful in creating structures and bringing about changes of mind which take to heart the legitimate interests of all stakeholders.

All the contributors to this issue agree that it would be short sighted to limit the project of the BRI to a mere alliance of trade and commerce. There is no doubt that Christian values of solidarity, subsidiarity, mutual help and learning as well as the orientation to the Common Good have profoundly shaped a unity within a wide variety of cultures in and beyond Europe. The mostly peaceful coexistence of the different member countries of the European Union and their advanced social security systems reflect a culture that has for centuries been influenced by Christian social values with its distinctive care for the vulnerable and poor. As there seems to be

an awakening to spiritual values in China, it may also be realistic to hope that the BRI may in one way or another be shaped by common values of integrity and trustworthiness for the benefit of the larger society.

If the BRI follows the old paradigm of exclusive focus on economic growth with its consequent neglect of the environment it may carry very serious and devastating consequences. China as the main driver in the BRI has a chance to learn from the very negative consequences that follow from an exclusive focus on economic growth and the failure to take into account the risks of ecological disasters involving water, soil and air pollution. Therefore the key test of the BRI is its consistent commitment to a sustainable approach to economic development which must entail also a commitment to create the necessary legal and institutional framework.



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THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES

“一带一路”倡议：机会和挑战

Mike Thompson 盛迈堂

ABSTRACT

This paper begins by setting out the vision for the renaissance of the New Silk Road as the “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI) announced by President Xi Jinping in 2013 and picks out a theme of moral leadership in Xi’s speeches. The opportunities for a Chinese approach to the Common Good are contrasted with six major challenges to Xi’s aspirations for the BRI as a pathway leading to friendship, shared development and peace. The Silk Road has a rich history across Asian civilisations with earliest records of it dating from the Han dynasty (207 BCE–220 CE). Over the centuries, the Silk Road has not only opened up a path for trade with silk as currency but also great opportunities for cross-cultural understanding and relations. The Silk Road has provided a means for the transmission of art, science and cultural and religious exchange. The BRI essentially promotes a regenerated Silk Road of infrastructural connectivity within and across China’s borders. It brings together the “Silk Road Economic Belt” of roads, railways and industrial corridors and the “21st Century Maritime Silk Road,” expanding through upgraded ports. The BRI extends beyond ports, railways and highways to other major types of infrastructure including oil and gas pipelines, electricity power plants and telecommunications networks. Construction of the \$68 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor creates a major

摘要

本文首先阐述了2013年习近平主席提出的复兴新丝绸之路的愿景，即“一带一路”倡议，并在习近平的讲话中选取了道德领导力的主题。习主席希望“一带一路”能够成为一条友谊之路，促进共同发展，实现和平，这一愿景既为中国实现共同利益提供了机遇，同时也会面临六大挑战。丝绸之路在亚洲文明中有着悠久的历史，最早的记录可以追溯到汉代(公元前207年-公元220年)。几个世纪以来，丝绸之路不仅开辟了以丝绸为货币进行贸易的道路，而且为跨文化理解和交往提供了重要的机会。丝绸之路还为艺术、科学、文化和宗教交流提供了传播途径。“一带一路”的核心内容是推动中国境内和境外基础设施互联互通，复兴丝绸之路。它包括连接公路、铁路和工业走廊的“丝绸之路经济带”以及通过升级港口来辐射更大范围的“21世纪海上丝绸之路”。“一带一路”建设不仅涵盖了港口、铁路、公路，还包括油气管道、电厂、电信网络等主要基础设施。总投资达680亿美元的中巴经济走廊的建设打通了一条从巴基斯坦瓜达尔深水港到中国新疆喀什的主要公路，有助于加强两国互联互通，为中国中西部地区进入印度洋和阿拉伯海提供了更直接的通道。其他几个走廊的项目也在进行中。正如战略与国际研究中心(CSIS)所指出的，“一带一路”“看似一个宏大的愿景”，而不是“一个可操作的蓝图”，尽管它比怀疑者可能愿意相信的要可

highway running from the deep-water port of Gwadar in Pakistan to the city of Kashgar in the Xinjiang region of China, improving connectivity between the two countries and offering central and western China more direct access to the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea. Projects are also underway in several of the other corridors. As the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has pointed out, the BRI is “more of a sweeping vision” than “an operational blueprint,” though it is far more credible and tangible than sceptics might like to believe (Johnson, 2016). A starting point for this enquiry inevitably begins with the plans originally set out by President Xi Jinping and China’s State Council in 2015. This paper aims to report Xi’s comments as an observer rather than as a critic following Watson (1994) to overcome externally imposed meaning and to appreciate other people’s realities.



POSITIVE OPPORTUNITIES

Relevant to the themes of this Journal is an analysis of the extent to which moral leadership and social innovation for the Common Good might be realised through the BRI. Ethical dilemmas inevitably arise in the midst of conflicts of geo-political interest, rival commercial interests and a multitude of conflicting personal interests for both wealth creation and personal prestige and advancement. The conflicts of the human condition are simply given a new road on which to travel and potentially exploit those who are poorer and less powerful: prosperity for the few potentially at the expense of the many. But is it reasonable to question the central intent of President Xi in pointing not only to the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation in expanding global trade but in helping peoples in small nations in SE Asia and Africa to develop?

The Chinese government envisages BRI countries working in concert to secure an efficient network of land, sea and air passages; lifting their connectivity to a higher level; enhancing trade and investment facilitation; establishing a network of free trade areas that meet high

standards; maintaining closer economic ties; deepening political trust; enhancing cultural exchanges; encouraging different peoples to learn from each other and flourish together (NDRC, 2015). The overarching moral claim put forward at the outset was that the BRI would promote mutual understanding, peace and friendship among peoples of all countries. President Xi has explained this claim within his five guiding principles of the BRI:

1. A road for peace: “The ancient silk routes thrived in times of peace, but lost vigour in times of war.”
2. A road of prosperity: “Development holds the master key to solving all problems. . . Infrastructure connectivity is the foundation of development through cooperation.”
3. A road of opening up: “Opening up brings progress while isolation results in backwardness [. . .] We should build an open platform of cooperation and uphold and grow an open world economy”
4. A road of innovation: “We should pursue innovation-driven development and intensify cooperation in frontier areas such as digital economy, artificial intelligence, nanotechnology, and quantum computing [. . .] we should pursue the new vision of green development [. . .]”
5. A road connecting different civilisations: “We should ensure that when it comes to different civilisations, exchange will replace estrangement, mutual learning will replace clashes, and coexistence will replace a sense of superiority.” (Xi, 2017a)

Although the focus of BRI action by business and political elites is on the infrastructural, commercial and trade opportunities, there is an ‘other-interested’ intent made explicit by Xi: “If we take the first courageous step towards each other, we can embark on a path leading to friendship, shared development, peace, harmony and a better future” (Xi, 2017a).

These ideals point towards a vision for the Common Good and, more precisely the “internal goods of excellence” (MacIntyre, 1983) cultivated through cooperative activity and social practice:

信和实际得多 (Johnson, 2016)。对“一带一路”的探究不可避免地要从2015年习近平主席和中国国务院最初制定的计划开始。本文的目的是从一个观察者的角度,而不是像沃森(1994)那样的批评家的角度来记述习的评论,以克服外在强加的解读,了解其他民族的真实情况。



积极的机会

本文与本学刊主题相关的是,分析了“一带一路”对于公益而言在道德领导力和社会创新方面可以实现的程度。无论是在在地缘政治利益冲突中,或是在商业利益竞争中,又或是在与财富创造、个人声望及晋升相关的大量个人利益冲突之中,都不可避免地会出现伦理困境。人类地位的冲突又多了一条用来潜在剥削贫穷弱势群体的道路:少数人的繁荣会潜在地以牺牲多数人的利益为代价。但是,我们是否有理由质疑习主席的核心意图,即不仅要扩大全球贸易,实现中华民族的伟大复兴,还要帮助东南亚和非洲小国的人民发展?

中国政府的愿景是,“一带一路”沿线各国携手努力,建设安全高效的陆海空通道网络,提升互联互通水平,加强贸易和投资便利化,建立高标准自由贸易区网络,保持更加紧密的经济联系,深化政治互信,加强人文交流,鼓励不同文明互鉴共荣(中国国家发改委,2015)。“一带一路”倡议从一开始就提出了推动各国人民相互理解、和平友好的重要道德主张。习主席在“一带一路”倡议的五项指导原则中阐述了这一主张:

1. 和平之路:“古丝绸之路,和时兴,战时衰。”
2. 繁荣之路:“发展是解决一切问题的总钥匙……设施联通是合作发展的基础。”
3. 开放之路:“开放带来进步,封闭导致落后……我们要打造开放型合作平台,维护和发展开放型世界经济”
4. 创新之路:“我们要坚持创新驱动发展,加强在数字经济、人工智能、纳米技术、量子计算机等前沿领域合作……我们要践行绿色发展的新理

念……”

5. 文明之路:“一带一路”建设要以文明交流超越文明隔阂、文明互鉴超越文明冲突、文明共存超越文明优越。”(习,2017a)

尽管企业和政治高层将“一带一路”的重点放在了基础设施、商业和贸易机会上,但是习近平明确提出了一个“利他的”意图:“只要我们勇敢迈出第一步,坚持相向而行,就能走出一条相遇相知、共同发展之路,走向幸福安宁和谐美好的远方”(习,2017a)。

这些理想指向一种实现公益的愿景,更准确地说,是通过合作活动和社会实践培养出来的“内在优秀品质”(MacIntyre, 1983):诚实、正义、勇气和谦逊。但要实现公益,就需要通过市场活动得以实现的“有效性商品”以对代理关系和不对称的权力关系的监管为前提,受促进分配正义的控制措施的约束,并以党的纪律监督和惩罚措施为后盾。“一带一路”各方参与者若存在经济机会主义,将可能导致垄断,这与习近平意欲让“一带一路”成为各国之间的友谊之路与合作之路的意图是相违背的。

习近平的五项指导原则要求,尽管地缘政治紧张和争端造成社会动荡不安,但基础设施互联互通所带来的利益是以责任、问责和正义为导向的。共同发展、安宁和谐的理想要通过友谊原则来实现。要实现习近平让“一带一路”成为友谊之路的愿景,需要一种具备高尚品格和美德的领导力。这种高尚的友谊难就难在它不是基于习近平所设想的互惠互利的结果,而是基于自愿承担对他人的责任。中国作为“一带一路”的主要参与者,想要实现习近平的“文明共存超越文明优越”的愿望,那么谦逊和慷慨的美德必不可少。

地缘政治困境

“一带一路”沿线地区不可避免地会存在对势力范围的竞争。冲突可以迅速取代合作,特别是当对中国的债务无法偿还时。全球发展中心等多家评论人士(Starrs, 2018)指出,“一带一路”未来融资存在负债担保风险,并列举了“债务危机高风险”的8个国家。斯里兰卡欠下中国国有企业80亿美元债务,这些企业对斯里兰卡的港口和其他海

truthfulness, justice, courage and humility. But operationalising the Common Good requires that the “goods of effectiveness” achievable through market activity presuppose the regulation of agency relationships and asymmetric power relations, restrained by controls that promote distributive justice and backed by Party disciplinary oversight and penalties. Economic opportunism by Belt and Road players on all sides could lead to monopolistic and monopsonist practices that contradict Xi’s intent for the BRI to become a path of friendship and cooperation amongst nations.

Xi’s five guiding principles demand that the benefits of infrastructural connectivity are led with responsibility, accountability and justice despite the turmoil of geo-political tensions and disputes. The ideals of shared development, peace and harmony are realised through the principle of friendship. The demand is for leadership with character and virtue to fulfil Xi’s vision of the BRI as a path to friendship. The high challenge of virtuous friendship is not based on the mutually beneficial outcomes of reciprocity assumed by Xi, but by a willing acceptance of responsibility for the other. For China as the leading player in the BRI, the virtues of humility and generosity are indispensable for achieving Xi’s hope that “coexistence will replace a sense of superiority”.

GEOPOLITICAL DILEMMAS

Competitive spheres of influence over regions along the BRI are inevitable. Conflict can rapidly overtake cooperation especially when debts to China cannot be repaid. A number of commentators such as the Center for Global Development (Starrs, 2018), have pointed out the risk of debt bondage in future BRI financing and list eight countries that face a “high risk of debt distress”. Sri Lanka owes \$8 billion in debt to Chinese state firms which upgraded Sri Lanka’s ports and other maritime facilities. Desperate for debt relief Sri Lanka handed over the China-funded Port of Hambantota on a 99-year lease. In similar circumstances, China has taken a 40-year lease on one of Pakistan’s most important ports (Kurlantzick, 2018).

So far, according to Du and Zhang’s study, BRI participating countries, “have been cooperative with Chinese acquirers, probably thanks to the high-profile international political cooperation feature embedded in the OBOR initiative” (Du and Zhang, 2018). A major research study on China’s outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) by Li, Luo and De Vita (2018) suggest that Chinese investors are influenced more by the difference of the institutional environment between China and

For China as the leading player in the BRI, the virtues of humility and generosity are indispensable for achieving Xi’s hope that “coexistence will replace a sense of superiority”.

the host country than government intervention. This finding highlights the economic advantage of respect and cooperation between China and the country receiving OFDI for the success of the BRI. Du and Zhang (2018) provide evidence on the efficiency and efficacy of the state capitalist system in promoting international economic integration through both SOE acquirers and non-SOE acquirers.

The potential for geopolitical dilemmas is illustrated in the case of Australia where headlines, news reports and opinion pieces have, in the words of Laurenceson, given rise to “China Threat, China Angst and China Panic” (Laurenceson, 2018, p.5). Resource-rich Papua New Guinea (PNG), a former Australian colony, is a current focus of the tensions between China and the Australian government. China and Australia are both eager to exploit PNG’s natural gas, minerals and timber resources. In January 2018 Australia launched a scathing attack on China’s efforts to build influence in the Pacific, accusing Beijing of currying favour with the region’s smaller nations by funnelling cash into little-used infrastructure projects. According to Concetta Fierravanti-Wells, Australia’s minister

上设施进行了升级改造。因为迫于急需债务减免，斯里兰卡将中国出资建设的汉班托塔港移交给了中方，租期为99年。类似地，中国租下了一个巴基斯坦最重要的港口，租期为40年（Kurlantzick, 2018）。

根据杜和张的研究，迄今为止，“一带一路”参与国“一直在与中国收购方进行合作，这可能要归功于“一带一路”倡议中蕴含着引人注目的国际政治合作特色”（Du & Zhang, 2018）。李、罗、德维塔（2018）对中国对外直接投资（OFDI）的一项重要研究表明，与政府干预相比，中国与东道国的制度环境差异对中国投资者的影响更大。这一发现凸显了中国与接受对外直接投资国家之间的尊重与合作对于“一带一路”的成功而言是很大的经济优势。杜和张（2018）还证明了国有资本主义制度通过国有收购方和非国有收购方在促进国际经济一体化方面的效率和效力。

中国作为“一带一路”的主要参与者，想要实现习近平的“文明共存超越文明优越”的愿望，那么谦逊和慷慨的美德必不可少。

地缘政治困境的潜在可能性可以从澳大利亚的例子中得到说明。澳大利亚的头条新闻、新闻报道和观点文章，用劳伦森的话来说，引发了“中国威胁、中国焦虑和中国恐慌”（Laurenceson, 2018: 5）。资源丰富的巴布亚新几内亚（PNG）曾是澳大利亚的殖民地，目前它则成了中国和澳大利亚政府之间紧张关系的焦点。中国和澳大利亚都渴望开发巴布亚新几内亚的天然气、矿产和木材资源。2018年1月，澳大利亚对中国在太平洋地区建立影响力的行动发起了严厉抨击，指责中国通过向鲜少使用的基础设施项目注入资金，来讨好该地区较小的国家。澳大利亚国际发展与太平洋部长孔塞塔·菲拉夫安特韦尔斯表示，“太平洋上到处都是无人维护的无用建筑，基本上都是无用的累赘”（Wembridge, 2018）。中国外交部副部长郑泽光回应称，中国“只是在把合作蛋糕做

大”。（Hornby&Smyth, 2018）。从巴布亚新几内亚的角度看，中国是巴布亚新几内亚的朋友，中国在当地建立基础设施，通过派遣医疗队的形式为防止疟疾传播提供社会支持，建立“友谊学校”，并在最近一次地震后提供救灾和重建援助（Ge, 2018: 1）。不管澳大利亚联邦政府的立场如何，维多利亚州总理丹尼尔·安德鲁斯于2018年10月签署了一项“一带一路”协议，他表示该协议将“推动维多利亚州与中国之间的合作”（Jinxi, 2018）。

“一带一路”倡议面临的挑战

1. 与一个正在崛起的大国保持和平关系

在权力关系不平等的情况下，习近平的合作和独立议程很难公正地加以管理。不可避免地，有关中国权力不对称的问题被提了出来。西方媒体评论员并不欣然接受习近平关于“文明共存超越文明优越”的承诺，而是普遍担心中国的资金会凌驾于小国之上，而基础设施互联互通则没有立刻得到证据的支持。2018年，马来西亚宣布将重新谈判与中国的合同，称其为“不平等条约”和一种“新的殖民主义”。马尔代夫、缅甸、巴基斯坦和塞拉利昂正在评估与中国合作的规模和范围（Roland, 2019）。与此形成鲜明对比的是，菲律宾作为中国国有和私人投资的重要受益者，没有执行国际仲裁法庭在2016年做出的一项支持菲律宾南海主权主张的裁决。当然，合作对于双方来说是共赢的，习近平最近与太平洋岛国达成自由贸易协定的呼吁将带来显著的经济利益（Baijie, 2018）。

除了扩大软实力和地缘政治影响优势，“一带一路”还将为中国带来一系列安全和经济利益：能源安全、中国东部省份的发展和基础设施出口增长（Leavy, 2018: 37）。据印度《经济时报》报道，或许最大的无形利好将是让中国回归到昔日全球经济的中心位置。其副作用是在钢铁、建筑、基础设施、技术和金融这些发展工具上，他国对中国的依赖可能会增加。

中国希望通过促进受援国的发展，“‘一带一路’倡议也能赢得人心，让这些国家的人民相信，中国作为地区霸主的崛起，总体上也会使他们受益”（Kurlantzic, 2018）。然而，要加强全球的安全环境，以和平

for international development and the Pacific, “You’ve got the Pacific full of these useless buildings which nobody maintains, which are basically white elephants” (Wembridge, 2018). Zheng Zeguang, China’s vice-minister of foreign affairs responded by explaining how China was “just making the cake of co-operation larger.” (Hornby and Smyth, 2018). From Papua New Guinea’s perspective, China is a friend who builds infrastructure and gives social support in the form of a medical team to prevent the spread of malaria, a “friendship school” and disaster relief and reconstruction following a recent earthquake (Ge, 2018, p.1). Despite the Australian federal government’s position, Victoria’s premier, Daniel Andrews, signed a Belt and Road agreement in October 2018 which he said would “provide an impetus for pushing forward Victoria’s cooperation with China” (Jinxi, 2018).

THE CHALLENGES OF THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE

1. Managing peaceful relations with a rising power

Xi’s agenda for cooperation and independence is difficult to manage with justice when power relations are unequal. Inevitably questions of China’s asymmetric power are raised. Western media commentators do not readily accept Xi’s promise that “coexistence will replace a sense of superiority” but the widespread concern that smaller nations are overpowered by Chinese money and infrastructural connectivity is not readily supported by the evidence. In 2018 Malaysia announced that it would renegotiate its contracts with China, describing them as “unequal treaties” and a “new version of colonialism.” The Maldives, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Sierra Leone are reviewing the scale and scope of their cooperation with China (Roland, 2019). In contrast The Philippines, a significant recipient of Chinese state and private investment, has not enforced a decision reached by an international tribunal in 2016 that upheld Manila’s South China Sea claims. Of course, cooperation can work positively both ways and Xi’s recent call to negotiate a free trade agreement with Pacific

Island nations promises a significant economic benefit (Baijie, 2018).

Apart from the extension of soft power and geopolitical influence advantages there are a number of security and economic prizes to be secured for China through the BRI: energy security, development of Chinese eastern provinces and growth for infrastructural exports (Leavy, 2018, p.37). According to India’s *Economic Times*, perhaps the biggest unnamed prize would be to put China back where it once was, at the centre of the global economy. The side-effect is likely to increase the dependency on China for the tools of economic development: steel, construction, infrastructure, technology and finance.

China’s hope is that by bolstering growth in recipient nations, “the initiative could also win over hearts and minds, convincing people in those countries that China’s rise as regional hegemon will, overall, benefit them too” (Kurlantzic, 2018). Nevertheless, the moral leadership challenge lies with China to bolster global security and to contain the “rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” peacefully to fulfil Xi’s aim for the BRI to “open more cooperation channels” (Xi, 2017a).

2. Managing financialisation and anti-corruption

The BRI ambitions may conflict with the powerful drives of financialisation¹ in which spontaneous and over-optimistic assessments can dominate decision-making and lead to corrupt and rent seeking practices. The negative effects of financialisation have been portrayed by the Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace as “Business leaders increasingly focus on maximising wealth, employees develop attitudes of entitlement, and consumers demand instant gratification at the lowest possible price” (Pontifical Council, 2015, p.3).

The high aims of Xi’s principles require behaviours, practices, enforceable law-making and regulatory scrutiny to manage the ever-

¹ In 2015, the Pontifical Council published *The Vocation of the Business Leader* in which it pointed to the financialisation of the world economy as having deleterious effects and defining financialisation as “the shift in the capitalist economy from production to finance. The revenue and profits of the financial sector have become an increasingly large segment of the world-wide economy. (Pontifical Council, 2015, p.9)

的方式实现“中华民族的伟大复兴”，从而实现习近平让“一带一路”“开放更多合作渠道”的目标，中国还面临着道德领导力的挑战（习，2017a）。

2. 应对金融化和反腐败

“一带一路”的愿景可能会与金融化的强大动力互相冲突。在金融化¹过程中，自发的评估、过于乐观的评估可能主导决策，并导致腐败和寻租行为。宗座正义暨和平委员会把这种金融化的负面影响描写为“商业领袖越来越注重财富最大化，员工形成权利理所当然的态度，消费者要求以尽可能低的价格获得即时满足”（宗座正义暨和平委员会，2015：3）。

习近平的原则所树立的崇高目标，需要与之对应的行为、实践，以及可执行的立法和监管审查来管理自私自利的道德风险，这种自私自利存在于我们每个人身上，也会存在于“一带一路”沿线的方方面面，角角落落。财富和权力的致命诱惑已经导致政府官员和商人行不轨之事。在中国将哈萨克斯坦霍尔果斯村改造为内陆航运枢纽和自由贸易区的过程中，就发生了冲击道德底线的地方走私行为和引人注目的腐败案件。霍尔果斯的例子还说明了茂克所报道的在“一带一路”项目中工人们可能面临的困境（2019）：

尽管在霍尔果斯，一些新的官方职位让少数幸运的人摆脱了贫困，但更常见的情况是，农民和牧民去兼职做出租车司机、保安或者去走私，包括他们在内的低收入自由职业者构成了一个不稳定的网络。这些工作在设计上很容易受到实施中突然变化的影响，并且有赖于可自由处置的工人的持续流入。这对于实现世界的互联互通来说似乎成本很高。鉴于这样的事情，在2018年8月的“一带一路”座谈会上，习近平明确指示中国共产党加强对在海外经营的中国公司的道德领导和监督，确保他们的行为和做法是合法公正的，不会给这些“值得称颂”的项目抹黑。“一带一路”建设应“完善全球治理体系”，打造“命运共同体”。（Rolland，2019）。

1 2015年，宗座正义暨和平委员会发表了《商业领袖的使命》，指出世界经济的金融化具有有害影响，并将金融化定义为“资本主义经济从生产转向金融”。金融部门的收入和利润在世界经济中所占的比例越来越大。（宗座正义暨和平委员会，2015：9）

3. 应对关于公正与合作的对立观点

“一带一路”要成为“高道德标准之路”，就需要有公正、可信的仲裁机制，以及和谐与和平的姿态。战略竞争以及对人力与自然资源的商业攫取是始终存在的危险。各国政府和企业正面临越来越大的压力，它们需要制定出公平分配的原则，以便分享“更大的合作蛋糕”，从而减少不平等、保护工人、保护自然资源和生态系统。中国计划在深圳和西安设立国际法庭，以解决“一带一路”商业纠纷。这类法庭是否将建立在真正独立的基础上尚存在疑问（Kuo&Kommenda，2018）。

2017年，习主席为支持“一带一路”沿线国家的社会扶贫项目提出了强有力和可衡量的目标，这些项目在三年内，向发展中国家和国际组织提供了价值600亿元人民币的援助（习，2017a）。2018年，习近平呼吁小型项目应满足当地人民的迫切需要，而不仅仅是精英阶层的需要，还应加强人文交流（Rolland，2018）。

战略竞争都涉及一定程度的利己主义，但“一带一路”传递的信息重点是“双赢”和友谊。这一信息正在接受考验，中国主要国有企业在签署任何协议之前都会先努力建立关系，应对跨文化挑战。例如，中国的铁路企业中国中车（CRRC）在一个为期5年的教育项目上投入巨资，让高管们学习国际商业、法律、治理和金融。从本质上来说，这种教育的基本要求便是尊重不同国家人民的权利，更好地理解支撑公司利益相关者之间关系的价值观，及其在道德、社会和环境方面的企业责任。

4. 推动当地的教育发展

在“一带一路”的金融和技术前沿，对人才和创新的需求不可避免地吸引着中国的人才和技能。但是，这些人才和技能如何在“一带一路”沿线的地方社区中得到培养呢？目前还没有明确的计划。中国承诺为“一带一路”项目所提供的600亿元人民币资金，可以优先考虑用来支持在“一带一路”沿线最薄弱的地方制定长期策略性教育发展能力规划。可以设计教育项目来遏制发展中国家由于缺乏教育资源而造成的社会剥夺的恶性循环。

尽管中方谈到了教育合作，但没有证据

present moral hazards of selfishness beyond self-interest that are present in all of us and all along the Belt and Road. The fatal attractions of wealth and power have led government officials and business people to do bad things. The Chinese

resources are ever-present dangers. Governments and companies are increasingly under pressure to work out the principles of distributive justice, such that the “larger cake of cooperation” is shared to reduce inequality, protect workers and preserve

If the language of friendship is mounted on a narrow platform of investment and infrastructural connectivity then friendship is not an end but a means to achieve self-interested objectives which prioritise power, capital and influence.

transformation of the village of Khorgos in Kazakhstan to an inland shipping hub and free-trade zone highlights the ethical blowback of local level smuggling and high-profile corruption cases. Khorgos also illustrates the plight that can face workers in BRI projects as reported by Mauk (2019):

While new official jobs in Khorgos are lifting a lucky few out of poverty, it is far more common to find farmers and herders moonlighting as taxi drivers, security guards or smugglers, part of a precarious network of low-paid freelancers. Such work is susceptible by design to sudden changes in enforcement and depends on a constant influx of disposable workers. It seemed like a high cost for connecting the world.

In light of such stories, at the Belt and Road Symposium in August 2018, Xi gave explicit instruction to the Party to strengthen its moral leadership and oversight of Chinese companies operating overseas to ensure that their behaviour and practices reflected well on projects that are “worthy of praise”. BRI projects should “improve the global governance system” and bring forth a “community of shared destiny.” (Rolland, 2019).

3. Managing conflicting views of justice and cooperation

For the BRI to be “a road with high ethical standards” there will need to be just and trusted arbitration mechanisms alongside the gestures for harmony and peace. Strategic rivalries and the commercial exploitation of people and natural

natural resources and ecosystems. China plans to set up international courts in Shenzhen and Xi’an to resolve BRI commercial disputes. Whether such courts will be based on true independency is under question (Kuo & Kommenda, 2018).

In 2017 President Xi offered strong and measurable goals for projects supporting social and poverty alleviation in countries along the Belt and Road over a three-year period with assistance worth RMB 60 billion to developing countries and international organisations (Xi, 2017a). In 2018 Xi called for small-scale projects that responded to the immediate needs of local populations and not just the elites and for more people-to-people exchanges (Rolland, 2018).

Strategic rivalries all involve a degree of self-interest but the emphasis of the BRI message is “win-win” and friendship. The message is being tested as China’s major state-owned enterprises attempt to build relationships and navigate cross-cultural challenges before any deals are signed. For example, CRRC, China’s railway enterprise, has invested heavily in a five-year educational programme for senior executives to learn about international business, law, governance and finance. Intrinsic to this kind of education is the basic need to respect the rights of different peoples and to better understand the values that underpin a company’s stakeholder relations and its ethical, social and environmental corporate responsibilities.

4. Advancing local educational development

The demand for talent and innovation at the financial and technological frontiers of the

表明“一带一路”项目内存在推动教育与经济同步发展的教育资源计划。例如，2018年11月在北京举行的第二届“一带一路”教育对话会议中，所讨论的是让教育交流作为支持“一带一路”建设的手段，而不是让“一带一路”建设成为支持其他国家教育发展的手段。

5. 努力实现跨文化理解

尽管人们担心中国将控制一个国家的社会文化影响力，但许多中国企业，尤其是缺乏经验的企业，仍在苦苦适应当地的文化和政治（O'Meara, 2018）。经济交流需要伴随着社会和文化交流，以建立信任、相互理解和实现习近平的五项原则中所蕴含的和平的成果。中俄关系就是增进跨文化理解的一个例子。中国在俄罗斯开设了20多所孔子学院和孔子课堂。但跨文化关系是与经济关系紧密相连的。例如，因西方制裁俄罗斯，俄罗斯企业惨遭损失，中国便增加了对这些企业的债务融资。

正是在跨文化交流中，我们可以向16、17世纪耶稣会士的早期传教工作学习，他们遵循利玛窦和徐光启友谊的榜样，同儒家知识精英文人紧密结合，建立起同中国学者的精神对话。在友谊的语境中，他们向朝廷

道教的传统精神的鉴赏，提供了一种途径，使每个国家和文化的人们的思想和灵魂得以开放，从而造福人类。

要促进跨文化和跨宗教的交流，以实现公益，而不仅仅是制度化的单向交流，这既是挑战，也是机遇。

6. 努力实现跨境数据流动

梅尔策和洛夫洛克认为，政府限制跨境数据流动是为了：

- 保护或改善公民个人隐私
- 确保执法人员快速访问数据
- 保护或确保国家安全
- 促进经济增长或提高经济竞争力
- 平衡监管领域。（Meltzer and Lovelock, 2018: 5）

确保数据隐私是大家共同关心的问题，但跨境数据流动究竟在多大程度上能被阻止呢？外交关系委员会的亚当·西格尔表示，“网络空间将更少由美国主导，而更多地由中国主导”，中方很可能通过其贸易和投资政策，尤其是作为“一带一路”的重要部分，对全球互联网治理产生最大的影响（Segal, 2018）。

专业风险咨询公司Control Risks表示，对于与中方合作伙伴从事合资项目的中国境

如果友谊的语言建立在投资和基础设施互联互通的狭窄平台上，那么友谊就不是目的，而是达到以权力、资本和影响力为优先考虑的利己主义目标的手段了。

介绍了西方的科学、数学、制图学、天文学和视觉艺术。传教士们从儒家智慧中受到启发，也分享了他们自己的宝贵信仰。

“一带一路”沿线不同民族和宗教团体之间缺乏互相体谅的对话品质，因此“一带一路”的金融化就对中国和平合作的愿望构成威胁。如果友谊的语言建立在投资和基础设施互联互通的狭窄平台上，那么友谊就不是目的，而是达到以权力、资本和影响力为优先考虑的利己主义目标的手段了。

真正的合作将尊重文化和宗教差异，促进互惠互利，正如天主教和新教传教士与中国人民之间友谊的性质所表明的那样。利氏学社所做的工作传承了这一传统，他们相信宗教间的对话和对佛教、儒教、伊斯兰教和

外企业来说，2017年的《网络安全法》(CSL) 引起了对数据管理的深切关注。他们指出，中国共产党对网络内容进行了广泛控制，这些控制要求开放他们的IT系统：

对信息流动和传递信息的技术的限制越来越大，这促使外国跨国公司要么全面进入中国，要么重新评估它们在中国的整体运营。这意味着需要大量IT人员、运营和数据专家，需要采购国内技术、制定本地化IT安全政策，以及制定内容和危机管理计划（Kedl&Wilford, 2018）。

这些政策可能产生的影响是，“一带一路”进入北美、欧洲、澳大利亚和新西兰将受阻。但非洲和东亚“一带一路”沿线的其他国家对于数据和网络内容的控制并不那么敏

Belt and Road inevitably attracts Chinese talent and skills. But how might such talent and skills be nurtured along the local communities of the Belt and Road? No plan is clear. The promise of RMB 60 billion funding for BRI social projects could be prioritised to ensure support for long term strategic educational development capacity planning at the weakest points along the Belt and Road. Educational projects could be designed to stem the cycles of social deprivation caused by a lack of educational resources in developing countries.

Despite talk of educational cooperation by Beijing there is no evidence of an educational resource plan within the BRI to further educational advancement in parallel with economic advancement. For example, the Second Belt and Road Education Dialogue held in Beijing in November 2018 discussed educational exchanges as means of support for the BRI rather than the BRI becoming a means of support for educational advancement in other countries.

5. Managing cross-cultural understanding

Despite the fears that China will dominate a country's social and cultural influence, many Chinese companies, particularly inexperienced ones, struggle with local cultures and politics (O'Meara, 2018). Economic exchange needs to be accompanied by social and cultural exchange to build trust, mutual understanding and the peaceful outcomes enshrined in Xi's five principles. Sino-Russian relations are an example of improved cross-cultural understanding. China has opened over twenty Confucius Institutes and Confucius Classrooms in Russia. But the cross-cultural relationship is tied to the economic relationship. For example, China has increased its debt financing of Russian companies lost because of Western sanctions against Russia.

It is in cross-cultural understanding that we can learn from the early mission work of the Jesuits in the 16th and 17th centuries following the example of the friendship of Matteo Ricci and Paul Xu Guangqi who engaged with the Confucian intellectual elite literati to establish a spiritual dialogue with Chinese scholars. In the context of friendship, they introduced Western science,

mathematics, cartography, astronomy and the visual arts to the imperial court. The missionaries recognised the inspiration of Confucian wisdom as well as sharing the treasures of their own faith. Chinese aspirations for peaceful cooperation are threatened by financialisation of the road without a quality of empathetic dialogue between different people and religious groups who lie along the Belt and Road. If the language of friendship is mounted on a narrow platform of investment and infrastructural connectivity then friendship is not an end but a means to achieve self-interested objectives which prioritise power, capital and influence.

True collaboration will respect cultural and religious difference, promote reciprocity as shown by the nature of friendship between Catholic and Protestant missionaries and the Chinese. The work of the Ricci Institutes continues this tradition today believing that inter-religious dialogue and an appreciation of the spiritual traditions of Buddhism, Confucianism, Islam and Daoism offer the means to open up the minds and souls of people from every nation and culture to the betterment of humankind.

The challenge and the opportunity is to promote cross cultural and inter-religious encounters for the Common Good beyond institutionalised one-way communication.

6. Managing cross-border data flows

According to Meltzer and Lovelock, governments restrict cross-border data flows to:

- Protect or improve citizens' personal privacy
- Ensure rapid access to data by law enforcement officials.
- Protect or ensure national security
- Improve economic growth or economic competitiveness
- Level the regulatory playing field. (Meltzer and Lovelock, 2018, p. v)

Ensuring data privacy is a shared concern - but how far can cross-border data flows really be checked? According to Adam Segal of the Council on Foreign Relations, "cyberspace will be much less American and much more Chinese" and Beijing is likely to have its biggest impact on

感。全球企业普遍欢迎数字化的丝绸之路，它们认为，数据需要自由地跨境流动，以扩大规模和创造价值，并与需要本地数据存储的政府进行博弈。中国目前的数据本地化法律，将把中国推上此类博弈的风口浪尖。

结论

习近平关于“一带一路”的讲话内容指向共享经济和发展的利益，但同时要把道德领导力的原则作为综合共享价值主张的一部分。他认为，“一带一路”是一件积极的好事，特别是对那些“希望加快发展又希望保持自身独立性的国家和民族；为解决人类问题贡献了中国智慧和方案”（习，2017b）。从道德领导力和精神比较的角度来看，中国正力图分享他们丰富的智慧遗产。习近平显然希望避免强加中国化，这就需要东西方智慧资源的互动，以创造出一种道德领导力，使“一带一路”成为和平之路和不同文明之间的互联互通之路。



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global Internet governance through its trade and investment policies, especially as part of the BRI (Segal, 2018).

For companies from countries outside China who engage in joint-venture projects with Chinese partners the 2017 Cyber Security Law (CSL) is, according to the specialist risk consultancy Control Risks, causing deep concern for the management of data. They point to the extensive Party controls on network content that require opening up their IT systems:

The growing chokehold over information flows and the technology that delivers it is pushing foreign MNCs in China either to be 'all in' or to reevaluate their operations in China, as a whole. This means IT personnel, operations and data specialists, procuring domestic technology, and localising IT security policies, content and crisis management plans (Kedl and Wilford, 2018).

The likely impact of these policies is to prevent the BRI moving into North America, Europe, Australia and New Zealand. But other countries along the Belt and Road in Africa and East Asia are not as sensitised to the control of data and network content. Global businesses generally welcome the digital Silk Road recognising that data needs to flow freely across borders to scale and create value, and to fight against governments that require local data storage. China will be at the centre of such battles with its current data localisation laws.

CONCLUDING

Xi's speeches on the BRI point to sharing economic and developmental benefits but also of principles of moral leadership as part of an integrated shared value proposition. He argues that the BRI is a positive good, especially to those "countries who want to speed up their development while preserving their independence; and it offers Chinese wisdom and a Chinese approach to solving the problems facing mankind" (Xi, 2017b). From moral leadership and comparative spirituality perspectives China is attempting to share their rich wisdom heritage. Xi's apparent desire to avoid imposing Sinicisation needs to be matched by a reciprocity of engagement in

East-West wisdom resources to create the kind of moral leadership that could enable the BRI to be a road of peace and true connectivity across different civilisations.



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ATTRIBUTES OF MORAL LEADERSHIP: EIGHT ENCOUNTERS ALONG THE SILK ROAD

道德领导力的特质： 一带一路的“八次对话”

Roderick O'Brien 山显治

ABSTRACT

The exercise of moral leadership within the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is not merely a theoretical study. Rather, the exercise of moral leadership is something that happens, and thus can be described. What would good moral leadership look like? This paper examines the writing of eight personalities along the BRI to identify some of the attributes of moral leadership. The attributes identified here are reciprocity, good governance, transparency, ethical credibility, respect, integrity, humanity, and trust. The eight personalities come from a variety of occupations, and from Asia and Europe. This survey is limited, yet it provides a useful beginning for wider examination.



INTRODUCTION TO THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE (BRI)

At the end of 2013 Chinese President Xi Jinping announced one of China's most ambitious foreign policy and economic initiatives. He called for the building of a Silk Road Economic Belt and a 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, now referred to as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Analyst Peter Cai comments that

摘要

建设“一带一路”，践行道德领导力不应只停留在理论层面，事实恰恰相反，道德领导力的实践已经展开，且已经取得一定进展。卓越的道德领导力应该是什么样呢？本文通过分析八位来自“一带一路”沿线国家人物的相关看法，对道德领导力的特质进行了阐释，其中包括：互惠互利、良善治理、透明公开、诚实守信、互相尊重、公正正直、人道主义和值得信赖。这八位研究对象有的来自亚洲，有的来自欧洲，职业各不相同。本研究的样本数量尚不全面，但却可以为后续更全面的研究起到抛砖引玉的作用。



“一带一路”倡议

2013年末，中华人民共和国主席习近平提出“一带一路”倡议，这是中国最宏大的外交政策和经济举措之一，习主席呼吁共建丝绸之路经济带和21世纪海上丝绸之路，简称“一带一路”倡议。智库研究员蔡源认为，“一带一路”也许称得上现代历史上范围最大的发展计划之一（蔡，2017，

BRI is arguably one of the largest development plans in modern history (Cai, 2017, p.2). But BRI is not limited to infrastructure. It also encompasses cultural exchange and institutions, media, and educational projects (Xi, 2013), (Xinhua, 2015a), (Xinhua, 2015b).

The method of BRI is to create a series of bilateral relationships and projects. Nevertheless, the size of BRI has meant that there is already a need for multilateral structures, including the Asian International Investment Bank (AIIB).

A CHINESE INITIATIVE AND A MULTILATERAL RESPONSE

The BRI is an initiative by the Communist Party of China and the Chinese government. Most of the responses to this initiative comment on the Chinese position, but the attributes to which they refer should apply reciprocally. Thus if it is correct to call for transparency in China, then it is equally correct to call for transparency in Pakistan or Poland, in Singapore or Switzerland.

Also, while the BRI is comprised of a series of bilateral agreements, it takes on a multilateral dimension because of the need for co-operation by all the parties. The multilateral nature of the BRI may open up possibilities for renewed dialogue about universality. Some years ago, there was a debate about “Asian values”. There were supporters for a variety of positions: that there could be Asian values which were not universal, or that there were no universal values, or that each polity decided its own values and their implementation. The multilateral nature of BRI will renew discussion about universality.

While the emphasis of this paper is on the testimonies of individual participants, we can begin with a context given in paragraph 14 of the Communique of Leaders at the conclusion of the Belt and Road Forum held in Beijing in 2017.

14. We uphold the spirit of peace, cooperation, openness, transparency, inclusiveness, equality, mutual learning, mutual benefit and mutual respect by strengthening cooperation on the basis of extensive consultation and the rule of law, joint efforts, shared benefits and equal

opportunities for all. In this context we highlight the following principles guiding our cooperation, in accordance with our respective national laws and policies:

- a) Consultation on an equal footing...
 - b) Mutual benefit...
 - c) Harmony and inclusiveness...
 - d) Market-based operation...
 - e) Balance and sustainability...
- (Communique, 2017).

This paragraph suggests that values, principles, and attributes across the BRI are universal. However, the adoption or implementation of these values, principles, and attributes may prove to be contested, just as universal values have been contested in the past.

If it is correct to call for transparency in China, then it is equally correct to call for transparency in Pakistan or Poland, in Singapore or Switzerland.

The participants featured here include academic researchers, a diplomat, journalists, a politician, and the leader of an international non-governmental organisation. Their testimonies come from speeches at conferences, interviews with journalists, academic periodicals, and newspapers. Many of the sources cover a wide range of topics, but I have selected only one for each person.

Each brings their own experience to the encounter: Chinese author Xiao Yunru, for example, motored the old Silk Road from Chang’an (modern Xi’an) to Rome. He travelled 15,000 kilometres, and visited eight countries and thirty-one cities.

ATTRIBUTES OF MORAL LEADERSHIP

The Oxford English Dictionary defines an attribute as “a quality or a feature regarded as a characteristic or inherent part of someone or something.” This paper identifies attributes which

第2页)。不过，“一带一路”倡议并不局限于基础设施建设，还包括文化交流、机构、媒体和教育项目。（习，2013）（新华社，2015a），（新华社，2015b）

如何打造“一带一路”？答案是构建一系列的双边关系，开展多样的双边合作。不过，“一带一路”的规模之大，需要构建多边关系格局，例如亚洲基础设施投资银行。

中方倡议，多边回应

“一带一路”是中国共产党和中国政府提出的倡议，大多数国家在回应此事时都对中国在这件事情上的立场有所疑虑。不过，他们对中国提出的要求应该同样适用于其他所有国家。如果中国被要求做到透明公开，其他国家如巴基斯坦、波兰、新加坡、瑞士也应该做到透明公开。

另外，“一带一路”虽然是由一系列双边协议构成的，但由于合作共建离不开所有方面的合作支持，所以可以说“一带一路”又必须建立在多边基础上。“一带一路”的多边性质为普世性对话的重新开启开辟了新的可能。几年前曾经有过关于是否存在“亚洲价值观”的辩论，当时的人们观点不一：有人认为存在非普世的亚洲价值观，有人认为不存在普世价值观，还有人认为应该由各国决定自己的价值观以及如何践行。所以，“一带一路”的多边性无疑将引发针对普世性的重新讨论。

虽然本文的重点在于给出八位研究对象的不同意见，但为方便起见，我们不妨从2017年“一带一路”北京论坛闭幕时领导人公报第14段开始谈起。

我们将秉持和平合作、开放包容、互学互鉴、互利共赢、平等透明、相互尊重的精神，在共商、共建、共享的基础上，本着法治、机会均等原则加强合作。为此，我们根据各自国内法律和政策，强调以下合作原则：

- a) 平等协商
- b) 互利共赢
- c) 和谐包容
- d) 市场运作
- e) 平衡和可持续性（“一带一路”国际合作高峰论坛圆桌峰会联合公报，2017）

上面这段文字暗示了“一带一路”秉持的价值观、原则和特质是普世的。然而，正如普世价值曾饱受争议，践行这些原则、特质和价值观同样将面临巨大的争议。

本文的研究对象包括学者、记者、一名外交官、一名政治家和一家国际非政府组织的领袖。引用的文字来自他们在会议上的演讲，或接受记者、学术期刊、新闻报刊采访时的发言。他们的演讲或发言往往涉及不同的主题，不过在这篇文章里，我仅仅选择了某个人在某一主题上的发言内容。

如果中国被要求做到透明公开，其他国家如巴基斯坦、波兰、新加坡、瑞士也应该做到透明公开。

每位研究对象都曾提到自己的亲身经历，以中国作家肖云儒为例，他曾自驾15000公里从古丝绸之路的起点长安（现在的西安）到罗马，足迹遍布8个国家和31个城市。

道德领袖的特质

《牛津英语词典》对“特质”的定义是“某人或某一事物的特征或固有的品质”。本文对“一带一路”道德领导者的特征或内在品质进行阐释，采用的办法是利用谷歌搜索查找人们对“一带一路”的回应。搜索字词，如“一带一路”、“伦理道德”、“道德”以及参与国家的名字……每个查找结果都是一次“电子碰撞”或“对话”。在这篇文章里，我们挑选了八位来自不同国家或组织的发言人，这些国家或地区都受到“一带一路”倡议的直接影响。这八名发言人可以被认为与笔者进行了“对话”，每个人都针对“一带一路”所需的道德领袖的特质表达了自己的观点。

阿布杜卡迪尔·埃明·约南（土耳其）：互惠互利

2017年11月，土耳其报纸《每日沙巴》发表了一则对土耳其驻华大使阿布杜卡迪尔·埃明·约南的采访（约南，2017）。采访的一个主题是有关中土两国互相了解彼此

can be regarded as characteristic or inherent for moral leaders who lead and implement the BRI. The method used was to search for a variety of responses to the BRI, using the Google search engine. Search words were “One Belt One Road” “Belt and Road” “ethics” “morality” and the names of countries... Each response is an electronic “encounter” or meeting with the originator. For the purpose of this article, eight commentators were selected from eight countries or organisations directly affected by the BRI. The commentators might be regarded as electronic “encounters” or meetings with the originator, each of whom express an attribute of moral leadership expected on the architects of BRI projects.

ABDULKADIR EMIN ÖNEN (TURKEY):
RECIPROCITY

In November 2017, the Turkish newspaper *Daily Sabah* published an interview with Turkey’s new Ambassador to China Abdulkadir Emin Önen (Önen, 2017). One of the topics was for Chinese and Turks to learn about each other’s country and its culture. Ambassador Önen said:

Our most significant handicap is that we learn Chinese culture from foreign sources ... There are many fields that the two countries share similarities, ranging from family structure to cultural life.

In the short-term, our priority is to improve economic relations, trade and Chinese foreign direct investments in Turkey. We are also preparing many projects that will increase cooperation in culture and education which will bring to the countries closer [sic]. (Önen, 2017)

Learning about each other and learning directly rather than through the mediation of foreign sources requires an attribute of reciprocity. BRI includes many nations, and if their relationships are truly reciprocal, then the sixty nations involved will each be enriched.

Ambassador Önen has referred to educational exchange. This is already taking place in at least one direction, as students from the Belt and Road countries find their way to China, and Chinese universities establish campuses abroad

(Liu and Sukumaran, 2017). But this is only one step in the multiple reciprocities that facilitates introducing China to Turkey and vice versa.

MIMI ZOU (HONG KONG): GOOD GOVERNANCE

Professor Mimi Zou wrote as an academic from the Chinese University of Hong Kong, with expertise in labour law:

A critical issue arises as to the ways in which the world’s largest industrialising economy, in pursuing a new industrial development strategy that will broaden its role in global markets and production networks in addition to its potential geopolitical influence, may shape the governance of international labour standards. Could China (including its public and private actors) become a new standard setter? Will Chinese firms drive a “race to the bottom” along the Belt and Road, especially in those countries with “weak governance zones”? (Zou, 2016)

Professor Zou identifies the International Labour Organisation as the key creator of international standards. Then, surveying the experience of Chinese workers at home and workers (both Chinese and local) employed by Chinese multinational enterprises in other countries, Professor Zou provides examples of the low level of Chinese standards, especially in countries with “weak governance zones”.

There is no doubt that China aspires to set standards. While China may achieve success in exporting its “hardware” technical standards, Professor Zou’s work draws our attention to how China may shape standards in “software” fields such as labour relations. These standards may encourage good governance, or they may produce what Professor Zou has called “a race to the bottom”.

Indeed, the sheer size and diversity of the BRI give it the potential to be a standard-setter in a wide variety of fields. Already there are new institutions such as the Asian International Investment Bank, providing an alternative to the existing financing structures. While the Asian International Investment Bank is a Chinese

的国家和文化，约南大使说道：

对我们来说，最大的障碍在于我们一直是从西方国家了解中国文化……从家庭结构到文化生活，我们和中国在很多领域都有相似之处。

短期来看，我们的首要任务是改善中土两国的经济贸易关系，扩大中国对土耳其的直接投资。与此同时，我们还筹备了丰富多样的文化及教育合作项目，以拉近两国关系[照原文]（约南，2017年）。

互相学习以及不依赖外国渠道进行直接学习要求双方秉持互惠互利的原则。“一带一路”倡议囊括了许多国家，如果真正做到互惠互利，那么它覆盖的60个国家每一个国家都将从中获益。

约南大使还提到了教育交流。随着越来越多的“一带一路”沿线国家学生到中国留学，教育交流至少已经在一个方面展开。另外，中国大学陆续在国外设立了校区（刘，苏库玛兰，2017）。不过，这仅仅只是中土两国拉近彼此距离的众多互惠政策中的一小步。

邹密密（香港）：良善治理

中国香港中文大学教授邹密密是劳动法方面的专家，她曾写道：

中国，世界上最大的正在进行工业化的经济体，正在寻求一项新的工业发展战略，以增强其在全球市场和生产网络的地位，扩大潜在的地缘政治影响力。这或许会改变国际劳工标准的执行，同时也提出了一个关键问题。中国（包括其公共或私营经济）是否将变成新的标准制定者？中国公司是否将在“一带一路”上掀起“逐底竞争”的血雨腥风，尤其对那些地区治理能力较为薄弱的国家？（邹，2016）

邹教授认为国际劳工组织是国际标准的重要决策者。通过调查中国国内工人以及中国跨国企业在他国雇工（来自中国及当地的工人）的生产现状，邹认为中国劳工标准水平较低，在地区治理较为薄弱的国家情况尤其甚。

毋庸置疑的是，中国渴望成为标准制定者。中国或许在出口“硬件”技术标准方面

取得了一些成就，但邹教授的研究将我们的注意力定格到中国如何塑造“软件”技术标准如劳资关系方面。这些标准也许可以有助于良善治理，也许会造成邹教授所说的“逐底竞争”。

事实上，“一带一路”规模之庞大，覆盖面之多样化，赋予了成为诸多领域标准制定者的可能。例如，已经有一些新的组织，如亚洲基础设施投资银行，可以为现有的融资体系提供新的替代方案；尽管亚洲基础设施投资银行是由中国发起，但已经吸引了广泛的国际支持和关注。

纳尔吉斯·卡森诺瓦（哈萨克斯坦）：透明公开

正是在哈萨克斯坦，习近平总书记提出“一带一路”倡议，虽然“一带一路”的具体细节却是在后来逐步公开的。阿拉木图哈萨克斯坦管理经济战略研究院的纳尔吉斯·卡森诺瓦教授谈到了政府间合作计划的一些内容，同时指出哈萨克斯坦政府对与中方达成一致的部分项目细节尚未公开。她补充道：

如果我们想要从“一带一路”中获益，我们就必须采取不同的办法。其一就是提高决策的透明度和包容性。项目的基本信息应当面向公众公开，议会应该召开公众听证会，积极听取专家团体的意见（卡森诺瓦，2018年）。

彼得·张·蒂亚姆（马来西亚）：伦理诚信

在张教授发表有关“一带一路”的文章之时，马来西亚正在进行政府改革，新任首相马哈蒂尔·莫哈迈德拟重新协商前首相纳吉布·拉扎克与中方达成的多个协议（张，2018）。张教授认为包括马来西亚在内的一些国家，其公民社会已经发展到了一定高度，把经济关系作为唯一优先的考虑已经不再行得通。张教授表示考虑到马来西亚等国家的社会现状，中国在与马来西亚或“一带一路”沿线其他国家进行交往时，应该重视伦理道德这一方面。张教授写道：

展望未来，北京必须调整当前以经济为中心的战略决策，对公民自由问题加大关注力度，用“更洁净”的软实

project, it has attracted significant international support and diverse interest.

NARGIS KASSENOVA (KAZAKHSTAN):
TRANSPARENCY

It was in Kazakhstan that Chinese leader Xi Jinping announced BRI, but there the details of BRI are only gradually being disclosed. Professor Nargis Kassenova of KIMEP University in Almaty, Kazakhstan, reviews some examples of the projects planned at the inter-governmental level, but also notes that the Kazakhstan government has yet to release the details of some projects already agreed upon with Chinese parties. She adds this comment:

If we want to benefit from the BRI projects, we need to approach it differently. One measure would be to increase transparency and inclusivity of decision-making. Basic information on projects should be available to the public. There is a need for public hearings in the parliament and consultation with the expert community (Kassenova, 2018).

PETER CHANG THIAM CHAI (MALAYSIA):
ETHICAL CREDIBILITY

Dr Chang of the University of Malaya writes in the context of Malaysia's recent change of government, and re-negotiation by incoming Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad of deals made with China by former leader Najib Razak (Chang, 2018). He argues that some countries, including Malaysia, have reached a level of development of civil society in which giving exclusive priority to economic relations is no longer possible. Dr Chang says that these societal changes require moral changes in China's way of dealing with Malaysia, and with other countries along the BRI. Dr Chang writes:

Moving forward, Beijing has to recalibrate its economic-centric approach with greater care for issues pertaining to civil liberties and restore its lost credibility with "cleaner" soft power.... Indeed, the People's Republic has enormous potential

to positively affect the world. But Beijing must set in place stronger moral oversight"

Dr Chang concludes by linking moral leadership with China's own ancient ethical tradition:

Apart from averting future ethical missteps, this enforcement will move modern China close in step with the much touted, idealized Confucian exemplary leadership, namely, "A ruler who governs virtuously is like the north star around which all other stars revolve."

ABDUR REHMAN SHAH (PAKISTAN): RESPECT

Pakistan is a key country for the BRI, as this initiative now includes the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Work on the Corridor is advancing and provides observers with early indications how the whole initiative might take shape. Researcher Abdur Rehman Shah of the Centre for Research and Security Studies in Islamabad has written not only of the hopes for CPEC, but also of the limitations (Shah, 2018). For Shah, one of the potential areas of difficulty comes from the structural differences between the Chinese and Pakistani polities. Shah writes:

As a democratically elected institution, the government of Pakistan is required to share the details of deals signed with the Chinese counterparts related to the CPEC in a transparent manner. However, the factor of transparency is clearly missing from this whole affair.

Incentives which favour Chinese stakeholders may be hidden in this opacity.

The structural differences in polities between Pakistan and China are not the only issue for Researcher Shah. He is concerned about the impact of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor on local or regional subversion, and the effect on national security policies. Shah is also concerned about other limitations which might prevent BRI from being mired in structural and economic difficulties. He concludes:

Making BRI a truly win-win and sustainable arrangement, therefore,

力重塑自己丢失的政治信誉……实际上，中国有相当大的潜力对整个世界产生积极影响。但这要求北京加强道德监管力度……

最后，张教授将道德领导力与古老的中国道德传统联系起来：

未来，中国必须避免伦理道德方面的失误。这样才能在践行道德领导力的同时，发挥多方认可、理想主义的儒家模范领导作用，即，“为政以德，譬如北辰，居其所而众星共之”

阿卜杜勒·拉赫曼·沙阿（巴基斯坦）：互相尊重

巴基斯坦是“一带一路”经济带上的重要一环，因为“一带一路”倡议覆盖了中巴经济走廊的建设。中巴经济走廊的建设正在进行中，作为“一带一路”的旗舰项目，它的建设也可以帮助我们一览“一带一路”倡议究竟是如何成型的。伊斯兰堡研究与安全中心研究员阿卜杜勒·拉赫曼·沙阿不仅展望了中巴经济走廊的美好前景，还阐明了中巴经济走廊可能面临的困难（沙阿，2018年）。对沙阿来说，困难之一来自于中国和巴基斯坦政体之间的结构差异。他写到：

作为民主选举的政府，巴基斯坦政府应将其与中方签署的中巴经济走廊协议的相关细节予以公开。然而，在这件事上，巴基斯坦政府并没有做到透明公开，于中方有利的激励政策公众尚不知情。

沙阿的关注点不仅仅是中巴政体的结构差异。他还担心中巴经济走廊是否会对当地或地区造成颠覆性影响，以及对国家安全政策的影响。针对其他一些可能会影响“一带一路”的经济或结构问题，沙阿抱有同样的忧虑。他总结道：

因此，要使“一带一路”达成真正意义上的双赢和可持续，就必须采取一些必要的预防措施。经济贸易的透明公开，巨额资金投入对地方经济、组织的潜在影响（包括积极与消极影响）、遵守“与政府治理相关的限制性条件”（即便是最低程度的遵守），这些都是中国在推行“一带一路”倡议时必须考虑的先决条件。互相尊重可以使巴基斯坦新政府更放心地承

担起自己的责任。

肖云儒（中国）：公正正直

肖云儒是一名学者兼文化评论者，来自古丝绸之路沿线的西安。他强调道德诚信在构建“一带一路”过程中的重要性（肖，2015）。他认为“一带一路”不仅对中国的“硬实力”提出了考验，而且对中国的文化和精神“软实力”提出了挑战。“一带一路”倡议对中国政府、中国企业及中国人民的道德水平提出了考验。

我们不能只要求中国及中国人民践行道德领导力，沿线各国的个人及组织都应该满足这些要求。

肖教授认为道德信誉在很多领域都至关重要。他再三强调质量信誉的重要性，并指出假冒伪劣、表里不一是目光短浅的行为，会直接造成信誉丧失。他还写道，由于“一带一路”背后可能有诸多风险，所以必须建立在互相信赖、互相理解的基础上。信任也是支撑合同法律关系的基础。从市场运作方面看，仅有良好的意愿远远不够，必须签订具有法律约束力的合约，且双方秉持真诚可靠的态度自觉遵守。

肖教授把诚信和法律制度结合起来。他总结说，读者朋友不仅需要培养诚信的商业精神，而且要把诚信和遵纪守法、诚信缔约结合起来，这样于己于国都大有裨益。

彼得·毛雷尔（瑞士）：人道主义

2017年5月，由中国政府组织的“一带一路”高峰论坛在京召开。此次论坛包括六场平行主题会议：（一）政策沟通、（二）加快设施联通、（三）推进贸易畅通、（四）促进资金融通、（五）增进民心相通、（六）智库交流。红十字会和红新月运动正在包括中国在内的“一带一路”国家如火如荼地展开。中国政府邀请了红十字国际委员会主席彼得·毛雷尔出席论坛，毛雷尔主席希望“一带一路”构想增加人道主义方面的内容，他表示

requires certain precautionary measures to be adopted. Transparency in economic dealings, concern for the impacts (both positive and negative) of massive funding on local economies and institutions and compliance with ‘governance-related conditionalities’ even if at minimal level are some of the essential prerequisites that China should consider while pursuing BRI project.

Mutual respect for the actual situation of all parties would make the task of Pakistan’s incoming government more secure.

XIAO YUNRU (CHINA): INTEGRITY

Author and cultural commentator Xiao Yunru writes from Xi’an city, along the ancient Silk Road. He stresses the moral importance of integrity in constructing the BRI (Xiao, 2015). Professor Xiao writes that the BRI will not only be a test of Chinese “hard power”, but also a test of China’s “soft power” of culture and spirit. The BRI will test the moral level of the Chinese government, of Chinese enterprises, and of the whole people.

For Professor Xiao, this moral credibility will be evident in many fields. He stresses credibility in quality and argues that a veneer of integrity or sub-standard production will expose short-sighted behaviour, bringing only loss of trust. Professor Xiao writes that, because BRI incorporates many risks, it must be based on mutual trust and understanding. Trust also underpins the legal relationship of contract. For the market to operate, good will is not sufficient. There must be legally binding contracts which the parties will implement sincerely and credibly.

Professor Xiao links integrity with the legal system. He concludes that his readers need to not only develop integrity as a commercial spirit, but also link it with the use of laws and regulations and contracting with integrity, to the profit of both the state and individuals.

PETER MAURER (SWITZERLAND): HUMANITY

In May 2017, the Chinese government

hosted a Belt and Road Forum in Beijing. The Forum included six thematic sessions held in parallel: [i] policy communication, [ii] connectivity of infrastructure, [iii] trade facilitation, [iv] financial cooperation mechanisms, [v] people-to-people exchange, and [vi] think-tank communication. The Red Cross and Red Crescent movement is well established in the BRI countries, including

We should expect moral leadership not only from China and Chinese people, but also from individuals and institutions in all of the BRI countries.

China. The Chinese government invited Dr Peter Maurer, President of the International Committee of the Red Cross, and Dr Maurer pleaded for a humanitarian dimension to the BRI. He said that he was “deeply convinced this initiative should add a humanitarian dimension, which will be an important building-block to deliver on the SDGs [Sustainable Development Goals]” (Maurer, 2017). Dr Maurer was responding to the emphasis on economics at the Forum, thus linking the Red Cross’ work in humanitarian relief with the overall goals of the BRI.

CHAN CHUN SING (SINGAPORE): TRUST

Chan Chun Sing is a politician in Singapore, and a senior minister in the Singapore government as Minister of Trade and Industry. Minister Chan attended the Davos Forum in January 2018. In the course of a panel discussion, Minister Chan suggested that BRI gave the Chinese the opportunity to “win the trust and confidence of the world” by lifting their focus from short and medium-term benefit to long-term benefit for all the participants (Chan, 2018). Minister Chan switched to Chinese to use the term 以德服人 (serving the people through morality) to emphasise that winning the trust and confidence of the world is a form of service,

自己“一直深信‘一带一路’应该增加人道主义的内容，这将成为实现‘可持续发展战略’的重要基石”（毛雷尔，2017）。这是他对论坛把经济作为重心的回应，他的发言将红十字会在人道主义救援方面的工作与“一带一路”的总体目标结合了起来。

陈振声（新加坡）：值得信赖

陈振声，新加坡政治家、新加坡贸易与工业部部长。陈部长在参加2018年1月召开的达沃斯论坛时，在小组会谈中提到，“一带一路”倡议使所有参与国家的关注点从中短期利益转至长期利益，这给了中国“赢得世界的信任及信心”的机会（陈，2018）。陈借用汉语“以德服人”（以良好的德行服务民众）强调赢得世界的信任及信心是一种以道德服务他人的方式。

陈教授借用孟子的这句“以德服人”，意为“以良好的德行服务民众”，揭示了将传统价值观融入现代伦理道德的重要性。现代中国仍然信奉传统的伦理道德，并将传统伦理道德纳入了社会主义道德的范畴。

对上文的总结

从“一带一路”沿线有关道德领导力的“对话”中，我们能学到什么呢？简单地说，我们明确了道德领导力究竟有哪些特质：互惠互利（约南）、良善治理（邹）、透明公开（卡森诺瓦）、诚实守信（张）、公正正直（肖）、互相尊重（沙阿）、人道主义（毛雷尔）和值得信赖（陈）。进一步的研究还可以揭示道德领导力的其它特质。这些特质不只局限在道德理论层面，同样也是开展实践的起点。更重要的是，这些特质既现代又传统。有些特质，如信赖和诚实，亚里士多德和孔子都非常重视。其他的特质似乎更现代，透明公开是开放社会的产物，在这种社会，社会参与度高。尽管透明公开更具现代性，但其根源也是来自于传统道德概念，如坦率和诚实。

不对称关系

针对上面得出的八种特质，有一个重要前提不能忘，即不对称关系。“一带一路”沿线国家的关系并不对称，中国面积最大，

力量最强，尽管除中国以外的许多国家之间的关系不对等状况并不明显。举两个例子，中国通过贷款和捐赠对其他国家进行资金支持。考虑到受益国家的财政实力，来自中国的单笔贷款数目非常庞大。沙阿提到，在中巴经济走廊建设的过程中，中方提供的数十亿美元的投资使“巴基斯坦相关机构和国家财政背负风险”（沙阿，2018，第384页）。在劳工关系方面，邹教授认为中方投资力量削弱了受益国执行国际劳工标准的能力（邹，2016，第19页）。

处理这种不对称关系需要考虑道德因素：当关系不对等时，尊重、互惠是很难达成的。道德领袖有责任推动互相尊重及互惠互利，为各方谋求利益。

结论

除了上文的总结，我们还要考虑关系不对称的问题。作为“一带一路”倡议的发起国，中国已经在发挥自己的领袖作用，这也是为什么上面大多数发言都是针对中国的。但是，“一带一路”倡议不仅包括一系列双边关系，更是多边的。我们不能只要求中国及中国人民践行道德领导力，沿线各国的个人及组织都应该满足这些要求。更何况，当双方关系不对等时，道德领导力的践行也会面临很多困难。力量更大的一方，很可能以压倒性优势压制力量较小的国家，即便不是有意为之。

针对道德领导力的思考不应只局限在道德理论层面。对道德领导力究竟如何践行心怀期待，这是合情合理的。上面提到的那些特质仅仅是道德领导力研究的开始。与“一带一路”沿线国家的人民对话，探究他们眼里的道德领导力特质，这或许只是理论层面的努力，但对“一带一路”覆盖的数十亿人口来说，无疑具有重要的实践意义。



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Translated by 翻译: Liang Yang 梁阳

carried out according to morality.

Quoting a traditional saying – the expression translated as “serving the people through morality” comes from Mencius – indicates the importance of incorporating traditional values in modern morality. Modern China is still coming to terms with its ethical traditions, and their relationship with socialist ethics.

AN INTERIM CONCLUSION

What do we learn about the attributes of moral leadership along the BRI? At the simplest level, we can list the attributes that we have observed: Reciprocity (Önen), Good Governance (Zou), Ethical Credibility (Chang), Transparency (Kassenova), Integrity (Xiao), Respect (Shah), Humanity (Maurer), and Trust (Chan). Further research may identify other attributes of moral leadership. These attributes are not simply to be found in moral theory, but are also the beginning of a practical description. Moreover, these attributes are both contemporary and traditional. Some attributes, such as trust, and honesty are found in Aristotle and Confucius. But other attributes seem more modern: transparency is an attribute which has grown in more open societies, with greater social participation. Perhaps while transparency seems to be a modern attribute, its roots are evident in older concepts such as frankness and honesty.

ASYMMETRY IN RELATIONSHIPS

One important context must be added to all the individual attributes listed above: asymmetry. In the BRI relationships between the parties may not be symmetrical. China is larger and more powerful than its other partners, although smaller partners may be more symmetrical in relationships with each other. Two examples will make this clear. China is providing finance, through loans and grants. A single loan from China may be overwhelming, given the financial capacity of a recipient nation. Researcher Shah has noted that the billions of dollars of investment under CPEC carry “the risk of straining Pakistan’s

institutions and economy” (Shah, 2018, p. 384). In labour relations, Professor Zou has pointed to the problem of China’s investment power compromising the ability of small recipient countries to implement ILO labour standards (Zou, 2016, p.19).

Handling this asymmetry in relationships has a moral dimension: attributes such as respect and reciprocity may be more difficult to implement in an asymmetrical relationship. Moral leadership carries a responsibility for a very high degree of respect and integrity to enable a positive outcome for all parties.

CONCLUSION

We can incorporate here the interim conclusions listed above, but we must add the dimension of asymmetry. Because China has initiated the BRI projects, it has already undertaken a type of leadership. Thus most of the responses listed above were directed to China. But BRI is not only a series of bilateral projects, it also is multilateral. We should expect moral leadership not only from China and Chinese people, but also from individuals and institutions in all of the BRI countries. Also, moral leadership faces particular difficulties when the relationship is not symmetrical. The larger party, even without intending to, might overwhelm the smaller parties.

Thinking about moral leadership is not limited to moral theory. We may legitimately have expectations of what moral leadership might be in practice. The attributes listed here are a beginning for a description. Encountering local people along the Belt and Road and searching in their responses for the attributes of moral leadership may have a theoretical dimension, but it is primarily practical for the large proportion of humanity within its ambit.



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POLICE COOPERATION AND THE FIGHT AGAINST CROSS-BORDER CRIME ALONG BELT AND ROAD COUNTRIES: THE EMERGENCE AND PROLIFERATION OF TELECOMMUNICATION FRAUD IN GREATER CHINA

“一带一路”沿线国家警方联手打击跨境犯罪： 大中华区电信诈骗案件的出现与蔓延

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ABSTRACT

Instances of telecommunication fraud in the region of Greater China – the Peoples Republic of China (PRC), Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan – have increased since 2015. Some criminal elements involved in telecommunication fraud have been operating in Belt and Road countries outside either the PRC or Taiwan. The governments of Greater China have been cooperating to combat telecommunication fraud. This paper examines the pattern of telecommunication fraud and addresses the issue of how the governments of China and Taiwan have been tackling it in cooperation with the countries involved in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).



INTRODUCTION

The BRI has brought about an unprecedented degree of human interaction across national boundaries; nevertheless, a challenge to the BRI is the spread of cross-border criminal activities. Cross-border crimes can be seen as a result of the liberalisation of border control; they are exacerbated by the greediness of criminal organisations and, to some extent, bureaucratic

摘要

自2015年以来，大中华地区（包括中国大陆、香港特区、澳门特区和台湾地区）的电信诈骗案件有所增加。一些电信诈骗涉及的犯罪活动开始出现在中国大陆和台湾地区以外的“一带一路”国家。大中华地区政府一直致力于合作打击电信诈骗。本文探讨了电信诈骗的模式，以及中国政府和台湾当局如何与其他参与“一带一路”倡议的国家携手解决这一问题。



简介

“一带一路”倡议将跨境活动提升至空前水平，而与此同时，跨境犯罪活动也有所增加，日益成为该倡议面对的一大挑战。跨境犯罪可以看作是边境管制自由化的结果，而犯罪组织的贪婪和执法过程存在的官僚腐败现象在某种程度上也加剧了跨境犯罪（Lo, 2009年）。本文将探讨警方在打击跨境犯罪方面的合作如何在参

corruption in law enforcement (Lo, 2009). This paper will explore how police cooperation in the combat against cross-border crime has been playing a significant role in the development and prospects of countries participating in the BRI. Apart from utilising the BRI as a platform to strengthen economic and diplomatic relations with various countries in the world, the PRC also hopes to consolidate security relations with them (Brown, 2018, p. 215). Traditionally, China has cooperated with many countries along the BRI to fight against various types of crimes, such as smuggling, drug trafficking and terrorism. In recent years, the joint efforts made by China and many other countries to combat telecommunication fraud have become more urgent with the rising popularity of the internet. This digital aspect is becoming a hallmark of cross-border crime control between China and many BRI countries. With the increased cooperation between the Chinese police and their counterparts of various countries, the prospects for the BRI in consolidating multilateral trade and cultural-social as well as economic linkages remain optimistic. Efforts at fighting cross-border telecommunication fraud include intelligence gathering and sharing among law-enforcement agencies, reports from the mass media, and the vigilance of the citizens who are the victims of such crimes. The persistence of these efforts can and will contribute to the success of the BRI.

THE RISE OF TELECOMMUNICATION FRAUD IN GREATER CHINA

Telecommunication fraud recently has surged in the region of Greater China. From 2011 to April 2015, police in China and their Taiwanese counterparts actually arrested 7,700 Chinese people from both places, with approximately 4,600 of the 7,700 arrested coming from Taiwan. In May 2015, for instance, 32 Taiwanese criminal suspects who had made calls from a Malaysia-based telecommunication fraud syndicate were arrested by the Malaysian authorities. But the Taiwanese were handed back to the law-enforcement authorities of the PRC rather than to the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan.

Some Taiwan people argued that the Taiwanese should be sent back to the island republic rather than to the Mainland. However, the PRC police contended that since most of the victims were Mainlanders, and 50 percent of the losses were due to Taiwanese-led syndicates, those detained should face trial in the PRC.

In another case, in November 2015, the PRC police cooperated with their counterparts in Indonesia, Hong Kong and Taiwan to arrange the return of 254 Mainland Chinese criminal suspects involved in a huge cross-border telecommunication fraud syndicate (Mai, 2015). Ninety people in Guangdong province were arrested, including seven Taiwanese. Working from bases in Indonesia and the Philippines, they cheated citizens of Hong Kong and Taiwan by making calls to the Chinese in both places, pretending that they were PRC police officers

Efforts at fighting cross-border telecommunication fraud include intelligence gathering and sharing among law-enforcement agencies, reports from the mass media, and the vigilance of the citizens who are the victims of such crimes.

and claiming that the victims had committed criminal offences, as a pretext for demanding monetary compensation. The money stolen by the Taiwanese syndicate went to Taiwan-based bank accounts. In March 2016, PRC police uncovered another extortion plot in which a 50-year-old man had lost RMB 2.7 billion, through a telephone fraud in which scammers falsely accused him of laundering dirty money for which they held an arrest warrant against him. His funds also found their way to a Taiwanese account.

These are typical of the numerous examples of cross-border telecommunication fraud. Several characteristics are prominent. First and foremost, the criminals often operate from

与“一带一路”倡议国家的发展和前景中发挥重要作用。除了将“一带一路”倡议作为加强与世界各国经济外交关系的平台外，中国还希望巩固与世界各国的安全关系（Brown, 2018:215）。

传统上，中国一直与“一带一路”沿线的多个国家合作打击走私、贩毒和恐怖主义等各种犯罪活动。近年来，随着互联网的日益普及，中国和其他国家急需联手合作打击电信诈骗。这一数字方面的合作正在成为中国与许多“一带一路”国家之间控制跨境犯罪的手段标志。随着中国警方与各国同行间合作的加强，“一带一路”倡议巩固多边贸易和文化社会以及经济联系的前景依然乐观。打击跨境电信诈骗的行动包括执法机构之间的情报收集和共享、大众媒体的报道以及作为此类犯罪活动受害者的公民警惕性的提高。在这些方面的持续努力有助于“一带一路”倡议取得成功。

大中华区电信诈骗案件数量上升

电信诈骗案件的数量近年来在大中华地区呈现上升态势。2011年到2015年4月间，海峡两岸的警察共逮捕了相关犯罪嫌疑人7700人，其中4600人来自台湾。例如，2015年5月，马来西亚当局逮捕了32名在马来西亚参与电信诈骗集团活动，进行电话欺诈的台湾犯罪嫌疑人，并将这些犯罪嫌疑人交还给中华人民共和国执法部门，而不是台湾当局。一些台湾人认为台湾人应该被送回台湾而不是中国大陆，但中华人民共和国警方认为，由于大多数受害者是大陆公民，而且50%的损失是由台湾犯罪嫌疑人领导的诈骗集团所致，被拘留者应在中国大陆接受审判。

在另一起案件中，2015年11月，中国大陆警方与印度尼西亚、香港和台湾警方合作，遣返了大型跨境电信诈骗集团的254名中国大陆涉案犯罪嫌疑人（Mai, 2015）。90人在广东省被捕，其中包括7名台湾人。他们在印度尼西亚和菲律宾的基地给香港和台湾三地的中国人打电话，谎称自己是中国警方，并声称受害者犯有刑事罪，需要缴纳罚金。这些台湾诈骗集团盗取的资金流向了台湾的银行账户。2016年3月，中华人民共和国警方通过电话诈骗案发现了另一起敲诈勒索阴谋，诈骗嫌疑人以受害人参与洗钱活动需要将其逮捕为名，骗取了该名50岁男子共计

27亿元人民币，而这笔资金也流到了台湾账户。

这些典型的跨境电信诈骗案件存在几个突出特点。首先，犯罪分子经常在中国大陆和台湾地区以外的基地开展犯罪活动，因此两地的执法部门都无法轻易逮捕他们。第二，台湾犯罪嫌疑人被捕时，中国政府通常要求他们与中国大陆犯罪嫌疑人一起送回中国大陆接受审判，因为电信诈骗案的受害者主要来自大陆。虽然大多数第三方已将大陆和台湾地区的所有犯罪嫌疑人送回中国大陆，但台湾当局自然希望将台湾嫌疑人直接送往台湾。

打击跨境电信诈骗的行动包括执法机构之间的情报收集和共享、大众媒体的报道以及作为此类犯罪活动受害者的公民警惕性的提高。

2016年8月，肯尼亚法院宣布五名台湾电信诈骗犯罪嫌疑人无罪，但将其遣返回中国大陆，招致台湾“外交部”投诉（苹果日报，2016：A19）。台湾当局还要求大陆有关部门按照2009年签订的双方关于跨境犯罪嫌疑人监护权的协议，报告五名台湾人的人身安全。对此，大陆相关部门给予驳回，并表示蔡英文任期内的新台湾当局应采取更多措施恢复双方的沟通渠道。

台湾和中国大陆的反应

尽管中国政府 and 台湾当局之间在如何处理台湾人被第三国逮捕的问题上关系仍然紧张，但双方最近都采取了强有力的措施来应对跨境犯罪活动。2016年11月，台湾立法院修订了“刑法”（中华民国刑法，2018年）第5条，对因参与跨境电信诈骗犯罪的台湾公民加大了法律处罚力度。根据该法律，被判犯有严重罪行的犯罪嫌疑人可最长被判处20年监禁。第5条还增加了“跨境犯罪欺诈”一词，授权司法当局不仅要对其施加更严厉的处罚，而且还对这些犯罪嫌疑人的管理行使管辖权。然而，授权司法当局拥有管辖权是一回事，中华人民共和国政府和第三国是否

bases outside the PRC and Taiwan so that law-enforcement authorities in both places cannot arrest them easily. Second, when the Taiwanese suspects are arrested, the PRC government often requests that they, along with Mainland Chinese criminal suspects, should be sent back to the PRC for trial because the victims of telecommunication fraud are mainly from the PRC. While most third countries have sent back all the criminal suspects to the PRC, including both Mainland and Taiwan Chinese, the Taiwan authorities naturally hope that Taiwanese suspects should be sent directly to Taiwan.

In August 2016, five Taiwanese criminal suspects were declared by a Kenya court not guilty of telecommunication fraud, but surprisingly they were later sent back to Mainland China, leading to a complaint from the Taiwan foreign ministry (*Apple Daily*, 2016: A19). The Taiwan government also asked its PRC counterpart to report on the personal safety of the five Taiwanese in accordance with the 2009 agreement between the PRC and ROC governing the custody of cross-border criminal suspects. Yet, in response to Taiwan's concern, PRC authorities dismissed the request, contending that the new Taiwan government under the presidency of Tsai Ing-wen should do more to resume the communication channels between the two sides.

RESPONSES FROM TAIWAN AND THE PRC

Despite the sour relations reflecting renewed tensions between the PRC and the Taiwan governments on how to handle Taiwanese people being arrested by a third country, both governments have recently taken strong measures to deal with cross-border criminal activities. In November 2016, the Taiwan Legislative Yuan revised Article 5 of the Criminal Law (*Criminal Code of the Republic of China*, 2018), adding more legal penalties for Taiwanese citizens who commit crime through their participation in cross-border telecommunication fraud. Those people convicted of serious offenses under this law can be imprisoned for 20 years maximum. The term "cross-border criminal fraud" was also added to Article 5, authorising the judicial authorities

not only to impose stiffer penalties but also to take jurisdiction over the management of these criminal suspects. Nevertheless, empowering the judicial authorities to have such jurisdiction is one thing; whether the PRC authorities and the third countries will allow the Taiwan government to exercise that jurisdiction appears to be another matter.

Meanwhile, the PRC authorities have also increased the penalties for telecommunication fraud. On December 20, 2016, a legal document issued by the Supreme People's Court, the Supreme People's Procuratorate and the Ministry of Public Security proposed that offenders convicted of telecommunication fraud amounting to or exceeding 3,000 yuan would be imprisoned for a minimum of three years, and that those offenders cheating other people for any amount over 500,000 yuan would be imprisoned indefinitely (*China Daily*, 2016: 5). Obviously, internet crime has become so serious in the PRC that the criminal courts and police authorities have to adopt stringent measures to curb its growth.

Nevertheless, since Taiwan has diplomatic relations with relatively few countries in the world, extradition of criminal suspects involved in telecommunication fraud directly from the country concerned to Taiwan remains difficult. Many Taiwanese criminal suspects try to exploit the loophole resulting from Taiwan's lacking extradition agreements with many countries in the world. However, some Taiwanese criminal suspects involved in telecommunication fraud have received imprisonment sentences from the countries where they started the fraud operation. For example, in February 2018, four Taiwanese who were arrested in Thailand for engaging in telecommunication fraud and money laundering were imprisoned for 16 years and six months in Thailand – a heavy penalty that could act as a deterrent to Taiwan criminal suspects (*Ta Kung Pao*, 2018a: A19).

For countries that do not have diplomatic relations with Taipei, in cases where Taiwanese criminal suspects stand accused of telecommunication frauds involving Mainland Chinese, the PRC requested that the accused be sent directly to the PRC for trial. In December

允许台湾当局行使该管辖权则另当别论。

与此同时，中国政府也加大了对电信诈骗的处罚力度。2016年12月20日，最高人民法院，最高人民检察院和公安部发布的法律文件提出，犯罪金额在3000元以上的电信诈骗罪犯将被判处三年以上的有期徒刑，而犯罪金额超过50万元人民币的罪犯将被判处无期徒刑（中国日报，2016：5）。显然，鉴于中国网络犯罪的严重态势，刑事法庭和警方必须采取严厉措施来抑制此类犯罪活动的进一步增加。

尽管如此，由于台湾与世界上相对较少的国家建立有外交关系，因此直接从有关国家向台湾引渡涉嫌电信诈骗的犯罪嫌疑人仍然很困难。许多台湾犯罪嫌疑人试图利用台湾与世界上许多国家缺乏引渡协议所造成的漏洞。但是，一些涉嫌电信诈骗的台湾犯罪嫌疑人已经在其犯罪活动发生地被判刑。例如，2018年2月，四名在泰国因涉嫌从事电信诈骗和洗钱而被捕的台湾人在当地被判处16年零6个月监禁，这一严厉处罚会对台湾犯罪嫌疑人构成威慑（大公报，2018a：A19）。

在内的犯罪活动。多名公安部门负责人出席会议，在会议上，赵克志强调要利用人工智能和大数据打击犯罪活动（星岛日报，2018年：A24）。紧接着，习近平主席也于4月20日至21日召开会议，强调互联网安全性、网民教育的必要性，以及互联网网站管理员和专家保持自律，并与政府合作打击网络犯罪的重要性。

电信诈骗新模式

近年间，大中华地区出现了一种新的电信诈骗模式，包括（1）情感诈骗，（2）投资欺诈，（3）逃税和相关的洗钱活动。例如，在香港，从2010年到2018年，一名富有的女性被她所谓的“情人”通过互联网欺诈使其汇款到马来西亚，损失总计140万港元。2018年10月，香港、马来西亚和新加坡警方合作捣毁了一个电信诈骗集团，该集团从上述三地招募52人，分别装作演员、足球运动员、专家、军官和富商，主要针对大中华地区的中国女性进行欺诈（文汇报，2018

如果中国希望向“一带一路”沿线其他国家推广其良好的治理模式，就有理由对打击跨境电信诈骗活动感到乐观，因为这符合“一带一路”倡议所有国家以及全世界的共同利益。

对于与台湾没有建立外交关系的国家，如果台湾犯罪嫌疑人被指控参与涉及中国大陆公民的电信诈骗，中国政府要求这些国家将被告直接送交中国大陆进行审判。2017年12月，中国政府正式要求韩国政府引渡51名涉嫌电信诈骗的台湾犯罪嫌疑人，此案的受害人不仅有台湾人，还有中国大陆公民（明报，2017：A11）。

在与电信诈骗进行斗争的过程中，一个棘手的问题是许多参与电信诈骗的台湾人都是年轻人，他们希望通过冒险参与此类活动一夜暴富。2016年，在台湾参与电信诈骗的21,576名台湾居民中，有71.77%年龄在18至39岁之间（大公报，2018a）。

中国政府认识到电信诈骗的严重性，并立即采取措施予以解决。2018年4月18日至19日，国务委员兼公安部部长赵克志主持在深圳召开的全国会议，讨论打击包括电信诈骗

年：A01；大公报，2018b：A04）。在受害人将钱汇入该集团后，由这个链条中被捕的28名香港人在香港开设账户，协助进行洗钱。在确保骗取受害者信任后，该犯罪集团成员获得了受害人的信用卡和账户详细信息，并在147起案件中窃取总金额近1.1亿港元。

投资欺诈和逃税在电信诈骗集团的犯罪活动中也很常见。2018年8月，中国政府相关部门严厉打击明星逃税行为，其中包括在新疆霍尔果斯开设工作室和空壳公司的范冰冰。尽管电影业试图通过“一带一路”倡议向西方扩展业务，但许多这类工作室和公司都涉嫌参与大规模的洗钱活动。

对“一带一路”倡议发展的影响

大中华地区电信诈骗案件的迅速增长已成为打击跨境犯罪的最大挑战，需要地区

2017, the PRC government formally requested that the South Korean government should extradite 51 Taiwanese criminal suspects in a telecommunication fraud, which cheated not only Taiwanese but also Mainland Chinese (*Ming Pao*, 2017: A11).

One challenge in the struggle against telecommunication fraud is that many Taiwanese involved in telecommunication fraud are young people, who have taken the risk of getting rich by participating in such activities. In 2016, 71.77 percent of the 21,576 Taiwan residents who committed telecommunication fraud in the island republic was from the age group between 18 and 39 (*Ta Kung Pao*, 2018a).

evasion and related money laundering activities. In Hong Kong, from 2010 to 2018, for example, a rich woman was cheated by her so-called “lover” through the internet, causing her to lose a total of HK\$1.4 million via remittances to Malaysia. In October 2018, the police in Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore smashed a telecommunication fraud syndicate that recruited 52 people from the three places to disguise themselves as actors, footballers, professionals, military officers and rich people, cheating mostly Chinese women in the Greater China region (*Wen Wei Po*, 2018: A01; *Ta Kung Pao*, 2018b: A04). The 28 Hong Kong people arrested in this ring opened accounts in Hong Kong to facilitate the process of money

If the PRC is keen to promote its model of good governance to other countries along the BRI, then there are grounds for optimism in the struggle against cross-border telecommunication fraud, which is in the common interest of all countries along the BRI, and in the world.

The PRC government recognises the severity of telecommunication fraud and has taken immediate measures to address it. On 18 and 19 April 2018, State Councillor and Minister of Public Security Zhao Kezhi chaired a nationwide conference in Shenzhen on combatting crime, including telecommunication fraud. Many public security chiefs attended as he emphasised the need for the utilisation of artificial intelligence and big data to fight crime (*Sing Tao Daily*, 2018: A24). President Xi Jinping also held a meeting on 20 and 21 April to follow up on the conference, emphasising the importance of internet security, the need for education of the netizens, and the importance of self-discipline among internet webmasters and professionals in cooperation with the government to fight internet crime.

A NEW PATTERN

Recently, a new pattern of telecommunication fraud has emerged in the Greater China region, including (1) manufactured love affairs, (2) investment fraud, and (3) tax

laundering after the victims sent their money to the syndicate. After securing the trust of their victims, syndicate members got the details of their credit cards and account information, and in the 147 cases stole a total amount of almost HK\$110 million.

Investment fraud and tax evasion are also commonplace in the operation of telecommunication fraud syndicates. In August 2018, the PRC authorities cracked down on tax evasion by celebrities, including Fan Bingbing, who opened studios and empty shell companies in Korgas in Xinjiang. Many of these studios and companies were suspected of being involved in large-scale money laundering, even though the film industry was trying to expand into the west through the BRI.

IMPLICATIONS FOR BRI DEVELOPMENT

The rapid growth of telecommunication fraud within the Greater China region has become the most prominent challenge in combatting cross-border crime. It necessitates

内警方展开频繁合作 (Lo, 2018)。更严厉的处罚能否遏制电信诈骗的趋势尚不明朗,但可以肯定的是,大中华地区针对所有公民的教育已经展开,以尽可能减少受害者的数量。针对普通公民的教育在香港和澳门地区相对比较容易,但鉴于中国大陆相对广阔和多样化的地域特性,同样的措施可能效果并不明显,而在某种程度上,台湾也面临着同样的问题。因此,中国依靠大数据等技术进步协助警方对电信诈骗集团进行打击。

当然,在“一带一路”不断发展带来全球化和区域化快速发展的时代,仅靠教育还不足以遏制电信诈骗案件的发生,幸运的是,中国内地与香港警方之间的合作,以及与许多其他国家的合作,成功地减轻了电信诈骗在“一带一路”倡议时代的蔓延。2016年是电信诈骗案件发生的高峰期,从2017年至今,对这一犯罪的打击工作一直在进行。截至2019年初,电信诈骗案件的发生率似乎有所下降。最近,在当地媒体上很少有关于电信诈骗的报道。最可能的原因是,2019年是中华人民共和国成立七十周年,中国政府希望将这一年作为中国共产党取得成功的历史象征,因此加大了对国内犯罪和跨境犯罪的控制力度。同时,旨在赢得香港人心的统一战线运动也更加活跃 (Lo, Hung and Loo, 2019)。尽管如此,电信诈骗案件是否会在2019年后死灰复燃仍有待观察。

在大中华地区的安全环境中,香港警方在遏制电信诈骗案件方面似乎最为高效,其次是澳门、中国大陆和台湾地区。香港和澳门的城市规模较小,因此警方对电信诈骗的控制也相对较为简单。澳门警方一直与珠海警方合作,通过模拟电信诈骗集团的技术,打击基于计算机针对本地居民的欺诈计划。中国大陆警方所面临的情况更为复杂,需要跨省和跨城市合作分享情报并采取共同行动。台湾也意识到电信诈骗集团涉及台湾居民的重要性。事实上,台湾当局和警方在打击台湾岛内的电信诈骗方面也做出了巨大努力,与中国大陆和其他国家在引渡台湾犯罪嫌疑人方面展开合作。毕竟,涉及大量台湾人的跨境电信诈骗集团已经玷污了台湾的良好形象。因此,对电信诈骗集团的产生和运作进行有效控制符合大中华区相关政府和当局的共同利益。

从“一带一路”倡议所面临的安全挑战来看,电信诈骗不仅威胁了中华人民共和国

的国内安全,也影响了其国际形象。因此,中国对涉及电信诈骗的犯罪集团,尤其是台湾犯罪分子采取了迅速而强硬的行动。在中国政府看来,这些集团就像黑社会一样威胁着其政权的安全。尤其是在习近平主席所倡导的“一带一路”倡议全面展开的情况下,这些电信诈骗犯罪集团破坏了中华人民共和国的良好形象。与此同时,这些电信诈骗集团也一直在利用大陆和台湾当局之间的政治紧张局势。简而言之,电信诈骗集团被视为中国政府的敌人,中国政府对其存在和运作采取零容忍态度。

从有来自中国大陆和台湾的犯罪分子在其国家实施电信诈骗的其他国家角度看,它们有与大中华地区警方合作打击此类犯罪活动的主观意愿。然而,这些非法活动可能会使一些国家对中国发起的“一带一路”倡议产生疑虑,担心这一倡议的发展及前景是否会像官方文件所描述的那样顺利。为了打消其他国家的疑虑,中国在打击跨境犯罪方面作出了艰苦的努力,同时加强了反腐等治理工作的开展。如果中国希望向“一带一路”沿线其他国家推广其良好的治理模式,就有理由对打击跨境电信诈骗活动感到乐观,因为这符合“一带一路”倡议所有国家以及全世界的共同利益。

最后,从打击跨国有组织犯罪的更广泛角度来看,电信诈骗集团具有独特的特征。与意大利和美国黑手党 (Cressey, 1997) 等犯罪集团的传统等级制度和严密组织性质不同,有中国大陆和台湾地区中国人在大中华区以外国家所参与的犯罪集团基于个人网络,似乎组织得相当松散。由于中国人非常重视“关系”的概念,个人关系在招募成员加入和这些犯罪集团的运作方面起着至关重要的作用。然而,由于“一带一路”国家的电信诈骗集团往往涉及中国大陆和台湾地区的华人,其构成相对宽松,其关系基于快速获利的共同目标。此外,这些犯罪集团经常针对他们自己的族群,即他们家乡的中国人。虽然他们的种族目标狭隘而且集中,支持网络却延伸到中国人以外的群体,这些人向他们提供后勤支持和基地,但并不是他们组织中的关键领导人。事实上,这些电信诈骗集团利用大中华地区窃取的个人数据,通过互联网对受害者展开诈骗活动。身份盗窃在大中华地区司空见惯,在这些地区,许多人对这个问题相对不敏感,私营部门组织和

frequent cooperation among the police in Greater China (Lo, 2018). Whether stronger penalties can stem the tide of telecommunication fraud remains unclear, but it is certain that education of all the citizens in the regions of Greater China has begun so that the number of victims can and will be minimised. While education of ordinary citizens is easier in both Hong Kong and Macao, the same measures may not be effective in the relatively vast and diverse geographical areas of China and, to some extent, Taiwan. As such, the PRC relies on technological advancement, such as the mobilisation of Big Data, to assist its police force in cracking down on telecommunication fraud syndicates.

Of course, education alone cannot curb telecommunication fraud in the era of globalisation and regionalisation culminating in the development of the BRI. Fortunately, cross-border police cooperation between the PRC and Hong Kong on the one hand and other foreign states on the other hand has succeeded in mitigating the spread of telecommunication fraud in the era of the BRI. The high tide of telecommunication fraud took place in 2016 and its crackdown began in 2017 until the present. As of early 2019, the incidence of telecommunication fraud appears to have declined. Very few reports on telecommunication fraud have been seen, recently, in the local press. The most probable reason is that, as 2019 represents the seventieth anniversary of the PRC, Beijing hopes to honour the year as an historical symbol of the Chinese Communist Party's success. As such, domestic crime and cross-border crime have to be put under tight control, along with a very aggressive united front campaign targeted at winning the hearts and minds of the people of Hong Kong (Lo, Hung and Loo, 2019). Still, it remains to be seen whether telecommunication fraud will resurge again after 2019.

In the context of security in Greater China, the police in Hong Kong appear to be the most effective in curbing telecommunication fraud, followed by Macao, mainland China and Taiwan. The small physical size of the cities of Hong Kong and Macao means that the police forces can control telecommunication fraud relatively

easily. The Macao police have been cooperating with their Zhuhai counterparts to crack down on computer-based schemes to cheat local citizens by imitating the techniques of telecommunication fraud syndicates. The police forces in mainland China are more complex, necessitating cross-provincial and cross-cities agreements to share intelligence and work together. Taiwan has realised the severity of telecommunication fraud syndicates that also involve their own citizens. In fact, the Taiwan government and police have also made tremendous efforts at fighting telecommunication fraud within Taiwan, while cooperating with foreign countries and also the PRC to extradite Taiwan criminal suspects. After all, cross-border telecommunication fraud syndicates that involve a large number of Taiwanese have already tarnished the good image of Taiwan. Therefore, it is in the common interest of the four governments in the Greater China region to exert effective control on the emergence and operation of telecommunication fraud syndicates.

From the perspective of the security challenges in and for the BRI, telecommunication fraud constitutes a menace to not only the domestic security of the PRC but also its image in the world. As such, the PRC has taken swift and tough action against criminal elements involved in the telecommunication fraudulent syndicates, especially the Taiwanese. In the minds of PRC leaders, such syndicates are like the new *heidao* (triads) that threaten the regime security of the Chinese Communist Party. They have undermined the good image of the PRC at a time when President Xi Jinping's BRI is in full swing. They have also been taking advantage of the political tensions between Beijing and Taipei. In short, telecommunication fraud syndicates are seen as the enemies of the PRC government, which can no longer tolerate their existence and operations.

From the perspective of foreign countries where criminal elements from the PRC and Taiwan operate their telecommunication fraud schemes, there is willingness to cooperate with the police forces in the Greater China region to fight these criminal activities. However, such illicit activities

公司可以轻松获取个人数据，却缺乏对这些个人隐私进行保护的措施。

电信诈骗集团在大中华地区根基很深，完全消除仍尚需时日，教育普通公民和私营部门组织加强个人数据保护是防止此类犯罪的第一步，之后还要采取多种措施，尤其是大中华地区犯罪信息的情报共享以及与海外警方的持续合作。



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might make some foreign countries cast doubts on whether the BRI championed by the PRC can and will be as smooth as it is presented in the official rhetoric. To calm the anxieties of foreign countries, the PRC has already made strenuous efforts at combatting cross-boundary crime, while emphasising the need for good governance, for example, in anti-corruption work. If the PRC is keen to promote its model of good governance to other countries along the BRI, then there are grounds for optimism in the struggle against cross-border telecommunication fraud, which is in the common interest of all countries along the BRI, and in the world.

Finally, from the broader perspective of fighting transnational organised crime, telecommunication fraud syndicates have displayed unique features. Unlike the traditionally hierarchical and tightly organised nature of crime syndicates like the Italian and American mafia (Cressey, 1997), the syndicates that involve Mainland Chinese and Taiwanese in countries outside Greater China appear to be organised quite loosely and are based on personal networks. As the Chinese attach great importance to the concept of *guanxi* (personal connections), it plays a crucial role in recruiting members to join and operate these criminal syndicates. Yet, since the telecommunication fraud syndicates in Belt and Road countries often involve a mixture of both mainland Chinese and Taiwanese, their composition is relatively loose and their *guanxi* is based on the common objective of making quick profits. Furthermore, these syndicates often target their own ethnic group, the Chinese in their hometowns. While their ethnic target is narrow and focused, the support networks extend to non-Chinese accomplices providing logistical support and bases rather than the key leaders in their organisations. Indeed, these telecommunication fraud syndicates cheat their victims through the internet by utilising personal data stolen in the regions of Greater China. Identity theft is commonplace in the regions of Greater China, where many individuals are relatively insensitive to this problem, and where private-sector organisations and companies acquire personal data easily without much by way

of safeguards to protect their privacy.

As such, the roots of telecommunication fraud syndicates are deep in the regions of Greater China. Their complete elimination may be a bridge too far, but the education of ordinary citizens and private-sector organisations on how to protect the personal data of individuals can be a first step toward the prevention of such crime, followed by multiple measures, notably the sharing of criminal intelligence among police forces in Greater China and the persistent cooperation between them and their overseas counterparts.



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ENCOUNTERING BUDDHISM IN TODAY'S CHINA - THE QUEST OF CHRISTIAN COCHINI

与当今中国的佛教结缘 - 高照民的探索

Book review by Benoit Vermander 魏明德

ABSTRACT

Christian Cochini (1929-2018), the author of *50 Great Masters of Chinese Buddhism*, was a man passionate about Chinese culture and Chinese religions, in particular. His love for China made him eager to foster intercultural and interreligious encounters. Before starting his Sinological studies he had specialised in the study of the Latin and Greek Fathers of the Church. His special attention paid to their monastic traditions, certainly prepared the way later on for his encounter with Chinese Buddhism. After several years teaching in China, Taiwan, and Japan, he moved to Hong Kong and Macao, where he embarked on a program of study and encounter with Chinese Buddhism that kept him busy till the end of his life. From around 2000 onwards Cochini became a pilgrim, travelling to every major Buddhist temple in China, and to many lesser-known centres. He recorded their cultural and scriptural riches, and engaged in long conversations with elder Masters whom he loved and revered. Deeply anchored in the Catholic and Jesuit tradition himself, he believed that interreligious dialogue was a privileged way to appreciate the spiritual traditions of the whole of humankind, in the hope of opening up the minds and souls of people from every nation and culture. Cochini was a visionary, and, for him, interreligious encounter was key to the betterment of humankind. Cochini published

摘要

《汉传佛教高僧》一书的作者高照民(1929-2018)，对中国文化特别是中国的宗教文化充满了热情，出于对中国的热爱，他十分热心于促进跨文化和跨宗教间的交流。在开始他的汉学研究之前，他专门研究教会的拉丁和希腊神父，尤其关注他们的清修传统，这为他后来接触中国佛教奠定了基础。在中国大陆、台湾和日本任教几年后，他移居到了香港和澳门，在那里他开始了一个学习和接触中国佛教的项目，他为了这个项目倾尽全力，直到生命的尽头。从2000年左右开始，高照民成了一名朝圣者，探访了中国的每一座重要的佛教寺庙，以及许多不太为人所知的佛教中心。他记录了它们的文化和佛经遗产，并与他敬仰的高僧们进行长谈。他深受天主教和耶稣会传统的浸润，相信宗教间的对话是欣赏全人类精神传统的一种得天独厚的方式，希望能开放每个国家和文化的人们的思想和灵魂。高照民是一个有远见卓识的人，在他看来，宗教间的接触是造福人类的关键。高照民出版了两本大部头著作，这是他无数次朝圣的成果。第一本是关于中国的佛教寺庙。第二本——也是本文要评论的——是关于著名佛教高僧。

two voluminous books that are the fruit of his countless pilgrimages. The first one is about Buddhist temples in China. The second one – which is the one reviewed here – is about eminent Buddhist Masters.



THE CENTRALITY OF BUDDHIST MONASTIC COMMUNITIES

During recent decades, China's religious awakening has manifested itself in many ways. One of its most notable expressions has been the rapid development of Buddhism, based on the reconstruction and expansion of the Buddhist monastic communities. This is not surprising; from the very beginning of Buddhist expansion in China, the monastic community constitutes the axis around which rotates the devotional practices, the beliefs and the institutional continuity of Buddhism. A liturgical place, the temple acts as a collective intercessor for the community of believers directing to it their wishes and their prayers, especially for the deceased. As places of learning, the great temples make it possible to carry on through several centuries the translation of the Buddhist canon into Chinese, one of the greatest editorial enterprises in history, and to multiply the interpretations of it. As a place of power, the temple knows how to negotiate its relationship with the political leaders of the locality and then of the Empire, although this model was held at bay at the time of the big persecution of the ninth century, partly due to the concentration of wealth realised by the monastic communities.

Erik Zürcher provides us with the best summary of the *modus operandi* proper to Chinese Buddhism:

During the first three centuries of our era the dissemination of Buddhism in China was carried on at the popular level. In the 4th century, Buddhism starts reaching out to the elites, and the first large monasteries are established. Enriched by important donations, they keep developing by running social and

economic activities: management of their estates, accumulation of capital, organisation of fairs and pawn shops, printing press and guest houses. Chinese Buddhism has thus become a powerful religious power drawing its strength from this remarkable institution which is the monastery. But the amazing fact is that this great religious power came to pass without any form of central direction or coordination. Chinese Buddhism has always been an ocean of countless centers, big and small, of very different levels, the biggest ones sponsored by the Court and peopled with learned monks, the smallest ones vegetating in the villages and inhabited by some illiterate monks. In summary: a great institutional force, combined with a great weakness of organisation. (Zürcher, 1990, p. 26-7)

The reconstruction of Chinese Buddhism after the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution relied therefore on the monastic institution, as it was already the case in other times. And the vitality of the monasteries bears witness to that of the Buddhist practices and beliefs in the whole of the society.

It is not so easy to describe the Chinese Buddhist world in its totality. Monks and nuns, be they still novices or already ordained, are as easily identified by their clothing, their tonsure, and, for those who have been ordained, by their ordination certificates as by the scars on the head following the fulfilled rites. But the faithful are not recognisable in the crowd of those who visit the temples, so great is the diversity of their motivations and behaviours. The term, “Buddhist faithful” (居士), is normally reserved for those who have formally taken refuge (皈依) in the “three Jewels”: The Buddha, the Law, the Community. In return they receive a certificate that they can show at the entrance of a temple to be exempted from paying admission fees, for instance, or to get board and lodging. The levels of membership are many and not always so clearly identified.

The visitor to a Buddhist monastery will generally be struck by the predominance

近几十年来，中国的宗教觉醒在许多方面得到了体现。最显著的一个表现就是佛教的快速发展，佛教僧会不断重建和扩张。这并不奇怪，从佛教在中国传播伊始，僧会就构成了佛教仪式、佛教信仰本身及其制度连续性的轴心。作为朝拜的场所，寺庙充当了来这里祈愿的信徒们，尤其是往生者的代祷者。作为学习之地，一些大寺使得佛经被译成中文成为可能，这一翻译过程延续了几个世纪，堪称史上最伟大的编纂事业之一，极大丰富了对佛经教义的解读。作为权力之地，寺庙深谙如何与当地乃至当朝的政治领导人进行斡旋，尽管在公元九世纪佛教遭受迫害时，这种关系模式曾一度陷入绝境，部分原因是财富聚集到了僧会手中。

许理和(Erik Zürcher, 荷兰著名汉学家，莱顿大学教授——译者注)最贴切地总结了佛教特有的运作方式：

在公元(之初的)三个世纪，佛教在中国的传播是在平民大众的层面上进行的。公元4世纪，佛教开始渗入精英阶层，第一批大型寺庙也建立起来。因获得一些重要的捐赠，寺庙相当富裕，他们通过经营社会和经济活动不断发展：管理自己的财产，积累资本，组织集市和典当行，组织印刷和兴办客栈。中国佛教就此成为一个强大的宗教力量，它的力量来自于寺庙这个非凡的机构。但令人惊奇的是，这一庞大的宗教力量的形成没有任何形式的指导或协调。中国佛教有无数个寺庙遍布各地，大小不一，层次迥异。最大的是由朝廷资助，住着学识渊博的僧侣，最小的扎根于村庄，里面住着一些不识字的僧侣。总而言之：这是一支强大的制度力量，但同时在组织上存在很大的弱点。(许理和)，1990：26-7)

因此，中国佛教在文化大革命后的重建依赖于寺庙机构，因为在其他时期亦是如此。寺庙的勃勃生机见证了整个社会的佛教实践和信仰的蓬勃发展。

要从整体上描述中国佛教并非易事。僧人和尼姑，无论他们是刚刚皈依佛门还是已经受戒，都很容易从他们的衣着和剃度后

的发式来辨认出他们的身份。至于已经受戒的，还可以从他们的受戒证书和他们在受戒仪式后头上留下的伤疤来辨认。但是，想要从来寺庙朝拜的人群中辨认谁是信徒是非常困难的，他们的动机和行为可谓千差万别。“居士”这个词，通常是指那些已经正式皈依“三宝”(佛宝、法宝、僧宝)的人。作为回报，他们可以拿到一张证明，在寺庙入口处出示这张证明便可以免费进入，或获得食宿。“居士”成员的级别很多，而且不总是能一眼认出。

寺庙里的僧侣大多非常年轻，这一点会让来参观的游客惊诧不已。他们往往已经是寺庙的院长，有的毕业于名牌大学。这些僧侣越来越将精力投入于工作——建造建筑、在社会机构中建立研究中心和图书馆。寺庙里荟萃了这么多优秀的僧侣是因为相关规定将进入佛学研究中心的平均年龄限制在30岁以下。除了这些年轻僧人，还能经常看到一些沉默寡言的年老僧人，他们在很小的年纪，远在动乱的60年代之前就进入了寺庙。

无论是今天中国佛教的发展，还是它的社会和文化影响，如果不在中国宗教觉醒的大背景下重新审视，我们就无法理解。

他们已经将寺庙所属学校的精神和传统吸收内化，努力地生存了下来，甚至在80年代初重新建立了一些僧会，然后他们把肩上的责任移交给了后来者。

当然，随着时间的推移，在1985年至2000年期间，中间一代的明显缺失现象，现在已经不那么明显了，而今天掌权的一代已经逐渐巩固了其经验和权威。这种权力的性质和行使主要取决于寺庙经济基础的转变。之前对农业地产的开发被取而代之，更多地依赖于捐赠(首先来自海外，然后来自当地)、政府机构的帮助(特别是在建筑物的重建方面)、做法事以及售卖一些专用产品。附属于某一寺庙的僧侣通常能通过做法事或其他服务获得少量津贴，可能是物质上的，也可能是现金。有些僧侣发展了自己的会众(因此也有收入)。

of young monks, often already at the head of their monasteries, sometimes graduated from prestigious universities. These monks are more and more engrossed in their tasks—construction of buildings, setting up of research centres and libraries in social institutions. The production of this elite of clerics is facilitated by regulations reserving admission into Buddhist studies centres to those of less than thirty years of age on average. Beside these young monks, one will usually see some quite old and silent monks who had entered the monasteries at a very young age, and long before the turmoil of the sixties. Having already assimilated the spirit and traditions of the school to which their temple belonged, and managing to survive, even starting anew some communities at the beginning of the eighties, they had handed over their responsibilities to their successors.

Of course, with the passing of time, the absence of an intermediary generation, conspicuous between 1985 and 2000, is less visible now, and the generation in power today has progressively asserted its experience and its authority. The nature and the exercise of this authority depends mostly on a transformation in the economic bases of the monasteries. The exploitation of the agricultural estates was replaced by an increased dependence on donations (at first from overseas, then from local donors), on the help of government agencies (for the reconstruction of buildings in particular), on the practice of rituals, and on some specialised productions. The monks affiliated with a given monastery generally receive a modest allowance, in nature or in cash, in return for their liturgical talents or for other services. Some develop a congregation (and thus a revenue) of their own.

One cannot understand the present state of Chinese Buddhism by looking only at its two extremes—the time of its beginnings, when the basic shape of the monastic community has taken form, and the reconstruction boom of the last two or three decades. One must also say a word about the ups and downs of its history throughout the last 150 years, for the destructions of the Cultural Revolution had been preceded by those of the Taiping Rebellion (1851-1864), particularly in South China, a traditional Buddhist bastion. The

subsequent effort of reconstruction coincided then with rising internal criticisms concerning the system of formation and the lack of respect towards monastic precepts. Seen in Catholic perspective, Chinese Buddhism was entering the era of *aggiornamento*. Some of the reformer monks advocated mainly going back to the ancient disciplines, privileging a small number of select texts and practices of meditation. A little later, came another trend, of which the

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monk Taixu (1890-1947) is the most well-known representative. This involved a modernisation of Buddhism, following a method close to that of the Chinese Republicans of the beginning of the last century—the ideal of “science and democracy” applied, so to speak, to the religious sphere. The role of the laity was emphasised, and monastic education was similar in style to that of the western universities.

The creation, in the first half of the twentieth century, of the Chinese Buddhist Association, the popularisation of a humanistic Buddhism or Buddhism in the world (人间佛教), the contacts between monks and political leaders of that time—all these characteristics have helped shape the look of Chinese Buddhism after 1980. Nonetheless, the debates that characterised the revival of 1870-1940 continue today, as the Buddhist community seeks to define its relationship with a post-modern China in a state of constant transformation.

Neither the development of Chinese Buddhism today, nor its social and cultural impact, can be understood without resituating it within the more general context of the religious awakening of China. Of course, the question of

要了解中国佛教的现状不能只看它的两个极端：它的发展，也就是僧会的基本形态形成之时，以及过去二三十年的重建热潮。我们还必须谈一谈它在过去150年来的兴衰沉浮。佛教在遭受文革的冲击和毁坏之前，在太平天国起义（1851-1864年）时期，也曾遭受沉重打击，特别是在佛教一度兴盛的南方。随后在对佛教的重建时，恰逢内部批评甚嚣尘上，主要针对的是其组成体系以及对

它是从19世纪末的日语中借用过来的，用来表达在汉语中找不到相应的词来对应的一种现实。从这个角度来看，谈论“宗教的回归”并非不可置疑。

不管怎么说，中国的宗教领域是逐步形成体系的。20世纪20年代和30年代的学者们断言“中国不需要宗教”，但也同样承认宗教领域与其他社会活动领域的区别，并且这一演变持续了好几个世纪。换句话说，中

阅读此书，我们不会觉得眼界局限一个异域世界，反而它将引领我们走进一段“全球精神历史”——主要包括旅游、交流、收获和长期演变等内容。

僧规戒律缺乏尊重。从天主教的角度看，中国佛教进入了与时俱进的时代。一些改良派僧侣则主张要回归古老的戒律，他们悉心研习少量几本精选的经文，专心于冥想练习。不久之后，又出现了另一种风潮，其中最著名的代表人物是太虚法师（1890-1947）。这涉及到佛教的现代化，其方法与上世纪初民国时期的思想方法相近——也就是说，“科学和民主”的理想，被应用于宗教领域。它强调佛教的振兴必须落实到正信的俗世士女，僧伽教育的风格类似于西方大学。

20世纪上半叶，中国佛教协会的创立，人间佛教的普及，以及当时僧侣和政治领袖之间的联系，所有这些特征共同塑造了1980年以后中国佛教的面貌。尽管如此，围绕1870-1940年佛教复兴的特征的辩论今天仍在继续，因为佛教界试图界定其与在不断变革中的后现代中国之间的关系。

无论是今天中国佛教的发展，还是它的社会和文化影响，如果不在中国宗教觉醒的大背景下重新审视，我们就无法理解。当然，不得不提的还有关于中国的“宗教”性质的问题，以及关于它的觉醒的问题。在中国，正如人们常说的，宗教会影响周围的方方面面，也会受周围一切的影响。仪式、朝圣、寺庙、会众和信仰，所有这些创造了一个政治、民间和家庭机构不可分割地联系在一起的形象，由此，佛教僧会可以繁衍壮大和自我调节，同时传达其对意义的探索和对兴盛的追求。此外，必须强调的是，“宗教”一词在汉语中是一个相对较新的词汇，

国宗教是一种不断演变、被重新定义和社会专业化的历史现象。宗教在发展过程中受到过国家的支持、遭受过镇压，也曾独立于国家之外自由发展；教义和行为规范得到过肯定、遭受过质疑，同时也在不断发展。关于宗教信仰和制度在个人和社会生活中所扮演的角色，这一争论在中日战争期间曾一度陷入停滞，但在1979年之后，又重新升温。

精神大师的传播

高照民神父的第一本书主要关于寺庙，可以被解读为一种“空间的建构”，就如依纳爵罗耀拉在《神操》一书中使用的概念：“第一前导 设定地点。默想可见的事物……想象所见者为有形的地点，即我所愿默观事物的场所。”我们要清楚地认识到：为了宏观地介绍这些神圣的场所，也就是寺庙，高照民开展了长期且细致的调查。这些寺庙将僧会、信徒和历史证据汇聚在一起，浓缩和延续了中国佛教的生存现实。如果说其中存在“想象”的话，那也不过是最严谨的观察。然而，他的《中国佛教寺庙指南》一书确实构造了一些“精神场所”，这就是我所说的“并行”。这些都是佛教对中国社会文化结构做出贡献的节点和连接点，也是佛教对人类自古以来所追求和共有的内在追求的贡献。高照民的视角不只是聚焦在建筑或寺庙组织上，更重要的是关注集体记忆，以及这些地方最宝贵的财富。构造这个地点，实际上是准备好从可见的世界走向其内在的

the nature of the “religious” in China must be raised at once, and therefore the question of its awakening. In China, as it is commonly said, religion affects and is affected by everything surrounding it. Rites, pilgrimages, temples, congregations, and beliefs create a landscape where political, civilian and familial institutions are inextricably linked together in a whole, through which the community reproduces and

of a place”, as the notion is used in the *Spiritual Exercises* by Ignatius of Loyola: “Preamble I. This is the composition, seeing the place. ... The 'composition' consists in seeing through the gaze of the imagination the material place where the object I want to contemplate is situated.” Let us be quite clear about this: Cochini carried out a long and meticulous survey to compose his overview of those privileged places—the temples—which join

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regulates itself, and at the same time expresses a search for meaning and prosperity. It must also be emphasised that the very word “religion” (宗教) in the Chinese language is relatively new, a term borrowed from the Japanese language towards the end of the nineteenth century to express a reality which could not be found in the Chinese world. From this perspective, to speak of the “return of the religious” would be immediately questionable.

Nevertheless, China has experienced a progressive structuring of the religious sphere. When the scholars of the 1920s and 1930s affirmed that “China [did] not need religion”, they acknowledged by the same token the distinction between the sphere of the religious and the other spheres of social activity, an evolution carried on through quite a few centuries. In other words, Chinese religions are historical phenomena in perpetual evolution, redefinition and social specialisation. Religions have developed with, against and beside the state; dogmas and norms of behaviour have been asserted, questioned and developed. Having been stalled at the time of the Sino-Japanese war, the debate about the role of religious beliefs and institutions in individual and social life was revived after 1979.

TRANSMISSION THROUGH SPIRITUAL MASTERS

Christian Cochini’s first book, focused on temples, can be read as a kind of “composition

together the monastic communities, the faithful and the historical evidence, which condense and perpetuate the living reality of Chinese Buddhism. If there was “imagination” in this regard, it was not anchored anywhere else than in the most scrupulous observation. However, and this is the meaning of the parallel I am suggesting, his *Guide to the Buddhist Temples* did construct some “spiritual places”. These are the nodes and the junctions through which Buddhism makes its contribution to the Chinese social and cultural fabric as well as its contribution to the inner quest that all humanity pursues and shares throughout the ages. Cochini’s perspective was not just concerned with buildings or monastic organisation but above all with collective memory and what was at stake in such places. To construct the place is indeed to get ready to go from the visible world to the invisible stakes involved in it.

By contrast, his new work, the *50 Great Masters of Chinese Buddhism*, calls to mind what Ignatius of Loyola asks from the person who starts a spiritual retreat once the place is composed: “It is to recall the narrative.” What is told here are the stories for which these temples have often been the scene. Here are stories of men (more rarely women) who lived and worked in their own time and environment and were often incorporated into the unified historical narrative made official both by the state and by their religious tradition. These individual monks have also become collective types: they have become models on

精神世界。

相比之下，他的新作《中国佛教高僧》会让人想到依纳爵罗耀拉对已经设定好地点，开始静修者的进一步要求：“对往事展开回忆。”书中讲述的是在寺庙里发生的故事。书中的主人公是在他们自己的时代和环境中生活和工作的高僧（尼姑鲜少），他们的故事往往被国家和他们的宗教传统正式地纳入统一的历史叙事中。这一个个高僧已经汇集成一个集体：他们已经成为佛教信徒，也可能是其他宗教的信徒，评估和引导自己的精神道路的榜样。他们的影响不仅限于中国。本书所研究的不少高僧，影响了东亚佛教的整体发展——特别是在日本和越南——并被认为是整个亚洲佛教宗派的创始人。

阅读此书，我们不会觉得眼界局限于一个异域世界，反而它将引领我们走进一段“全球精神历史”——主要包括旅行、交流、收获和长期演变等内容。在这方面，关于慧能（也许是这里提到的所有高僧中最著名的一位）的生活描述是一个很好的例子。在一个深夜，方丈为慧能说法，当他确定慧能已经顿悟——这种顿悟对社会、宗教而言是激进的、颠覆性的，便让他离开寺院。方丈让慧能离开寺院的目的似乎是为了保住他的性命，但是这样一个能把佛心阐述得如此透彻的人却被迫离开寺院，从中我们难道看不出别的东西吗？冥冥之中，方丈似乎没能坚守到最后。这种叙事力透纸背，深深地印刻在我们的脑海中，它在很大程度上诠释了禅宗学派在日本乃至当今全球范围内的成功和惊人的兴盛。在这里，似乎很难把一个教义从它所体现的生活故事中分离出来。慧能已经成为世界精神史上超越宗派和教条的一类大师。读一读高照民的书就会发现，这类大师或多或少地指导着他之后的僧侣的人生和选择。

值得注意的是，尽管佛教在中国已经产生了一种超越国界的精神影响（这种影响仍在继续），但它首先深深地，并最终扎根于它所接受的文化遗产——第一代僧侣大部分来自波斯帝国。我们拥有的第一部经文旨在建立本地化的僧会——然而，这些经文并不仅仅是面向僧会的：四十二章经中的许多章节显然是针对所有信徒的，它给出了一种折中的方法，使所有人都能终生从事修行和学习。公元二世纪由牟子所著的另一篇经文也是如此，他的《理惑论》显然是针对儒家学

者。这种融合是后来中国历史的一个特点，即便如此，它也不是基于对佛教教义的削弱：公元三世纪和公元七世纪之间，在本书中所记载的一些大师的推动和指导下，佛经汉译成了历史上最伟大的翻译事业，这深刻地改变了汉语本身的演变。不过这个主题超出了我们的讨论范围。

最后，有一点我想提醒读者注意：高照民的这本著作特别有助于我们理解佛教在中国现当代的历史和作用。他把重要的篇幅留给了二十世纪的大师们，这是一个最幸运的选择。中国佛教在那个世纪经历了两次最重要的转变：第一次是由于太平天国起义期间的破坏和洋务运动的冲击。继文化大革命的重创之后，20世纪80年代中期以来，佛教迎来了第二次转变，依靠新的政治和社会条件，重建了寺院机构，开展了以城市为主的社会各阶层的宗教教育事业。因此，当我们开始理解上个世纪后半叶宗教变革的意义和范围时，你将会对本书最后一部分的传记产生特别的兴趣。

虽说本书有助于我们理解当代的佛教，然而它的重要性不止于此：它为我们——介绍了历史上德高望重的高僧，使不同时代的个体之间产生了精神联系，为所有追求精神之路的人们提供了榜样和灵感。换言之，今天的佛教不仅通过佛教机构的力量改变了中国，更通过其悠久历史的影响改变了中国，因为一代代僧侣和信徒在不断传承，并赋予新的诠释。这些高僧的传记形成了一根长链，本书回顾了其中的一些环节，并且这根长链似乎还会不断延伸。感谢高照民神父帮助我们将中国佛教纳入全球精神史册，它必定会继续指导和激励整个人类。



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which Buddhist faithful, but also perhaps believers from other religions, evaluate and guide their own spiritual paths. Their influence is not limited to China. Quite a few monks studied in this book shaped the development of East Asian Buddhism as a whole—in Japan and Vietnam notably—and are considered the founders of Buddhist Schools in the whole of Asia.

Far from confining ourselves to an exotic world, the reading of this book enables us to enter a "global spiritual history"—marked by travels, exchanges, returns, long-term evolution. In that respect, the account of the life of Hui Neng (慧能), perhaps the best known of all the monks mentioned here, is a good example. At night, his abbot expelled him from the monastery, at the very moment when he confirmed the authenticity of Hui Neng's awakening however socially radical and religiously subversive it may have been. It seems that the purpose of the expulsion was to save Hui Neng's life, but can we not discern something else in the expulsion of the man who tells the inner truth? Somehow, his Master does not appear to be able to follow through to the end. The narrative has such force that it has left a mark on the imagination, so much so that it largely explains the success and astonishing fecundity of the Zen school in the Japanese world and nowadays also on a global scale. Here it appears difficult to separate a doctrine from the story of the life in which it was embodied. Hui Neng has become a type in the spiritual history of the world beyond schools and dogmas. A reading of Cochini's book will show that this type plays a part in guiding the lives and choices of monks who have come after him.

It is significant to note that while Chinese Buddhism has exerted (and still exercises) a spiritual influence that extends beyond its borders, it had first strongly, and at length, taken root in the heritage it was receiving – the ones of the first generations of monks coming, for the most part, from the Persian Empire. The first texts we possess are aimed at building up localised monastic communities – however, these texts are not reserved for the community of monks: many passages of the *Sutra in Forty-two Sections* (四十二章经) are clearly directed at all the faithful and

define a middle way which makes asceticism and study a vocation shared by all. This is also the case with another text of the second century ascribed to Mouzi (牟子), whose *Settling of Doubts* (理惑论) is clearly aimed at an audience of Confucian scholars. That synthesis has been a characteristic of subsequent Chinese history, but even so it was not accomplished on the basis of a doctrinal weakening of the Buddhist tenets: between the third and seventh centuries, and under the impetus and the direction of some of the Masters whose biographies are in this book, the translation of the Buddhist Canon into Chinese established itself as the greatest enterprise of translation in history and deeply modified the evolution of the Chinese language itself. But that subject is beyond our scope here.

There is a final point to which I would like to draw the reader's attention: Cochini's book proves particularly useful for understanding the history and role of Buddhism in modern and contemporary China. The eminent place he has given to the Masters of the twentieth century is a most fortunate choice. Chinese Buddhism experienced two transformations of the utmost importance in that century: the first one was a consequence of the destruction underwent during the Taiping rebellion as well as of the shock created by Westernisation. Following the trauma of the Cultural Revolution, the second transformation took place from the middle of the 1980s onwards and relied on new political and social conditions to rebuild the monastic institutions and carry out an enterprise of religious education for all social classes, mainly in the cities. Therefore, the biographies of the last part of this volume acquire a special interest as we begin to appreciate the meaning and scope of the religious mutations unfolding throughout the second half of the last century.

But the book's importance in throwing light on the most contemporary period does not stop there: once again it is the long lineage of eminent monks, with spiritual connections formed between individuals who lived in different times, which provides models and inspiration for all people in quest of a spiritual path. In other words, Buddhism today transforms China not

only by the power of its institutions but even more by the impact of its long history, as it is taken on and reinterpreted by the monks and faithful who continue it. The biographies of monks form a chain, with some of its links recalled in this volume, and the chain looks likely to continue. Thanks are due to Christian Cochini for having helped us to locate Chinese Buddhism into a global spiritual history, which must continue to guide and inspire the whole of humankind.



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APPRECIATING ISLAMIC BUSINESS ETHICS

给伊斯兰经济伦理点赞

Dennis P. McCann 丹宁思

Abstract

If the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is to achieve its goals, the Chinese people and their government must recognise the importance of their own diverse wisdom traditions, for establishing peaceful and mutually beneficial relationships with the peoples and countries that lie to the West along the Silk Road. Nowhere is this more apparent than in coming to appreciate Islamic Business Ethics. As one of the greatest of the world's religious communities, both in number of believers as well as in its influence, Islam is a faith tradition that has shaped business practices in the nations that adhere to it. This paper will explore Islamic faith and will map out what difference it makes in how Muslims think about business and market transactions. Related issues regarding the specific moral obligations all Muslims recognise as imperatives of justice and charity, will be discussed, as well as the kinds of occupations that are forbidden (Haram) and permitted (Halal), marking the path of faithfulness. This paper is offered as an appreciative introduction to Islamic business ethics, with the intent of facilitating mutual trust not only in interreligious dialogue and collaboration, but also through a realisation of the common ground upon which all wisdom traditions stand in their attempt to shape and uphold good business practices.

摘要

要实现“一带一路”建设目标，中国人民和中国政府必须认识到，中国丰富多彩的智慧传统，对于同丝绸之路沿线国家和人民建立和平互惠的关系意义重大。这一点在伊斯兰经济伦理方面表现得尤为突出。无论信仰者数量还是其影响力，伊斯兰教都是世界上最伟大的宗教团体之一。伊斯兰教是一种宗教传统，它塑造了信奉伊斯兰教国家的商业实践。这篇文章将探讨伊斯兰信仰，并将分析指出它如何影响穆斯林对商业和市场交易的看法。文章将探讨所有穆斯林在忠诚信仰的道路上都信奉的正义和慈善的必要性等具体道德义务相关问题，以及非法(Haram)与合法(Halal)从事的各种职业。文章以肯定的态度对伊斯兰经济伦理进行介绍，旨在通过宗教间的对话和合作促进相互信任，并找到所有传统智慧塑造和维护良好商业实践的共同基础。

If the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is to succeed even in its strategic economic and political goals, those promoting it must come to grips with the diverse cultures and religions that they will meet as they seek to do business abroad. Many of these cultures have been shaped by Islamic faith and practice, which is also a significant factor in the Chinese provinces west of Xi'an¹. A major question for Muslims is whether China can be trusted to deal fairly with foreigners whose cultures differ significantly from China's majority Han culture. Trust, of course, is a two-way street. If Chinese people are to respect and seek to understand the ways of their non-Chinese partners, the partners in turn must show themselves to be trustworthy. Building such trust among diverse partners requires the expansion of transparency and mutual accountability. The study of Islamic business ethics, not only in general, but also as it is interpreted in various Muslim countries, therefore ought to be an important factor in building the trust that will be required for the BRI to become a lasting success.

In what follows, I will outline the principles of Islamic business ethics, showing how they are grounded in Islam's radical monotheism, and what practical consequences they indicate for business transactions involving both Muslim and non-Muslim business partners, clients and customers. My research suggests that faith in Islam, focused on Muhammad's revelation of *Allah's* will for humanity as recorded in the *Qur'an*, and subsequent authoritative interpretations of it, is decisive for understanding not only the declared values enshrined in Islamic business ethics, but also the seriousness with which these are observed in Muslim business practices². While this sketch must remain focused on the principles of Islamic business ethics—

which is conventionally located in the field of normative ethics—it cannot ignore a major and apparently universal problem—studied in the field of descriptive ethics—namely, the perceived discrepancy between declared Islamic values and actual practices among Muslim business people³. The discrepancy between “what ought to be” and “what actually happens” is no more acute in Islam than in any other perspective in religious ethics. All forms of religious ethics struggle with the problem and attempt to understand it and offer concrete proposals for overcoming it. Islam may have a different explanation accounting for how the problem arises for believers, but like the others it does offer concrete steps to realign one's conduct with one's declared values.

ISLAMIC FAITH AS AN ORIENTATION TO GOOD BUSINESS ETHICS

Islamic ethics begins and ends with the Muslim's response of faith in *Allah*. But who or what is *Allah*⁴? *Allah* reveals Himself to us, in the *Qur'an*, as a personal God who is uniquely worthy of worship. Scholars have shown that Islam is but one version of Abrahamic religion, that is, the interrelated beliefs of Judaism, Christianity and Islam. *Allah* is one and the same as the God of Abraham, Moses' “I am who I am,” as well as the One whom Jesus acknowledged as “Father”. *Allah's* existence and expectation for humanity are revealed through this line of prophets, the last and greatest of whom is Muhammad. In Islamic faith, the Great Ultimate is emphatically alive and passionately involved in this world, aware of all that we think, say and do, and responsive to our attempts to communicate with Him through prayer, worship, and the good that we do. What *Allah* demands of each person is given in the

1 Gerhard Böwering provides an impressive survey of the history of Islamic communities in China and interprets their morality, showing its convergence and divergence from Chinese moral philosophy in “Preliminary Observations on Islamic Ethics in the Chinese Context.” (Böwering, 2012).

2 W. Travis Selmier II's essay “The Belt and Road Initiative and the influence of Islamic economies,” is a useful introduction to the diversity of Islamic cultures, typically represented in the economies of Kazakhstan, Iran, and Pakistan. It suggests that what is presented here as introduction to basic principles is hardly sufficient for doing business with Muslims, without local knowledge. (Selmier, 2018).

3 Contemporary Muslim literature on business ethics often addresses this universal discrepancy. One example is Safdar Alam's *Primer on Islamic Banking: An introduction to Islamic Banking and Finance*, which not only explains how Islamic financial transactions work, but also provides a critical discussion of whether they actually do preserve faithfulness to Muslim moral and religious principles (Alam, 2019).

4 Gerhard Böwering's essay, “Names and Images of God in the *Qur'an*,” provides a basis for non-Muslims to understand how Islam's concept of *Allah* (God) is constructed from the passages of the *Qur'an*, thus showing how theology emerges from reflections on a Scripturally authoritative revelation. (Böwering, 2010).

要

实现“一带一路”倡议经济和政治方面的战略目标，推动倡议的各方必须在开展海外业务的过程中认真对待多种多样的文化和宗教。这些文化中有许多都源于伊斯兰教的信仰和实践，这也是中国西安以西省份文化中的一个重要因素。¹穆斯林面临的一个主要问题是，在公平对待其文化与汉族文化差异显著的外国人方面，中国是否值得信任。当然，信任是双向的。要中国人尊重和ación非中国伙伴的行为方式，这些伙伴也要相应地表现得值得信任。在不同伙伴之间建立这种信任需要增加透明度和相互问责。对伊斯兰经济伦理的研究，不仅包括对普遍意义上经济伦理的研究，还包括对不同穆斯林国家经济伦理实践的解读。“一带一路”的持久成功需要这种信任，而对伊斯兰经济伦理的研究是构建这种信任不可或缺的重要因素。

接下来，我将概述伊斯兰经济伦理的原则，阐述其如何植根于伊斯兰激进的一神论，以及涉及穆斯林和非穆斯林商业伙伴和客户的商业交易的实际结果。伊斯兰信仰聚焦在《古兰经》所载、先知穆罕默德所揭示的真主安拉的仁慈意志。我的研究表明，伊斯兰信仰及其权威解读，对理解伊斯兰经济伦理宣称的价值观及其在穆斯林商业实践中体现的严肃性至关重要。²在专注于通常属于规范伦理学范畴的伊斯兰经济伦理原则的同时，文章也不能忽视一个属于描述伦理学研究范畴的重要且普遍的问题，即穆斯林商人所宣称的伊斯兰价值观与其实际做法之间的差异。³“应该是什么”和“实际发生了什么”之间的差异在伊斯兰教和其他宗教伦理中并无两样。所有形式的宗教伦理都在竭力设法解决这个问题，试图理解它并为克服它提出具体的建议。对于这一问题如何发生在

信徒身上，伊斯兰教可能有不同的解释，但伊斯兰教确实为实现个人行为和其所宣称的价值观的统一提供了具体的步骤。

伊斯兰信仰作为良好经济伦理的导向

伊斯兰伦理始于也终于穆斯林对安拉信仰的回应。但真主是谁或是什么？⁴安拉在《古兰经》中向我们展示了自己——独一无二值得崇拜的个人神。学者们已经证明，伊斯兰教只是亚伯拉罕宗教，即犹太教、基督教、伊斯兰教三教相互关联信仰的一个版本。安拉是和亚伯拉罕的神、摩西的“自有永有”神，以及耶稣承认为“父”的神完全同一的神。安拉的存在和对人类的期望由这一系列先知揭示出来，穆罕默德是其中最后和最伟大的一位。在伊斯兰信仰中，伟大的终极者是强大的存在，激情地参与这个世界，对我们所想、所说和所做的一切了然于心。我们通过祈祷、敬拜和行善尝试与其进行沟通，并得到回应。真主以“伊斯兰”的名义提出对每个人的要求。“信仰意味着完全服从安拉的意志，相信他的正义和仁慈，履行与他的意志一致的行为（“合法”），同时避免违反其意志的行为（“非法”）。简而言之，活在对安拉的忠诚中就是按照人类存在的真理生活。

伊斯兰信仰有五个试金石（“五功”），或称为“伊斯兰教的支柱”（arkān al-Islām），界定了这种启示在实践中的意味。“五功”是穆斯林生活的基石：

- 念功（Shahādah）：宣告信仰一神教和穆罕默德先知身份的终极性；
- 拜功（Salah）：信徒应每日礼拜五次，念诵信仰告白五次；
- 课功（Zakat）：关心和施舍穷人；
- 斋功（Sawm）：通过斋戒自我净化，特别是在斋月期间；
- 朝功（Hajj）：有能力的信徒，一生至少去麦加朝圣一次。（Zahid, n. d.; Schimmel, A., Mahdi, M. S., Rahman, F., 2019）

“念功”尤为重要，即信仰的告白，其中最重要的内容是Tawhīd，即“认主独一”：信仰安拉或真主是唯一的神。“认主独

1 在《在中国语境对伊斯兰伦理进行初步观察》一文中，Gerhard Böwering对中国伊斯兰社区历史进行了深入调研，围绕与中国道德哲学的趋同与背离，对其道德行为进行了解析。（Böwering, 2012）

2 W. Travis Selmier II的论文《一带一路倡议和伊斯兰经济的影响》是对伊斯兰文化多样性的有益介绍，哈萨克斯坦、伊朗和巴基斯坦经济是这种多样性的典型代表。文章表明，没有对当地情况的了解，这里介绍的基本原则对与穆斯林进行商务合作是不够的。（Selmier, 2018）。

3 当代穆斯林关于经济伦理的著作常常处理这种普遍存在的差异。以Safdar Alam的《伊斯兰银行业入门：伊斯兰银行和金融引论》为例，该文不仅详述了伊斯兰金融交易是如何运作的，而且对他们是否真的忠于穆斯林忠诚原则进行了批判性讨论。（Alam, 2019）

4 Gerhard Böwering的文章《古兰经中真主的尊名和形象》为非穆斯林理解伊斯兰教安拉（真主）的概念是如何通过《古兰经》所构建的提供了基础，进而阐释了神学如何产生于对权威经文启示的反思。（Böwering, 2010）。

name, “Islam.” Faith means total submission to the will of *Allah*, trusting in His justice and mercy, performing the deeds that are consistent with His will (“*halal*”) and avoiding those that are contrary to His will (“*haram*”). To live one’s life in faithfulness to *Allah* is simply to live by the truth of human existence.

Islamic faithfulness has five touchstones or “Pillars of Islam” (*arkān al-Islām*) that define what this revelation means in practice. These five are the foundation of Muslim life:

- *Shahādah*: The profession of faith in the Oneness of God and the finality of the prophethood of Muhammad;
- *Salah*: Prescribed daily prayers, recited five times a day;
- *Zakat*: Concern for and almsgiving to the needy;
- *Sawm*: Self-purification through fasting, especially during the month of Ramadan; and
- *Hajj*: Pilgrimage to Mecca, at least once in one’s lifetime, for those who are able. (Zahid, n.d.; Schimmel, A., Mahdi, M.S., Rahman, F., 2019)

The most important of these is *Shahādah*, the confession of faith, the content of which is *Tawhīd*, meaning “unity” or belief in the Oneness of *Allah* or God. The centrality of *Tawhīd* is far more than conceptual, as if it were merely an abstract philosophical proposition. *Tawhīd* implies that all things are interrelated in God, that all thoughts, words, and deeds have deep ethical significance as signs of a Muslim’s faith or lack thereof. The contrast term indicating a lack of faith is *shirk* (*širk*) or idolatry, suggesting the elevation of anyone or anything to a position of equality with *Allah*. *Allah* has no equals, *Allah* is totally, exclusively, and uniquely Absolute⁵. Idolatry in any form violates *Tawhīd*, for it fragments the unity of the world, introducing false principles or forces (idols) claiming powers over us that belong to God alone. Idolatry, therefore, is not simply a false religious practice, but a state of soul in which confusion reigns, where moral

clarity becomes impossible because forces other than God become the basis of our survival and prosperity. Riches, or the love of money, for example, can easily become a manifestation of *shirk*, insofar as we place our trust in our savings accounts rather than relying on God’s justice and mercy.

Each of the other Pillars also has profound meaning for Islamic business ethics. *Salah*, the ritual prayers said five times a day, ensure that faithful Muslims remain aware of the presence of *Allah* at all times. If they are faithful in performing *Salah* their minds will not stray from *Allah*’s will for them in every moment. *Zakat*, the practice of almsgiving or reserving a portion of one’s wealth for charitable donations, reminds each believer that *Allah* alone has absolute ownership of the earth and any goods that a Muslim may

Since *Allah* is the only absolute owner of anything, the creation of wealth through commerce must submit to *Allah*’s will as concretely and personally experienced in the actual vicissitudes, or uncertainties, of doing business.

have extracted from it. If *Allah* is the owner of all wealth, then the use of that wealth must be directed by *Allah*’s express will for the world, in short, its uses must be consistent with the principles of justice and mercy, as revealed in the *Qu’ran* and the *hadith*. *Sawm*, or the rituals of fasting, reinforce the practical meaning of faith in *Allah*. Our bodies as well as our minds must be brought into submission (Islam) to the will of *Allah*. *Sawm* cultivates self-discipline which is essential to faithfulness. *Hajj*, the pilgrimage to Mecca, which should be on every Muslim’s “bucket list,” so to speak, offers a privileged opportunity to experience the meaning of *Tawhīd*, the unity of Muslims in a worldwide community of faith (*Ummah*).

⁵ Cf. Gerhard Böwering’s essay, “God and his Attributes,” in the *Encyclopaedia of the Qurān* (2018), for an in-depth treatment of these interrelated concepts.

一”的中心地位远非概念而已，也不仅仅是一个抽象的哲学命题。“认主独一”意味着一切事物都通过神互相关联，所有的思想、言语和行为都可作为信仰穆斯林与否的表现，因而具有深刻的伦理意义。表示信仰缺失的术语是以物配主(širk)或偶像崇拜，认为有人或事可以与真主的地位平等。没有什么可以和安拉相提并论，安拉是绝对的、无可替代的、唯一的。⁵偶像崇拜以某种形式违反“认主独一”，因为它破坏了世界的统一，引入错误的原则或力量(偶像)，并宣称其拥有真主独有的控制力。因此，偶像崇拜不仅是一种虚假的宗教行为，而且是一种精神状态，在这种状态中，混乱占主导地位，道德的明确性变得不可实现，因为真主以外的力量成为我们生存和繁荣的基础。举例来说，如果我们依赖自己的储蓄账户，而不是信仰真主的正义和仁慈，财富或对金钱的热爱就容易成为“以物配主”的表现。

其他几大支柱对伊斯兰经济伦理也有深远影响。“拜功”通过每日五次的礼拜仪式确保虔诚的穆斯林始终可以感知真主的存在。如果忠实地履行拜功，他们的思想在任何时刻都不会偏离安拉的意愿。课功是将个人财富的一部分用于慈善捐赠的行为，它提醒每一位信徒，只有真主安拉拥有对大地以及一个穆斯林可从大地获取物品的绝对所有权。如果安拉是所有财富的主人，那么财富的使用必须由安拉的明确意愿来指引，简而言之，财富的使用必须符合《古兰经》和《圣训》所揭示的正义和仁慈的原则。斋功，或称斋戒仪式，强化了对安拉信仰的实际意义。我们的身体和思想必须服从(Islam)安拉的意志。斋功培养了忠诚于信仰所必须有的自律精神。朝功，即麦加朝圣，应该在每个穆斯林的“遗愿清单”上。可以说，它提供了一个体验“认主独一”意义的特权机会。“认主独一”实现了全球穆斯林信仰的统一(Ummah)。

伊斯兰教对经济伦理的具体指导植根于“念功”，这需要进一步解释。一个关键的区别是，执行与真主意志一致的行动(“合法”)和避免违反真主意志的行动(“非法”)(Beekun, 1997, pp. 31-36)。只有安拉可以决定哪些行为是合法的，哪些行为是非法的。虽然两者的分别大致和对与错、好与

坏、合适与否等公认的道德界限类似，在伊斯兰教，区分的基础不是人类经验，或祖先的圣贤的智慧，或任何编纂的自然法则和其他道德推理模式，而是在《古兰经》和记录先知穆罕默德言行教导的《圣训》中明确指出的安拉的意愿。

安拉关于合法和非法的指示可以非常具体。比如，各种职业都会用这二者来表示褒贬。现代伊斯兰经济伦理论著将农业、制造业以及各种手工艺和专业视为合法职业。“总的来说，伊斯兰教把满足社会合法需求的工作看作是好的，前提是按照伊斯兰教的方式去做。”(Beekun, 1997, p. 34)。相对地，非法指的是通过酒精和毒品交易等被禁止的khamr类别获得收入。强调的是其令人沉迷和产生幻觉的效果(Beekun, 1997, p. 34)，这与通过忠诚实现的自我觉察是不相容的。除此之外，“制作图片、雕像等作为礼

因为安拉是所有事物的唯一绝对拥有者，每个人在商业活动中经历浮浮沉沉、通过商业创造财富必须服从安拉的意志。

拜的对象或作为安拉的造物”是作为非法被禁止的，“生产和销售非法物品”也是被禁止的，即色情制品等用于犯罪的物品。(Beekun, 1997, p. 35)。卖淫也被认为是非法的，圣训对此也有明确谴责(《古兰经》，24:33)。⁶还有一类是“Al Garar……即任何涉及不确定性的贸易，比如要交换或交付的数量不详。”因此，伊斯兰教禁止期货交易。期货交易涉及出售卖方尚未拥有的商品……”(Beekun, 1997, p. 36)。简言之，不确定性“发生在各种各样的交易中，在这些交易中，标的物、价格或两者都没有事先决定和确定。资本市场、衍生品工具和卖空合约中的投机行为是不确定性在现代金融领域的鲜明例子。”(Uddin, 2015)。

当然，禁止期货交易引发了更多关于伊斯兰金融伦理的问题。禁止放高利贷，或以任何利率发放贷款等戒律表达出的道德担忧

5 《古兰经百科全书》(2018)所载Cf. Gerhard Böwering的文章《真主及其属性》对这些互相关联的概念进行了详细解读。

6 Beekun (Qu'ran, 24:33)引用的文本明确谴责了强迫性剥削，即强迫“女奴”成为妓女，为其主人谋取金钱利益。

The concrete guidance of Islam for business ethics, while rooted in the *Shahādah*, requires further explanation. A key distinction is between performing actions that are consistent with *Allah's* will (“*halal*”) and avoiding those that are contrary to his will (“*haram*”). (Beekun, 1997, pp. 31-36) *Allah* alone can decree which acts are *halal* and which are *haram*. Though the difference is roughly equivalent to universally recognised ethical distinctions of right and wrong, good and bad, appropriate and inappropriate, in

35). Prostitution is also considered *haram*, and expressly condemned in the *hadith* (*Qur'an*, 24:33)⁶. There is also the category of “*Al Garar*... any kind of trade involving uncertainty, regarding an unspecified quantity to be exchanged or delivered. Futures trading is therefore prohibited in Islam. It involves the selling of commodities not yet in the possession of the seller...” (Beekun, 1997, p. 36). *Gharar*, in short, “occurs in all sorts of transactions where the subject matter, the price or the two, are not determined and

The maxim, “Love *Allah* More Than Your Trade,” should be a signal for others to be wise: you may encounter real limits to what people are willing to do to make more money.

Islam the basis for the distinction is not human experience, or the wisdom of ancestral sages, or any codification of natural law or other paradigms of moral reasoning, but on the manifest will of *Allah* as revealed in the *Qur'an* and the *hadith*, authoritative teachings of His Prophet Muhammad.

Allah's instructions regarding *halal* and *haram* can be quite specific. Various occupations, for example, are praised or condemned using these terms. Contemporary treatises on Islamic business ethics identify the *halal* occupations as agriculture, and work in manufacturing industries, as well as various crafts and professions. “In general, then, Islam looks on work that fulfills a *halal* need in society as good, provided that the person performs it in an Islamic manner” (Beekun, 1997, p. 34). *Haram*, however, would be earnings from trading in alcohol and illegal drugs, representative of the prohibited category of *khamr*, highlighting their intoxicating and hallucinogenic effects (Beekun, 1997, p. 34), which are incompatible with the self-awareness achieved through faithfulness. Besides these two, “the manufacture of pictures, statues, etc., as objects of worship or as objects to be likened to *Allah's* creations” is forbidden as *haram*, as is “the production and sale of *haram* goods,” that is, goods used in committing sins, for example, pornography (Beekun, 1997, p.

fixed in advance. Speculative activities in capital markets, derivatives instruments and short-selling contracts are bright examples of *Gharar* in modern finance.” (Uddin, 2015).

The prohibition on futures trading, of course, invites more questions about the ethics of Islamic finance. The moral concern expressed in a variety of precepts—including the prohibition against usury, or money lending at any rate of interest—is that the uncertainties or risks involved in an investment scheme be shared equally. Islamic teaching, in the interest of both justice and mercy, insists that both the risks and the rewards be shared equally. Similarly, the prohibition of lending at interest, or *riba*, expresses a moral concern over the fact that the lender typically makes money without any fear of loss, while the debtor is saddled with all the risks involved in accepting a loan and paying it back. As Beekun observes, “There is no opportunity cost of lending money in Islam” (Beekun, 1997, p. 46), and thus no justice in paying interest to the lender in compensation for borrowing the lender’s money. Furthermore, the prohibited practice of *riba* “simply increases the gap between the haves and the have nots.” (Ibid.)

One may well ask, if *riba* is prohibited,

⁶ The text cited by Beekun (*Qur'an*, 24:33) explicitly condemns coerced sexual exploitation, that is, a situation in which one’s “slave-girls” are forced to become prostitutes in order to make money for their masters.

在于，投资计划涉及的不确定性或风险是平均分摊的。为了正义和仁慈，伊斯兰教教义坚持风险和回报平等分享。同样，禁止计息贷款表达了一种道德上的担忧，即贷款人通常不需担心损失即可赚钱，而债务人则承担着接受贷款并偿还贷款所涉及的所有风险。正如Beekun指出，“在伊斯兰教中，贷款没有机会成本”（Beekun, 1997, 第46页），因此，向贷款人支付利息补偿其贷款行为是不公平的。此外，利息之所以被禁止，是因为其“只是增加了富人和穷人之间的差距。”（同上）

- 爱真主胜于生意
- 优先与穆斯林交易
- 在生活中保持谦逊
- 处理事务要互相协商
- 不欺诈
- 不贿赂
- 公平交易 (Beekun, 1997, p. 64-67)

除了第四条“优先与穆斯林交易”，其他各项都可视为常识。为何偏爱与穆斯林打交道？如果伙伴关系是发展业务的首选模型，那么答案就在于支持伙伴间相互作用的价值共同体。与穆斯林同伴打交道首先要认可在

“对真主的爱胜于生意”这句格言应该可以提醒人们保持明智：人们并不会为了赚更多的钱而无所不为。

有人可能会问，如果利息是被禁止的，伊斯兰金融如何实现？⁷如果利息是非法的，商业又怎么可能是合法的呢？显然，伊斯兰教鼓励商业发展，但更偏爱建立商业伙伴关系，甚至是那些一方提供资金或融资，另一方提供劳动力和技能以执行双方商定的商业计划的伙伴关系。只要双方“事先就如何分享利润或分担亏损达成一致”，这样的伙伴关系就是合法的（假设他们一起从事的业务等所有其他方面都是合法的）。如果风险资本家的资本保证盈利，无论他的合伙人是盈利还是亏损，这就与高利贷类似。”（Beekun, 1997, P. 48）。因为安拉是所有事物的唯一绝对拥有者，每个人在商业活动中经历曲折起伏、通过商业创造财富，都必须服从安拉的意志。试图通过涉及“利息、不确定性和赌博”的计划来限制被卷入的风险，或可成为偶像崇拜（以物配主）的一种表现，是对真主福佑特权的僭越（Uddin, 2015）。

正如Beekun的《伊斯兰经济伦理》所明确指出，那些被视为合法的行为与商业中普遍认可的道德价值观在很大程度上是一致的。穆斯林要接受以下原则，这些原则与基督徒、犹太人、佛教徒以及遵循孔子之道的中国企业家所尊崇的原则产生共鸣：

- 诚实守信
- 遵守诺言

商业伙伴间建立信任面临的挑战。相较于合伙人除了盈利意愿没有任何共同之处，有共同信仰的合伙人之间更容易建立并维持相互的信任。

当然，最终的约束是精神上的、超越道德的：“爱真主胜于生意”。“这是来自伊斯兰信仰的爱，包括对安拉的适当恐惧或崇敬，这将促使穆斯林服从安拉的意志，而不是试图通过各种暗藏的偶像崇拜（以物配主）来逃避。”对安拉的爱为判断商业活动是否可以建立道德限制。爱安拉就是知其意志，如《古兰经》和《圣训》所示——先知穆罕默德的启示和基于此的传统。从信仰角度来理解，接受这些限制、放弃逃避或欺骗，是我们在生活中实现繁荣甚至生存的唯一可靠基础。

经济伦理的宗教取向可以应用于当代商业实践，其含义可以通过传统的国际商业伦理工具进一步阐明。例如，Beekun的大部分演讲利用了传统的利益相关者分类理论，这使其可以重点研究参与或受商业活动影响的不同人群的伊斯兰内涵。例如，他引用了穆斯林商业的伦理准则，该准则的提出基于此类商业活动所涉及的利益相关群体：客户、供应商和分销商、员工、竞争对手、股东和伊斯兰社区（Beekun, 1997, P. 60-61）。Beekun还详细阐释了环境责任（Beekun, 1997, p. 53-54）、企业社会责任（Beekun, 1997, p. 55-57）、在公司内部任命伦理倡导者（1997年Beekun p. 61）以及执行社会审计

7 Usman Hayat及Adeel Malik的著作《伊斯兰金融：伦理、概念、实践（2014）》对这一问题给出了理性、全面和系统的答案。

how is Islamic finance possible?⁷ How can commerce be *halal*, if *riba* is *haram*? Clearly, Islam encourages business development, but favours the creation of business partnerships, even those in which one partner supplies the capital or financing and the other partner supplies the labour and skills to enact their mutually agreed upon business plan. Such partnerships are *halal* (assuming all other aspects are *halal*, such as the kind of business they are doing together), so long as the parties “agree in advance how they will share any profits or loss. Should the venture capitalist be guaranteed a profit on his capital whether his partner makes a profit or a loss, it would be similar to usury” (Beekun, 1997, p, 48). Since *Allah* is the only absolute owner of anything, the creation of wealth through commerce must submit to *Allah*'s will as concretely and personally experienced in the actual vicissitudes, or uncertainties, of doing business. To try to limit one's exposure to the risks involved through schemes involving “*riba*, *gharar* and *maysir*” would be a form of idolatry (*shirk*), a usurpation of *Allah*'s own prerogative to bless or refrain from blessing our activities. (Uddin, 2015).

As Beekun's *Islamic Business Ethics* makes clear, much of what is judged as *halal* coincides with universally recognised moral values in business. Muslims are urged to accept the following principles, which resonate well with the teachings espoused by Christians, Jews, Buddhists, as well as Chinese entrepreneurs seeking to follow the ways of Confucius:

- “Be Honest and Truthful.
- “Keep Your Word.
- “Love *Allah* More Than Your Trade.
- “Deal with Muslims before Dealing with Non-Muslims.
- “Be Humble in how You Conduct Your Life.
- “Use Mutual Consultation in Your Affairs.
- “Do Not Deal in Fraud.
- “Do Not Bribe.
- “Deal Justly.” (Beekun, 1997, p. 64-67)

Each of these might well be accepted

as common sense, except perhaps the fourth principle, “Deal with Muslims before Dealing with Non-Muslims.” Why the preference for dealing with Muslims? If partnership is the preferred model of business development, the answer lies in the community of values assumed to support the partners in their mutual interactions. Dealing with fellow Muslims first recognises the challenges involved in establishing trust among business partners. If the partners share the same faith, trust may be easier to achieve and sustain, than if the partners have nothing in common other than their desire to make a profit.

The ultimate constraint, of course, is spiritual and beyond morality: “Love *Allah* More Than Your Trade.” This is the love that emerges from Islamic faithfulness, which includes a proper fear or reverence for *Allah*, that would motivate Muslims to submit to *Allah*'s will rather than to seek to evade it through various schemes that implicitly devolve into idolatry (*shirk*). Love for *Allah* establishes moral limits to how business may and may not be conducted. To love *Allah* is to know His will as revealed in the *Qur'an* and the *hadith*—the revelations to the prophet Muhammad and the traditions based on them. Accepting these limits and abandoning any effort to evade or cheat on them, is—when understood in the light of faith—the only secure basis for prosperity, or even survival, in our lives.

This religious orientation to business ethics, nevertheless can be applied to contemporary business practice, whose implications can be clarified using many of the conventional tools of international business ethics. Beekun, for example, organises much of his presentation using the conventional categories of stakeholder theory, which allows him to highlight Islam's meaning for the various categories of persons typically involved in or affected by business activities. He quotes, for example, a code of ethics for Muslim businesses that organises its pledges according to stakeholder groups: customers, suppliers and distributors, employees, competitors, stockholders, and the Islamic communities, which such businesses are expected to serve (Beekun, 1997, p. 60-61). Beekun also shows in detail how environmental

⁷ A well-reasoned, comprehensive and systematic answer to this question can be found in the work by Usman Hayat and Adeel Malik, *Islamic Finance: Ethics, Concepts, Practice* (2014).

(Beekun, 1997年, p. 63-64)等普遍接受的管理实践与伊斯兰教实践的一致性。Beekun表明, 伊斯兰经济伦理已成为促进国际经济伦理运动的积极因素。

伊斯兰经济伦理与“一带一路”建设面临的挑战

本文对伊斯兰经济伦理的简要概述表明, 与穆斯林商业人士的互动可以并且应该发生在善良人共同的道德基础之上。如果穆斯林和非穆斯林双方真诚地希望可以共同努力, 即便存在分歧, 也是可以理解和接纳的。下面是两个例子, 一个消极的, 一个积极的:

考虑到合法和非法的道德区别在宗教上的重要意义, 非穆斯林绝不能要求穆斯林参加被视为非法的活动。一些中国的传统做法, 比如在商务宴请时要喝大量的酒, 吃各种各样的猪肉菜肴, 或者在宴会结束后去那些有妓女活动的卡拉ok厅, 对于忠诚的穆斯林信徒来说, 可能会很冒犯并且适得其反。如果想和忠诚的穆斯林做生意, 你不会想要让他因为陷入类似境地而觉得不适。“爱真主胜于生意”这句格言应该可以提醒人们保持明智: 人们并不会为了赚更多的钱而无所不为。

穆斯林爱与其他穆斯林建立伙伴关系, 这一点表明, 非穆斯林通过穆斯林中介与穆斯林企业谈判业务是明智之举。穆斯林社群中有地位的人士可以就行为适当与否为非穆斯林提供建议, 与他们进行磋商有助于加快和简化通过有效合作实现互利的进程。确保可以发展信任的条件对商务成功至关重要。与穆斯林商人打交道, 您应该假设伊斯兰教是他们身份认同的核心。除非有明显相反的迹象, 否则您的其他想法会被认为是一种无礼表现, 表明您并没有认真与其做生意。

“一带一路”机制生效的最大挑战之一, 是有机会证明, 中国商界人士有能力对其未来商务合作伙伴的文化表现出应有的尊重。像利玛窦和他的耶稣会伙伴们一样, 许多来到中国的外国人已经学会欣赏儒家道德及其学术传统的普遍意义。通过他们, 欧洲首先学会了欣赏中国文化, 开启了包括商业在内许多领域的和平互动。现在, “一带一路”为中国企业家和贸易代表提供了一个前所未有的回馈机会。学会欣赏伊斯兰商业伦

理原则, 意味着向前迈出了重要一步, 展现了中国道德智慧的包容性, 对中国推进“一带一路”倡议的努力有支持作用。



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responsibility (Beekun, 1997, p. 53-54), corporate social responsibility (Beekun, 1997, p. 55-57), and various commonly accepted management practices, such as appointing an ethics advocate within the firm (Beekun, 1997, p.61) and performing a social audit (Beekun, 1997, p. 63-64), are consistent with Islamic practice. Beekun demonstrates that Islamic business ethics is already an informed participant in the movement to promote international business ethics

ISLAMIC BUSINESS ETHICS AND THE CHALLENGES OF THE BRI

This brief sketch of Islamic business ethics suggests that interactions with Muslim business people can and should occur on the common moral ground inhabited by all people of good will. Where there are differences, these can be understood and accommodated, if both parties—Muslim and non-Muslim—are sincere in their desire to work together. Here are two examples, one negative, one positive:

Given the religious weight of the moral distinction between *halal* and *haram*, non-Muslims should never demand that Muslims participate in activities regarded as *haram*. Some traditional Chinese customs, such as banquets sealing a business deal, involving prodigious quantities of alcohol, or various pork dishes, or after banquet visits to karaoke bars where prostitutes are available, are likely to be offensive and counterproductive, if offered to faithful Muslims. If you want to do business with faithful Muslims, you do not want to make them uncomfortable by involving them in compromising situations. The maxim, “Love *Allah* More Than Your Trade,” should be a signal for others to be wise: you may encounter real limits to what people are willing to do to make more money.

The preference for forming partnerships with other Muslims suggests that non-Muslims would be wise to work through Muslim intermediaries when negotiating business with Muslim enterprises. Consulting with Muslims who have status within the *ummah*, who can advise non-Muslims on what is appropriate and inappropriate, may help expedite and simplify

the process of learning how to work together productively for mutual benefit. Securing the conditions under which trust may develop is crucial to business success. If you are dealing with business people who identify themselves as Muslims, you should assume that Islam is central to their identity. To assume otherwise, unless there are clear indications to the contrary, may be regarded as an insult, a sign that you are not serious about doing business with them.

One of the great challenges of making BRI work is the opportunity to demonstrate that Chinese business people are capable of showing proper respect for the cultures of the people with whom they hope to do business. Many foreigners who have come to China have learned to appreciate—as did Matteo Ricci and his Jesuit companions—the universal significance of Confucian morality and its scholarly traditions. Through them, Europe first learned to appreciate Chinese culture, opening up the possibility of peaceful interactions in many areas, including commerce. BRI now provides Chinese entrepreneurs and trade representatives with an unprecedented opportunity to reciprocate. Learning to appreciate the principles of Islamic business ethics may be a major step forward demonstrating the inclusiveness of Chinese moral wisdom, supportive of China’s effort to achieve a new standard of global benevolence.



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PAINTING SPIRITUAL FRIENDSHIP: GIUSEPPE CASTIGLIONE AND THREE EMPERORS OF CHINA

描绘精神友谊： 郎世宁与康雍乾三位皇帝

Michelle Mope Andersson

ABSTRACT

This paper examines the dynamic of spiritual friendship between the Jesuit painter Giuseppe Castiglione and three emperors: Kangxi, Yongzheng, and Qianlong, who reigned in China between 1662 and 1796. Paintings, historical reference and the poetic calligraphy which the emperor added with his own brush to Castiglione's paintings, corroborate the notion of a deep friendship, one that is spiritual, in the way that spiritual friendship is defined and described by the 11th century Cistercian, Aelred of Rievaulx. The role of perspective, in both its technical and its spiritual connotations, is examined in terms of classical Chinese and western European traditions in relation to the deeper interior seeing of a spiritual friend. It is argued that Castiglione came to know the heart and mind of the emperor with such empathy that he is able to paint from that shared interiority, sharing affection, joy and even sorrow, beyond words, to suffuse spiritual experience within the work of painting, brush to silk, and for the gaze of the viewer.

摘要

本文研究耶稣会画家郎世宁（本名：朱塞佩·伽斯底里奥内）与中国1662-1796年间在位的康熙、雍正、乾隆三位皇帝的精神友谊。郎世宁的多幅经典画作、诸多史料记载以及皇帝在郎世宁作品上的诗文题词，无一不是他们深厚友谊的见证。这种友谊符合11世纪熙笃会教士圣埃尔雷得对“精神友谊”的定义和描述。无论从现实层面还是精神层面，无论从传统中国视角还是西欧视角，精神友谊意味着其中一方能够洞察另一方深层次的内心需求。有人认为，郎世宁正是抱着这样的同理心接近皇帝的心灵和思想，这样他才能分享皇帝的内心世界，他的情感、喜悦甚至悲伤，无需言语交流，在绢本中融入丰富的精神体验，创作出令读者（皇帝）满意的作品。

PAINTING SPIRITUAL FRIENDSHIP:
GIUSEPPE CASTIGLIONE AND THREE EMPERORS
OF CHINA

In September 2018 the *Global Times* ran an article entitled, “Giuseppe Castiglione: role model for modern diplomacy”. It began by explaining that while his name is hardly known in the west, in China he is well known as Lan Shi’ning, meaning Generations of Peace and Tranquillity or Peace of the World, a name held in highest esteem. Castiglione’s work and his contribution to the cultural history of China “invoke the greatest dignity and respect among the people of China,” as a man who navigated seas of turmoil and unrest, built bridges of understanding, rising above internal church politics and the short-sightedness of high level decision-makers who had never experienced life in China. With his brush, he built relationships, dialogue and above all, beauty: the beauty of Peace in the court of three consecutive emperors, Kangxi (r.1662-1722), Yongzheng (r.1723-1736) and Qianlong (r.1736-1796).

While it is often suggested that Castiglione was forced to paint, as if against his will, within the walls of the Forbidden City, I am inclined to believe that Castiglione, a Jesuit, did not act against his conscience. I agree with Francisco Vossilla who details the depth of Castiglione’s commitment to his faith (Andreini and Vossilla, pp. 101-122), which gave him the courage to weather the stormy upheavals of the Rites controversy and remain, with seven of his Jesuit brethren, at work in the imperial art studios. His pieces were embellished with poetic commentary, calligraphed by the Qianlong emperor himself. It is likely that this man of great peace grew in closeness and friendship with each of the emperors. Indeed, at the request of the Qianlong emperor, Castiglione was honoured with gifts upon his death including an imperial funeral in Beijing.

SPIRITUAL FRIENDSHIP

What is spiritual friendship? Going back to the 11th Century Cistercian monk, Aelred of

Rievaulx, we find this description: A spiritual friend is one with whom you share your soul and you are likely to have one, perhaps two in a lifetime (Rievaulx, 1163/2010). Today it has developed into the practice we call spiritual direction. In the Ignatian tradition, the spirituality of the Jesuits—of which Castiglione was a member—this involves sharing the spiritual experience of engagement of the senses, to imagine a scene where the observer becomes a part of the ongoing narrative, often entering into the characters’ various perspectives.



Landscape. Giuseppe Castiglione
Wikimedia Commons

Engagement of the senses integrates the lived experience of the world around us with a larger understanding of goodness - God - in the world. “My friend must be the guardian of our mutual love, or even of my very soul, so that he will preserve in faithful silence all its secrets, and whatever he sees in it that is flawed he will correct or endure with all his strength. When I rejoice, he will rejoice; when I grieve, he will grieve with me.” (Rievaulx, p. 32)

In his early years of working within the palace walls, Castiglione apparently is

2018年9月,《环球时报》发表了题为“朱塞佩·伽斯底里奥内,现代外交的榜样”的文章。文章开篇说朱塞佩·伽斯底里奥内的名字在西方鲜为人知,但在中国其中文名郎世宁却家喻户晓、备受敬仰,意为“世世代代和平安宁或举世安宁”。郎世宁长途跋涉、不远万里来到中国,为促进中西方互相了解建立起桥梁。他不屑于教会内部的尔虞我诈,不像那些目光短浅的从未踏足东方的教会高层,他的精美作品以及对中国文化史的贡献“激起了中国人民最崇高的敬意和尊重”。他用自己的画笔与皇帝交好,与皇帝对话,更重要的是,传达美的真谛:康雍乾三帝宫廷安宁之美(康熙(1662-1722),雍正(1723-1736),乾隆(1736-1796))。

虽然总有人坚称郎世宁是被迫关在紫禁城作画,但我本人更愿意相信郎世宁作为一名耶稣会士是绝对不会违背自己的意愿的。我同意弗朗西斯科·沃斯拉的说法,他曾对郎世宁对信仰的忠贞不渝做了详细描述(安

透过郎世宁的人物肖像画,我们发现他非常清楚自己的皇帝朋友的喜好,不仅如此,借助内心体悟与耳濡目染,他也能准确了解自己的绘画对象的喜好。

德烈尼、沃斯拉,101-122页)。正是这种精神给了郎世宁勇气,让他经受住“礼仪之争”¹的狂风暴雨,一边在宫廷画室作画,一边坚持与七位教士同胞联络。乾隆曾在郎世宁的作品上题词点评。这位内心平和的画家似乎与每一位皇帝都结成了亲密的友谊。实际上,郎世宁死后,乾隆皇帝追加封赏,并为他在京城举办了一场盛大的葬礼。

¹ 17世纪至18世纪西方天主教传教士就中国传统礼仪是否与天主教义相容发生的争论,从而和清王朝在学术和政治上发生的冲突。

什么是精神友谊?11世纪熙笃会教士圣埃尔雷得认为,(属灵)精神朋友是可以互相分享灵魂的人,人的一生中也许只有一到两个这样的朋友(圣埃尔雷得,1163/2010)。精神友谊包括今天称为实践层面的“精神导引”。根据依纳爵灵修的传统,(郎世宁所属的)耶稣会的灵性包括:互相分享感官领悟的精神体验,观察者可进入场景中,成为故事的一部分,甚至频繁地变换各个角色



Landscape. Giuseppe Castiglione
Wikimedia Commons

的不同视角。感官体验与个人对周边世界的体验融为一体,深化了个人对上帝、对良善的深刻体悟。

“我的朋友必须是我们相互的爱的守卫者,甚至是我的灵魂的守卫者,他必须对我内心所有的秘密保持忠贞,保持缄默,无论他发现什么问题,他都会用尽全力纠正它,或忍耐它。我欢喜时,他欢喜;我悲伤时,他悲伤。”(圣埃尔雷得,第32页)

郎世宁刚进入宫廷的前几年,也曾竭力向大清皇帝传教。1723年,抵京仅仅一年,

already striving to send a spiritual message to the Emperor. In 1723, just a year after arriving in Beijing, he paints *Gathering of Auspicious Signs*, richly detailed in spiritual symbolism well understood by the Chinese eye, and not unlike the *vanitas* and garland symbolism which had taken over European painting in the same era. Castiglione studied in the circle of Jesuit artists

three emperors, which may be characterised as a kind of spiritual friendship.

Castiglione's portraiture captures an intuitive understanding of not only what is pleasing to his friends, but also his subject, from the perspective of interior knowledge and a growing visual wisdom. Castiglione was just twenty-seven years old when he arrived in



One Hundred Horses. Giuseppe Castiglione National Palace Museum, Taipei.

which included Daniel Seghers (1590-1661) and Andrea Pozzo (1642-1709) who frequently used floral imagery to go beyond words with the poignant message of the brevity of life (Po-chia Hsia, p. 154; Wittkower and Jaffe, p. 8; Fagioli in Alessandro and Vossilla, pp. 133-136). "It is the mark of a virtuous mind always to meditate upon lofty and difficult things, so that it either attains or more clearly understands and recognises that

China. The first emperor under whom he served, Kangxi, was already 43. A somber scholar, austere in comparison to his successors, Kangxi was interested in amassing knowledge, translating literary works and seeing connections between diverse fields of learning. Each of these would have resonated well with the principles of Jesuit pedagogy outlined in the *Ratio Studiorum* (1599), the seminal compendium for Jesuit education. This compendium would have shaped Castiglione's own orientation, while studying in Genova and Coimbra, before voyaging eastward to China. Thus prepared, Castiglione, could well find common ground, shared perspective with the goals and desires of the Kangxi emperor. Though he was perhaps not ready to be a spiritual guide, he could well become in the eyes of the emperor a favored and promising companion, and a teacher to the other painters of the court. His spiritual wisdom would grow with time, and through the tribulation of the era in which he lived.

Castiglione's portraiture shows an intuitive understanding of not only what is pleasing to his friends, but also his subject, from the perspective of interior knowledge and a growing visual wisdom.

which it desires" (Rievaulx p.60).

Indeed Aelred of Rievaulx is writing about a friendship infused with the love of God, or what we more generally call the divine, and in the minds the emperors of China, there was of course the conviction that he himself was divine. This matter of identity—of an "I and thou"—was certainly pertinent to Castiglione's relationship with the

DEPTH PERSPECTIVE AND THE ROLE OF THE SCROLL

A good spiritual director, a spiritual friend, needs two things: depth and perspective, in order to be able to see and to share vision with the eyes of the person she accompanies. Castiglione had to learn to see with new eyes, without losing sight of God. He gave lasting depth and perspective to

郎世宁即作成《聚瑞图》，这幅画承载了丰富的精神象征，不同于同时期欧洲盛行的用鲜花象征生命易逝的虚空派画作，这幅画很容易被中国人理解。郎世宁曾与耶稣会画家丹尼尔·西格斯（1590-1661）和安德烈·波佐（1642-1709）一同学习绘画，两人习惯用花朵的形象比喻生命的短暂和残忍（夏伯嘉，第154页；威特科尔、杰夫，第8页；法

准确了解自己的绘画对象的喜好。郎世宁刚到中国时，年仅27岁。而他服侍的第一个皇帝康熙，当时已经43岁。康熙是个沉稳好学的人，与雍正、乾隆相比甚为朴素。他对学习新知识、翻译文学作品很感兴趣，他还善于看到不同学科之间的联系。所有的这些品质都与《学习纲领》（1599）（耶稣会主要教育纲领）提倡的耶稣会教育信条——不谋



One Hundred Horses. Giuseppe Castiglione National Palace Museum, Taipei.

焦利、阿利桑得欧、沃斯拉，133-136页）。“这是贤者的标志，他们常常思索崇高且艰涩的事物，所以他们要么得到自己想要的，要么更清楚地理解并认识自己想要什么”（圣埃尔雷得，第60页）

实际上圣埃尔雷得笔下的“精神友谊”是一种融入了上帝之爱，或我们通常所说的神性的友谊。在皇帝心里，他坚信自己就是神。这种有关“我和你”的身份认知很自然地贯穿于郎世宁与三位皇帝的交往过程中，

而合。或许正是这一纲领，在郎世宁来华之前，在热那亚、科英布拉学习之时，塑造了他的个人品性。也正是这一纲领，帮助郎世宁更好地找到与皇帝的共同点，了解康熙皇帝的目标和渴望。也许郎世宁并没有做好当皇帝的精神导师的准备，但在皇帝眼里，他可以成为可信赖的伙伴、其他宫廷画师的老师。郎世宁的精神智慧会随着时间，随着时代的坎坷发展逐渐增长。



Portraits of the Qianlong Emperor and His Twelve Consorts | 1736 - c. 1770s Giuseppe Castiglione and others | Cleveland Museum of Art.

也许正反映了精神友谊的特征。

透过郎世宁的人物肖像画，我们发现他非常清楚自己的皇帝朋友的喜好。不仅如此，借助内心体悟与耳濡目染，他也能

深刻的洞察和卷轴的作用

一个好的精神导师、精神伙伴应当具备两种品质：深度和洞察力，这样才能看到同

China's interactions with the West, growing out of personal encounter through shared seeing.

Perspective differs greatly between east and west. In the west, perspective depends upon a vanishing point in a single scene one place at one point in time, whereas in the Chinese tradition, there are multiple perspectives, many ways of looking at a scene depending on where one is

territory represented and understood in this way, in other words, to have his perspective received and understood by Castiglione, as the way the emperor sees the world (Crossley, 1999). The emperor has at least visual command over his observable territory, at least in imagination—like an ongoing piece of theater, a living text, something almost biblical. In western linear



Portraits of the Qianlong Emperor and His Twelve Consorts | 1736 - c. 1770s Giuseppe Castiglione and others | Cleveland Museum of Art.

placed. The sequence of events in human time plays a lesser roll. Several events can be taking place, as one glances and moves through a scroll, revealing scenes or situations in every day life.

In classical Chinese painting there are at least three perspectives, all potentially present in any composition: foreground, middle ground

perspective, what is beyond the vanishing point is beyond what the picture invites us to imagine. Linear perspective also encompasses a geometric understanding of scale, but Castiglione was able to free himself of these limitations. In fact his experience of the *Spiritual Exercises*, the core of Ignatian spirituality, where one creates

Perhaps no painting is more affirmative of the spiritual reflection that Castiglione inspired, particularly in the Qianlong emperor, than his double portraits, *One or Two?*

and far distance, as we learn from the 11th century writing of Guo Xi and Guo Si, *Lin quan gas zhi /Lofty Ambitions in Forests and Streams*. (ca. 1050/1957). Looking from the bottom of a mountain to the top is *gaoyuan*; from front mountain to back mountain is “deep distance,” *shenyuan*, and from nearby mountains to the distant mountains is *pingyuan*. It would have been important for the emperor to have his

a composition of place, and then shifts in and out from the vantage point of various characters in the story, prepared him well for the kind of moving perspective that explores space from shifting vantage points, as in Chinese painting, in this instance with the eyes of the emperor himself. In a Chinese scroll, there are many scenes taking place at the same time. Handling a scroll we limit our vision to one part, one act, in scenes from

伴看到的，分享同伴的思想。郎世宁不得不掌握新的观察视角，同时又不丢弃上帝的视角。他在中西交流这个问题上进行了持久深入的研究并仔细观察，通过分享对方的视角



Fragrant Concubine
From Sotheby's Fine Chinese Ceramics and
Works of Art. September, 2014

得到了成长。

中西方看事情的视角相差很大。西方看问题，通常站在某时某地某一场景的某一点上，而中方看问题可能有多个角度，同样一个场景，站的位置不同，角度就不同。时间的前后关系并不重要。几件事情可以同时发生在一幅卷轴里，代表寻常生活某一天的生活场景。

11世纪的郭熙、郭思曾在《林泉高致》（纵情林泉，抱负高远）（约 1050/1957）一文中提到，在传统的中国画里，至少三个视角——前景、中景和远景，可以同时出现在一幅画里。山有三远，自山望山巅，谓之高远。从山前看山后，谓之深远。由近山望远山，谓之平远。在皇帝眼中，他恰恰希望自己的广阔疆土以这种方式展开，换句话说，

他希望郎世宁能用自己的眼光，用和自己一样的方式看世界（柯娇燕，1999）。至少，皇帝要对自己目光所及之处的疆土有视觉上的掌控权，想象力的掌控权。他希望自己的疆土像一幕正在上演的戏剧，或一页鲜活的文本，有圣经般的神圣意味。西方视角是线性的，只有观察点以内的才是作者希望我们看到的，观察点以外的我们无需遐想。线性视角同时伴随着对空间的几何理解，不过郎世宁成功地摆脱了这些限制。实际上他的精神修炼实践——依纳爵灵修的核心，就是要创造一种情境，让人自由地使用并变换场景中各个角色的不同视角。精神修炼赋予他变换视角的能力，允许他站在不同的角度探索世界，就像他在创作中国画时，采用的正是皇帝本人的视角。

有关郎世宁的精神主张，尤其是对乾隆皇帝的启发，没有什么作品比画中画——《是一是二图》表达得更明显。

在一幅中国卷轴画里，许多场景可以同时出现。打开一幅卷轴画，我们将视线定格在某一部分，某个动作，某个生活场景上，然后我们移动，展开，定格新的焦点，新的场景或视角。卷轴画更像是上帝对世界的打量，喜悦与悲伤、欢笑与泪水、出生与死亡，所有这些都上帝看在眼里。画家是上帝的合作者，向读者揭示神性的存在，揭示作品所蕴藏的主题精神，而这恰恰又是神性的产物。“上帝努力在自己和自己的产物之间建立伟大的友谊和爱”（圣埃尔雷得，第74页）。

郎世宁大约三十五岁时，当时在位的雍正皇帝命其创作《百骏图》。那是1723年，郎世宁耗费五年的时间最终完成这幅绢本长卷。百骏图纵长超过26英尺，被认为是郎世宁最优秀的作品。最开始，雍正皇帝驳回了郎世宁的第一稿，因为画中人物皆为裸体，是郎世宁采用欧洲巴洛克风格塑造的，抑或是他曾经亲眼所见的场景。雍正皇帝坚持应该给画中人物“穿上衣服”。1735年末，雍正皇帝驾崩，郎世宁将修改了的《百骏图》

daily life, and then we move, scroll, to a new focal point, a new situation or perspective. The scroll becomes more like God's view over the world, with joy and sorrow, laughter and tears, births



Fragrant Concubine

From Sotheby's Fine Chinese Ceramics and Works of Art. September, 2014

and deaths, all within God's view and the painter serves as co-creator, revealing the divine to the observer, the spirit within the subject, which is in turn the object of divine creation. "God himself is at work pouring forth such great friendship and love between himself and his creation" (Rievaux p. 74).

When Castiglione was in his mid 30's, under the Yongzheng emperor, he received an imperial commission to paint *One Hundred Horses*. The year was 1723. Done on a large silk hand scroll, over 26 feet in length, it took Castiglione five years to complete and is considered his greatest work. Yongzheng rejected the first sketch, insisting that Castiglione put clothes on the men, whom Castiglione had

envisioned in their more European Baroque bareness, or perhaps as he had actually seen them. After the Yongzheng emperor died, in late 1735, *One Hundred Horses*, with the riders now clad, was presented to the newly enthroned Qianlong emperor and declared a masterpiece. Shortly thereafter, Castiglione was named the Emperor's principal court painter.

Another scroll which Castiglione at least initiated is *Portraits of emperor Qianlong, the Empress and eleven Imperial Consorts*. "For a friend is the sharer of your soul, to your friend's spirit you join and attach your own, and you so mingle the two that you would like for your two spirits to become one" (Rievaux, quoting Ambrose, p. 58).

Painted right to left, over the 34 year reign of the Qianlong emperor, the images are tender and peaceful. Proud of his consorts and his reign, the emperor called it: *Mind Picture of a Well Governed and Tranquil Reign*. From the seals on the scroll we know that in his old age, after stepping down from the throne, Qianlong would open this scroll and meditate on his life and his concubines. Castiglione captures a serenity that affirms the heart and mind of the emperor, from the faces of his beloved to nature and wildlife and, in this way, he lifts the gaze of the observer, the emperor, to the divine through love.

LADY HOJA: THE FRAGRANT CONCUBINE

One concubine in particular seems to have captured the heart of the Qianlong emperor and the brushes of Castiglione and those who painted around him. She was Rong Fei, the Fragrant Concubine, or Lady Hoja, Huojuo shu. At least four images were made, so called "commissioned visages," *maitaigong*, with Lady Hoja's exotic attributes and similar accessories (Sotheby's, 1952). The painting shown here, attributed to Castiglione, dates from 1722, the year before the Qianlong emperor came to power, when she first came to the court and was given the name Rong Fei (Millward, 1994). To preserve a scent, which the emperor found irresistible, she bathed each day in camel milk, while making her way across China, to the Palace in Beijing. From his days

呈给新登基的乾隆皇帝，乾隆皇帝赞赏不已。此后不久，郎世宁被任命为皇帝的首席画师。

另外一幅至少由郎世宁起笔的卷轴画是《乾隆帝后妃嫔图卷》。“朋友之间就是要分享各自的灵魂，领会对方的精神，并融入自己的精神，将二人的精神合二为一，将两人融为一体。”（圣埃尔雷得，出自安布罗斯，第58页）。”

这幅画的创作过程贯穿了乾隆皇帝34年的统治史，画卷从右至左展开，人物温柔祥和。乾隆对自己的妃嫔及统治内心无比自豪，于是给这幅画起名为《心写治平图》。从画上的印章，我们了解到，乾隆皇帝晚年退位后，经常打开这幅画，沉思自己的一生及诸位嫔妃。郎世宁给画中人物注入了一种

了纪念香妃，皇帝至少命人画了四幅香妃衣冠像，即“为死者画的像（买太公）”，描述了香妃的异域风情及异族配饰（苏富比，1952）。下面展示的这幅画是郎世宁1722年的作品。香妃初次入宫，被册封为“容妃”，次年乾隆皇帝登基（米华健，1994）。在来京路上，她日日在骆驼奶中沐浴，目的是使身体散发一种令皇帝欲罢不能的奇香。郎世宁入宫以后，他一定听说过和卓氏如何思念回鹘故土及人民的故事。皇帝命人为其修建了一座花园，甚至还在她的窗户外修建了一座清真寺，一小片绿洲和一个回民街。皇帝曾问她还想要什么，她回答说只想要死。一直到1766年香妃过世，她都是乾隆皇帝最爱的妃子。



Giuseppe Castiglione | A Victory Banquet Given by the Emperor for the Distinguished Officers and Soldiers of the Rebellion of Huibu (1758-1759) | Wikimedia.

宁静，这种宁静肯定了乾隆的心灵和思想，他的爱妃、自然、野兽，无一不凝聚了这种宁静的力量，他用这种方式提升了读者皇帝的观感，使其洞察到爱背后神性的存在。

和卓夫人：香妃

有一位妃子似乎格外受乾隆皇帝宠爱，也是郎世宁及一众弟子笔下的常客。她就是容妃，又名香妃、霍卓氏（和卓氏）。为

创造回忆

我们能记住什么，如何记忆，能回想起什么，这些对皇帝而言尤其重要。比郎世宁早一个世纪的利玛窦或许正是受到伊格内修斯精神修炼的启发，在中国创造了一种复杂的保存记忆的方法，他称之为“记忆宫殿”。人们可以借助这种方法独自一人或最好与朋友一同追忆往昔（可能会有一些由想象力产生的小的出入）。这也是郎世宁在描绘狩

inside the palace walls, Castiglione would surely have heard, how Lady Hoja desperately longed for her home among the Uyghur people. The emperor gave her a garden, and it is said he even built a mosque, a small oasis, and a bazaar, just outside her window. Asked what more she longed for, she replied that she longed to die, and until that day came, in 1766, Rong Fei remained the emperor's favorite.

CREATING MEMORY

How and what we remember, and what we call to mind at some later point, was of great importance, especially to the Emperor. A hundred years before Castiglione, perhaps inspired by the

of the instruments and voices nearly lifts from the silk.

Castiglione is able to move the emperor, or any viewer, in and out of the scene by various levels of detail. In an image from the New Year's festival, painted in 1738, where his technique is more in European perspective, we engage in an idyllic world of adults at leisure, children playing with the snowflakes that melt on their fingertips and cling to the trees (Victoria Museum, ymy3010). Castiglione is masterful at capturing the joy of the moment, in a way that enables the emperor to recall, with the cast of his gaze, his many blessings: the children playing, the women gracing with their presence, the purity of the gleaming snow.



Giuseppe Castiglione | *A Victory Banquet Given by the Emperor for the Distinguished Officers and Soldiers of the Rebellion of Huibu* (1758-1759) | Wikimedia.

Ignatius' *Spiritual Exercises*, Matteo Ricci had created in China a complex method for preserving memory, a Memory Palace, as he called it, where one could call to mind, alone, or better yet, with a friend, memories of the past, with some possible modifications, as the gift of one's imagination. This was essentially what Castiglione also did in his paintings of hunts, feasts and other celebrations. He recreates in animated detail the experience so that the smoke from grilled meats and the sound

The Qianlong emperor so enjoyed hunting, both in visual images and in experience, that he had the scene recreated, complete with yurts, at both the Yuanminguan and at the Chengde summer palaces. In 1754 the Emperor gave a feast to welcome the Toro Mongols, who came in search of his protection. We know from records at the Palace Museum that the feast was held in The Garden of Ten Thousand Trees, Wanshu, at the Chengde palace. Castiglione captures the

猎、宴饮及其他庆祝活动时做的，他用栩栩如生的笔法详细再现了那些场景，于是炙烤的阵阵烟气、乐器的此起彼伏以及人们的欢声笑语似乎都从绢本中一一浮现。

郎世宁可以借助各种层次的细节描绘，引导皇帝或任何读者自由地出入场景。他于1738



One or Two. Double portrait of the Qianlong emperor.

年创作了一副描绘中国新年的画作——《弘历雪景行乐图》，当时的他更多地采用了欧洲绘画技巧。这幅作品描绘了一幅田园般祥和的景色，大人们悠闲地在宫苑赏雪，孩子们纵情玩雪，雪花或融化在他们的指尖，或飘落在树上（维多利亚博物馆，ymy3010）。

郎世宁非常善于捕捉当下的快乐，透过郎世宁的画，皇帝可以追忆曾经那些美好的事物：孩童的快乐嬉戏，妃嫔的优雅娴熟，雪花的晶莹剔透、纯洁无瑕。

乾隆皇帝不仅喜欢打猎，还喜欢用绘画的形式将狩猎场景记录下来。他命人在圆明园和承德避暑山庄建造了狩猎场及蒙古包。1754年，乾隆皇帝设宴欢迎来京寻求庇护的蒙古族首领。从故宫博物院的历史记载中，我们得知这场宴会发生在承德避暑山庄的万树园。郎世宁在自己的《万树园赐宴图》中，准确地描绘了皇帝骄傲的一面，他身着青金石蓝长袍，盘腿坐在红衣太监抬着的肩舆上，四周有许多王公贵族、文武大臣、蒙古将士跪在地上迎候。

感恩“精神之礼”

乾隆皇帝曾设宴为郎世宁庆祝70大

寿。“祝寿活动发生在圆明园，皇帝赐给郎世宁‘头等绢6匹、朝服1领、玛瑙项饰1环’。”回程路上由乐师、官员和士兵组成了庞大的随行队伍，“好不热闹”，这场提前计划的庆祝活动非常顺利地结束了（麦克道尔，2015）。

晚年的皇帝开始把自己当做合作者，在郎世宁的帮助下，他完成了一幅自画像，把自己变成了画作的一部分。那是一个飘雪的冬日，皇帝正坐在书房的暖炕上看书，白色宣纸在黑色墨迹的映衬下仿若白雪。1763年，乾隆皇帝画了一幅画，但由于他信心不足，他令郎世宁帮他完成人物的部分。这幅画展示了乾隆皇帝高超的画技，然而他却非常自谦，把荣誉让给了郎世宁，这是一次艺术与精神方面的成长，是两人精神友谊结出的硕果（故宫博物院，故237286）。

双重递归，画中画

有关郎世宁的精神主张，尤其是对乾隆皇帝的启发，没有什么作品比画中画——《是一是二图》表达得更明显了（司徒安，1997，39-43页；拉赫曼，1996，736-744页；李启乐，2012，25-46页；罗友枝、罗森，205，283页）。这类以乾隆皇帝为对象的绢本“画中画”一共有四副，郎世宁至少对其中两幅起到了启发及指导作用。在其中一幅名为《是一是二图》的画中，乾隆皇帝正在书房工作与沉思，墙上挂着他本人的肖像画。这一刻的神圣本质在皇帝对奉茶小童的凝视以及周围象征性事物上得到了增强，例如，古老的青铜嘉量，15世纪初制成的盛水用的蓝白瓷觚（张）。这些象征着皇帝至高无上的权威及神性的人格化。

我们还可以从佛教反观的角度，或基督教“两性论”的角度进行解读（李启乐，2012，25-46页）。郎世宁也许早就认识到在皇帝眼中人性、神性结合的重要性。这一点耶稣会士迭戈·德·潘多哈（庞迪我）也曾提到，他是第一批来京侍奉皇帝的耶稣会士（拉莫斯，私人交流，2019年2月9日）。庞迪我曾经以骄傲的口吻在《七克》中阐释了基督教“两性论”和佛教反观论的关系（庞迪我，叶农编，8-9页，19；拉莫斯，2018）。皇帝更是用自己的题词印证了这种关系：“是一是二，不即不离。儒可墨可，何虑何思。”（巫鸿，1996，235页）。墨家推

pride of the emperor, clad in lapis blue, seated cross-legged in his sedan chair, entrusted to red-dressed eunuchs who bear him to court. Around him Castiglione depicts the Manchu princes, Mongols and other officials kneeling to honour the emperor upon his arrival.



One or Two. Double portrait of the Qianlong emperor.

GRATITUDE FOR SPIRITUAL GIFTS

For Castiglione's 70th birthday, the emperor gave a grand party. "Festivities were held in the palace of Yuanmingyuan. The gifts given by the Emperor to Castiglione '... were six pieces of silk of rare quality, a mandarin's robe and a large agate necklace.'" A grand procession with musicians, mandarins and soldiers "made a great deal of noise" and the well-planned ceremony went off without a hitch (McDowall, 2015).

Late in life, the Emperor comes to see himself as a co-creator, placing himself literally inside the image in a self-portrait that he paints with the help of Castiglione. It is a snowy winter day; the Emperor enjoys the warmth of his heated kang bed inside his study. The white paper becomes the snow against a darkish wash of ink. The year is 1763 and the Qianlong Emperor writes in his own brush, but because of his lack of confidence, he has asked Castiglione to paint the figures for him. The painting demonstrates the emperor's excellence as a painter, and yet he humbles himself with this deferral to Castiglione,

a movement of both artistic and spiritual growth, from the gift of their mature spiritual friendship (Palace Museum, Gu237286).

DUAL NATURES RECURSION AND DOUBLE PORTRAITS

Perhaps no painting is more affirmative of the spiritual reflection that Castiglione inspired, particularly in the Qianlong emperor, than his double portraits, *One or Two?* (Zito, 1997, pp. 39-43; Lachman 1996, pp. 736-744; Kleutghen, 2012, pp. 25-46; Rawski and Rawson 2005, p. 283). Castiglione inspired and supervised work on at least two of the four of these recession paintings, on silk, where the Qianlong emperor appears in a painting of himself which hangs in his study where he is portrayed working and reflecting. The sacred nature of the moment is enhanced in one, where the emperor's eyes focus on his attendant, pouring water from a ritual vessel, surrounded with other symbolic attributes, for example, an ancient bronze measuring tool and a blue and white porcelain water vessel which can be dated to the early 15th century (Truong). These symbolise the Emperor's personification of that which is sacred as well as his ultimate authority.

These can be interpreted both as a Buddhist reflection (Kleutghen, 2012. pp.25-46) and as a Christian interpretation of the "two natures" of God and man. Castiglione would have been aware of the importance of the dual nature, human and divine, in relation to the emperor, as this was discussed also by the Jesuit Diego de Pantoja who served in Imperial China together with the first Jesuits in Beijing (I. Ramos, personal communication 9 Feb, 2019). Pantoja writes about the relationship of the dual nature of Christ in relation to Buddhism and in his *Seven Victories*, in the context of pride (Pantoja, in Ye Nong, ed, pp. 8-9, 19; Ramos (2018). These can both be affirmed by what the Emperor writes with his own brush: "One or two? My two faces never come together yet are never separate. One can be Confucian, one can be Mohist. Why should I worry or even think?" (Wu, 1996, p. 235). The philosophy of Mohism was related to care or Caritas or in some contexts universal love and

崇的“兼爱”与西班牙语的“明爱”意思很相近，有时也可表示为普世的大爱或良治。

结论

郎世宁用自己的笔触创造了一幅幅视觉意象，深入帝国的核心，探究深层次的存在问题。他的作品似乎是一面镜子，透过它，我们可以了解康雍乾三位皇帝的日常及政治生活。这三位皇帝不仅希望扩张自己的地理疆土，更希望自己的野心得到智慧及美学上的肯定。作为回报，他们得到了郎世宁及其耶稣会同伴赠与的精神礼物，即对人类境遇的普世性理解：对上帝赋予的简单的生之喜悦的感恩，对只有上帝才能平息的对死亡、失去和拒绝的恐惧。



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good governance.

CONCLUSION

Castiglione creates with his brush, the visual imagery to raise the deeper existential questions from the depths of imperial interiority. As if in a mirror, his paintings give perspective to the lives and dealings of three emperors who sought not only to expand their geographical realm, but also to find intellectual and aesthetic affirmation for their aspirations. What these three emperors might have received as a spiritual gift in return, through the presence of Castiglione and his Jesuit companions is a broader understanding of the universality of the human condition: gratitude for the simple joys of life, granted to us by God, as well as a fear of death, loss and rejection, which only God can redress.



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THE SPIRITUAL PRINCIPLES INDISPENSABLE FOR THE BRI CONSTRUCTION

“一带一路”建设必不可少的精神原则

Yang Hengda 杨恒达

Abstract

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) proposed by China is now being carried out. The preparation for BRI is rich and sufficient. At the same time to achieve its material goals, the issue of values, ethics and spiritual principles is more and more attracting people's attention. President Xi advocates the spirit of the Silk Road and its intensive cultivation in the humanistic fields and cooperation among the humanities. His dream of a "community of shared interests, destiny and responsibility" will benefit mankind not only on the material side, but also on the spiritual side. The spiritual benefits especially will make the achievements of the BRI permanent. We therefore need to clarify the spiritual principles indispensable for the BRI construction, to help people all over the world to explore points of convergence with their own values, ethics, and spiritual beliefs, and invite them to unite in achieving the commonwealth state or grand harmony as advocated by Confucianism, that bears a family resemblance with the perspective advocated by the Parliament of World Religions 1993 Declaration toward a Global Ethic. Although the values are drawn from various cultural and political backgrounds that differ in thousands of ways, a common basic principle can, nevertheless, be found. That means there is always the possibility for people all over the world to find something common in their spiritual need. My

摘要

中国提议的“一带一路”倡议现在正在付诸实施。“一带一路”的准备工作做得丰富有序而充分。在实现物质目标的同时，价值观、伦理、精神原则的问题正在越来越吸引人们的注意。习近平主席提倡丝路精神及其人文领域的精耕细作和人文合作。他的“利益共同体、命运共同体、责任共同体”梦想将不仅在物质方面，而且也在精神方面裨益人类。精神的福泽尤其将使“一带一路”的成就与世长存。因此我们需要阐明“一带一路”建设必不可少的精神原则，帮助全世界的人们探究他们自己价值观、伦理、精神信仰的趋同点，使他们团结起来实现儒家思想提倡的“大同”，这和世界宗教议会1993年的《世界伦理宣言》所提倡的观点极其相似。虽然价值观的汲取，来自十分不同的各种各样文化政治背景，但是仍然可以找到一种共同的基本原则。这意味着，对于全世界的人来说，总是有可能在他们的精神需求中找到共同的东西。我的论文将表明，儒家“君子”理想的智慧必然在“一带一路”建设适当精神原则和利益共同体、命运共同体、责任共同体的形成中发挥重要作用。

paper will show that the wisdom of the Confucian “*junzi*” ideal must play an important role in the formation of appropriate spiritual principles for BRI construction and the community of shared interests, destiny and responsibility.



THE SPIRITUAL PRINCIPLES INDISPENSABLE FOR BRI CONSTRUCTION

The BRI Project initiated by the Chinese government is now under construction in an increasingly progressive and orderly way. As the BRI Progress, Contributions and Prospects points out,

The Belt and Road Initiative upholds the principles of extensive consultation, joint contribution, and shared benefits. It follows a Silk Road spirit featuring peace and cooperation, openness and inclusiveness, mutual learning and mutual benefit. It focuses on policy coordination, connectivity of infrastructure, unimpeded trade, financial integration, and closer people-to-people ties. It has turned ideas into actions and vision into reality, and the initiative itself into a public product widely welcomed by the international community. (Office of the Leading Group for Promoting BRI, 2019)

This is the general principle animating the BRI’s basic ideas and targets, intended to address the challenges along the BRI way, including different religions and faiths, different habits and customs, different political influences, different economic systems and levels, different cultures and cultivations, different values as well as different nations with unbalanced development. The problems inherited from previous history and the conflicts of realistic interests caused by differences in values and religious beliefs as well as by competition for resources such as petroleum, inevitably will create various difficulties for the BRI construction.

President Xi’s “community of shared interests, destiny and responsibility” (hereinafter referred to as “community”) is a great dream,

and it involves not only capital investment, the building-up of a firm economic structure and an effective network of transportation, as well as cooperation based on a convergence of economic interests, but it also lies in the establishment of a spiritual principle universally applicable. The realisation of genuine “community” is in the final analysis a spiritual issue, an issue of values, that is, it depends on whether a common orientation can be found in the basic values of different cultures. Five goals for the BRI were stated in the central Party journal *Qiushi*. (Ou X., et. al., 2017, pp.12-17) While four of these focused on the material and operational dimensions, the fifth goal emphasised closer people-to-people ties, following the direction asserted by President Xi Jinping, “to lay importance on the intensive cultivation in the humanistic fields, respect the different peoples’ cultures and histories, customs and habits.” (Xi, 2016) This fifth dimension, however, raises questions that require reflection on our common spiritual principles through the exchange and communication of values. We need to seek a basic principle that emerges from the common spiritual needs of people all over the world.

Although the values and ethical perspectives of all the religions in the world vary greatly, a promising way forward already may have been outlined for us in the *Declaration toward a Global Ethic*, passed by the initial Parliament of the World’s Religions in 1993. The *Declaration* points out:

We affirm that there is an irrevocable, unconditional norm for all areas of life, for families and communities, for races, nations and religions. There already exist ancient guidelines for human behaviour which are found in the teachings of the religions of the world and which are the condition for a sustainable world order. (*Declaration toward a Global Ethic*, p.2)

The set of shared core values is a spiritual principle, which transcends the materialistic concerns of life but at the same time is related closely to them. It is universally applicable to any societies, any individuals, any families, any races, any countries, and any religions, and expressed

“一带一路”建设必不可少的精神原则

中国政府发起的“一带一路”倡议计划正在稳步有序地付诸实施。《共建“一带一路”倡议：进展、贡献与展望》指出：

共建“一带一路”倡议以共商共建共享为原则，以和平合作、开放包容、互学互鉴、互利共赢的丝绸之路精神为指引，以政策沟通、设施联通、贸易畅通、资金融通、民心相通为重点，已经从理念转化为行动，从愿景转化为现实，从倡议转化为全球广受欢迎的公共产品。（推进“一带一路”建设工作领导小组办公室，2019）

这是“一带一路”建设的基本理念和目标的总体原则。这个总体原则适合于“一带一路”沿线的复杂情况。这里包括不同宗教信仰、不同风俗习惯、不同政治势力、不同经济体制和水平、不同文化修养、不同价值观以及发展不平衡的各个民族。历史遗留的问题和价值观、宗教信仰的差异以及石油等资源争夺引发的现实利益冲突等，不可避免地会给“一带一路”建设造成各种困难。

真正的“共同体”的实现，归根结底是一个精神的问题，也就是说，它取决于是否能在各种文化的基本价值观中寻求到共同的价值取向。

习近平主席的三个“共同体”的打造是一个伟大的梦想，不仅是资金的投入，不仅是牢靠的经济结构和有效的交通运输设施的建立，不仅是出于经济利益考虑的合作，更在于一个普遍适用的精神原则的确立。真正的“共同体”的实现，归根结底是一个精神的问题，也就是说，它取决于是否能在各种文化的基本价值观中寻求到共同的价值取向。中共中央《求是》期刊讨论了“一带一路”倡议的五个目标。（欧晓理等人，2017，第12-17页）其中四个目标着重于物质和操作层面，第五个目标强调民心相

通，如习近平主席所强调的要“注重人文领域的精耕细作，尊重各国人民文化历史、风俗习惯。”（习近平，2016）总之，这五个方面提出了要求通过价值观的交流和沟通思考我们共同的精神原则的问题。我们需要寻求出自全世界人民共同精神需求的基本原则。

虽然世界各种宗教的价值观和伦理观各不相同，但是一条大有可为的前进道路已经在原先由世界宗教议会在1993年通过的《世界伦理宣言》中为我们概括出来。《宣言》指出：

我们坚信，在一起生活领域，无论家庭、社会、种族、国家和各种宗教，存在着一种不可违逆、需无条件遵循的标准。人类的行为准则古已有之，人们可以从世界各大宗教的教义之中找到这些准则，它们为一种可以延续的世界秩序提供了条件。（《世界伦理宣言》，第2页）

这一套共同的核心价值是一种超越生命的物质牵挂但同时又同其密切相关的精神原则。它普遍适用于任何社会、任何个人、任何家庭、任何种族、任何国家、任何宗教，并被以不同形式的不同文化表达出来。

我们把人类看做自己的家庭。我们必须努力做到仁慈与慷慨。我们不应该只为自己而活，更应该也为他人服务，永远不忘记老弱病穷、残疾人、难民和孤苦无依之人。任何时候，也不应该把任何一个人作为二等公民来看待或对待，或者以任何方式去剥削利用他人。男女两性间应该拥有一种平等的伙伴关系。我们决不做任何种类不道德的性行为。我们应该摒弃一切形式的控制或虐待。（《世界伦理宣言》，第3页）

儒家思想早在两千多年前就表达了相似的思想：

大道之行也，天下为公，选贤与能，讲信修睦。故人不独亲其亲，不独子其子，使老有所终，壮有所用，幼有所长，矜、寡、孤、独、废疾者皆有所养，男有分，女有归。货恶其弃于地也，不必藏于己；力恶其不出于身也，不必为己。是故谋闭而不兴，盗窃乱贼而不作，故外户而不闭，是谓大同。（《礼记·礼运》）

by different cultures in different forms.

We consider humankind our family. We must strive to be kind and generous. We must not live for ourselves alone, but should also serve others, never forgetting the children, the aged, the poor, the suffering, the disabled, the refugees, and the lonely. No person should ever be considered or treated as a second-class citizen or be exploited in any way whatsoever. There should be equal partnership between men and women. We must not commit any kind of sexual immorality. We must put behind us all forms of domination or abuse. (*Declaration toward a Global Ethic*, p.3)

Confucianism expressed a similar idea more than two thousand years ago:

When the perfect order prevails, the world is like a home shared by all. Virtuous and worthy people are elected to public office, and capable persons hold posts of gainful employment in society; peace and trust among all people are the maxims of living. All people love and respect their own parents and children, as well as the parents and children of others. There is caring for the old; there are jobs for the adults; there are nourishment and education for the children. There is a means of support for the widows, and the widowers; for all who find themselves alone in the world; and for the disabled. Every man and woman has an appropriate role to play in the family and society. A sense of sharing displaces the effects of selfishness and materialism. A devotion to public duty leaves no room for idleness. Intrigues and conniving for ill gain are unknown. Villains such as thieves and robbers do not exist. The door to every home need never be locked and bolted by day or night. These are the characteristics of an ideal world, the commonwealth state. (*Liji IX, Li-yun*)

The more practical implications of the Confucian ideal of “*datong*” (大同)—the great harmony or the commonwealth state, which affirms that “the world is like a home shared by all”—are as follows: a) Every person should participate in its public affairs, and elect the leadership of ability, talent, and virtues, to build

a harmonious society; b) While every person cannot avoid taking his family as the starting point of his consideration of interests, at the same time he should take a broad view of the society, sharing the social responsibility of mutual caring, mutual assistance, and developing a harmonious society; c) We must cooperate to develop the wealth and human force resources

The realisation of genuine “community” is in the final analysis a spiritual issue, an issue of values, that is, it depends on whether a common orientation can be found in the basic values of different cultures.

with sustainability; and d) We must realise social security and harmony through integrity and mutual trust. This is not a utopian illusion, but the basic root of the spiritual guiding principles for achieving the BRI’s “community of shared interests, destiny and responsibility” or of the “human destiny community”.

But how can the “*datong*’s” four points to be realised? There is a need to cultivate the personality of a “*junzi*” (君子, “exemplary man,” or as in James Legge’s translation, “superior man”) based on the two key characters “*zhong*” (忠, “loyalty”) and “*shu*” (恕, “reciprocity”) in Confucianism, because this is “one principle that can run through the whole of one’s life” (*Confucian Analects* 4.15). These can be counted as the two key concepts supporting the foundation toward a global ethic, and the important spiritual principle of the community of shared interests, destiny and responsibility.

“*Zhong*” (忠, loyalty) means faithfulness to one’s own sincerity and cordialness, as well as one’s own spiritual principle, that is, to recognise the world and the self with sincere mind and rectified heart, to treat other people with sincerity and cordialness by discarding the false

儒家“大同”理想肯定“天下为公”，其实际含义如下：a) 每个人都应该参与天下的公共事务，选出有能力、有才华、有德行的领导来建立和谐社会；b) 尽管任何人都无法避免把家庭作为他利益考虑的出发点，但是他同时应该有宽广的社会观点，分担互相关怀、互相帮助、发展和谐社会的社会责任；c) 我们必须可持续地合作开发财富和人力资源；d) 我们必须靠诚信和互信来实现社会安全与和谐。这不是一种乌托邦的幻想，而是实现“一带一路”“利益共同体、命运共同体、责任共同体”或者实现“人类命运共同体”的精神指导原则的根本。

但是如何才能实现“大同”的四点含义呢？必须培养立足于儒家思想中“忠恕”二字的“君子”人格，因为这是孔子“一以贯之”（《论语》4·15）之道。这两个字可以被看作支持世界伦理基础的两个关键概念和利益共同体、命运共同体、责任共同体的重要精神原则。

从道德理解的角度看，“耻”和“罪”可以建立起一致的可能性，共同针对违背共同的基本精神原则的行为。

“忠”意味着忠于自己的诚挚之心，也就是正心诚意认识世界、认识自己，以诚挚待人，其中包含着去伪存真，真心待人的意思。孔子的学生曾子说：“为人谋而不忠乎？”意思就是说，为他人办事，要自问有没有做到尽心竭力。所以要做到“忠”就要摆脱自私和主观偏见的干扰。正确理解“忠”能帮助我们区分具有普适性的真正精神原则和以虚伪方式提出的政治策略。即使我们的目标是“大同”，按照孔子的要求，重要的在于“正名”，因为“名不正，则言不顺；言不顺，则事不成。”（《论语》13·3）

“恕”指的是一种相互性的意识。孔子的解释是：“己所不欲，勿施于人。”（《论语》15·24）这是和西方黄金律一样重要的中国伦理信条。

“忠恕”两个字概括了中国人以“仁”为核心，共同面对利益、责任、命运的伦理基础和道德理想。这是“一带一路”建设必不可少的精神原则。

儒家思想中推崇的“君子”，是贯彻

这种精神原则的楷模。“君子”并非天生。孟子指出：“天降大任于斯人也，必先苦其心志，劳其筋骨，饿其体肤，空乏其身，行拂乱其所为，所以动心忍性，增益其所不能。”（《孟子》12·15）能担当大任者，均需经过艰难的修身历练。“君子”的修身尤其重要，“君子”的许多优秀品质均来源于此。在与“小人”的对比中，“君子”品质的优点尤为突出，例如，“君子坦荡荡，小人常戚戚。”（《论语》7·37）说明“君子”心胸宽广，能够包容和满足。“君子周而不比，小人比而不周。”（《论语》2·14）说明“君子”普遍和人亲近而不只是和少数几个人亲近。“君子喻于义，小人喻于利。”（《论语》4·16）说明“君子”明白大义，懂得处理好义和利之间的关系。“君子成人之美，不成人之恶。小人反是。”（《论语》12·16）说明“君子”一贯成全别人的好事，而不助长别人做坏事。“君子和而不同，小人同而不和。”（《论

语》13·23）说明“君子”寻求和谐，彼此协调，而不是强求苟同。“君子求诸己，小人求诸人。”（《论语》15·21）说明“君子”勇于担当。

“君子”必须接近有道之人，从而学会自我批评，纠正错误。这样他自己也成为有道之人。孔子说：“君子食无求饱，居无求安，敏于事而慎于言，就有道而正焉，可谓好学也已。”（《论语》1·14）“君子”不追求物质享受和感官满足，在这一点上，孔子提倡向颜回学习：“一箪食，一瓢饮，在陋巷，人不堪其忧，回也不改其乐。”（《论语》6·11）按照孔子的说法，“君子”做事勤快，说话谨慎，也就是“君子欲讷于言而敏于行。”（《论语》4·24）或者“先行其言而后从之。”（《论语》2·13）但是，即使“君子”少言寡语，在他心中却始终有一个他在行动中遵循的原则。所以孔子说：“君子务本，本立而道生。”

那么什么是这个本呢？我们该如何理解其社会含义呢？孔子接着说：“孝弟也者，其为仁之本与？”（《论语》1·2）按照儒

and retaining the true. When Legge translated “为人谋而不忠乎” into “whether, in transacting business for others, I may have been not faithful” (*Confucian Analects*, 1.4), he understood “zhong (忠)” clearly as faithfulness. If one is faithful to others and others’ affairs, as well as to the truth of the world, one has to get rid of the disturbances caused by selfish interests and subjective prejudices. To understand “zhong” in its right sense can help us to distinguish a true spiritual principle with universality from political strategy posed in a hypocritical way. Even if our goal is the “datong” (大同) or “human destiny community”, according to Confucius, it is important to rectify the names (正名)—meaning to live by the truth in them—because “when names are not correct, what is said will not sound reasonable, affairs will not culminate in success.” (*Confucian Analects*,

of toughening and self-cultivation. The self-cultivation of a “junzi” is especially important. It helps to form a “junzi’s” many excellent qualities. In contrast with “xiaoren” (小人, the mean man), the advantages of “junzi’s” qualities stand out strikingly. For example, “The superior man (i.e. junzi) is satisfied and composed; the mean man (i.e. xiaoren) is always full of distress.” (*Confucian Analects*, 7.37) This means that “junzi” knows satisfaction and has an open mind. “The superior man is catholic and not partisan. The mean man is partisan and not catholic.” (*Confucian Analects*, 2.14) This means “junzi” keeps friendly ties widely and never forms cliques with a few people. “The mind of the superior man is conversant with righteousness; the mind of the mean man is conversant with gain.” (*Confucian Analects*, 4.16) This indicates that a “junzi” understands

From the perspective of moral understanding, a comparison of “shame” (*chi*) and “guilt” can establish the possibility of a consensus, a united front against the acts that violate the common basic spiritual principle.

13.3)

“Shu” (恕, reciprocity)” is explained by Confucius himself as “What you do not want done to yourself, do not do to others,” (*Confucian Analects* 15.24) which is a Chinese ethical creed as important as the Golden Rule in the West.

The two characters “zhong” and “shu” thus summarise the ethical foundation and moral ideal of the Chinese commitment to benevolence as the proper way to share interests, responsibility and destiny. This is the spiritual principle indispensable for the BRI construction.

“Junzi” held much in esteem by Confucianism is a model for carrying out this spiritual principle. “Junzi” is not innate. Mencius said, “Before Heaven lays a grand mission on a man, it will first distress him in the spirit and exhaust him in the body, causing him to suffer from hunger and poverty, and subverting every bit of his effort, with which to inspire his ambition, forge his endurance, and remedy his defects in capacity” (Mencius, 12.15). Those who can assume a grand mission must undergo the hard experience

well what righteousness means and knows how to deal with the relationship between righteousness and gain. “The superior man seeks to perfect the admirable qualities of men and does not seek to perfect their bad qualities. The mean man does the opposite of this.” (*Confucian Analects*, 12.16) This means that a “junzi” always helps others to realise their noble ideals but not their evil ideas. “The superior man is affable, but not adulatory; the mean man is adulatory, but not affable.” (*Confucian Analects*, 13.23) This means that “junzi” seeks harmony and mutual coordination, not superficial agreement with others. “What the superior man seeks, is in himself. What the mean man seeks, is in others.” (*Confucian Analects*, 15.21) This means that a “junzi” assumes but never escapes his own responsibility.

“Junzi” must be close to men who follow the *Dao* so as to learn from self-criticism and correct mistakes. In this way can he himself be a man who follows the *Dao*. Confucius says, “He who aims to be a man of complete virtue (i.e. junzi), in his food does not seek to gratify his

家思想推己及人的原则，这个“本”不局限于家庭，而是具有更广泛社会性的，用孟子的话说，就是：“老吾老，以及人之老；幼吾幼，以及人之幼。”（《孟子》1·7）更是儒家推崇的：“己欲立而立人，己欲达而达人。”（《论语》6·30）所以，“本立而道生，”这个道就是上述的基本精神原则。在这个原则指导下，“君子”和圣徒以及各种文明的精神代表都可以进行沟通、交流和协调。“君子”的思想品质铸就了他与世无争的本质。孔子说：“君子无所争。必也射乎！揖让而升，下而饮。其争也君子。”（《论语》3·7）从这段话中，我们可以看出，“君子”不为世俗利益而争斗，若要说争的话，也是友谊竞赛，场下礼貌相待，场上打的是一种友好的擂台，致力于双赢。赛后大家一起饮酒言欢。

儒家思想严格规定了一套完整的“君子”人格，概括起来可以用传统上称之为“国之四维”的“礼义廉耻”四个字来表述。前三个字已经包含在上面关于“君子”的描述中了，这里着重讨论“耻”字。中国的伦理文化和西方的“罪感”文化不一样，中国人也许不知道西方文化中的“罪”是什么，但是他们像Ruth Benedict所描述的日本人一样，认为耻是“德之本，敏于耻的人会贯彻一切良好行为的规则。”（Benedict，第224页）从道德理解的角度看，“耻”和“罪”可以建立起一致的可能性，共同针对违背共同的基本精神原则的行为。

发掘中国古代精神财富，我们可以找到更多属于这种精神原则的思想观点。墨子的“兼爱”是一种更容易让人联想到“博爱”的思想，他认为：兼相爱就要“视人之国若视其国，视人之家若视其家，视人之身若视其身”（《墨子》“兼爱”中第十五）；他的“非攻”形成了耶稣、托尔斯泰、甘地、马丁路德金等伟大人物所提倡的非暴力精神遗产的一部分；他的“节用”思想已经预期了现代关于节约资源、合理使用资源以实现可持续发展的重要主张，和联合国可持续发展目标所坚持的主张相一致。（联合国，2019）

最后，我们还需要达成一个关键性的共识，“三个共同体”必不可少的精神原则的普适性是无可怀疑的，因为它本身就存在于各种文化之中，但是要在内心里、在行动上加以实行，还需要花出巨大的努力。尤其

在“三个共同体”的问题上，不仅在于需要有共同的精神原则，还需要有坚持实行这种原则的伦理态度和决心。究竟是将“三个共同体”的倡议看做一种政治战略，还是具有普适性的精神原则，这是决定“一带一路”能否真正地、长久地造福于沿线地区乃至于全世界人民的关键。



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appetite, nor in his dwelling place does he seek the appliances of ease; he is earnest in what he is doing, and careful in his speech; he frequents the company of men of principle (i.e. men who follow the *Dao*) that he may be rectified:—such a person may be said indeed to love to learn.” (*Confucian Analects*, 1.14) “*Junzi*” do not think much of materialistic enjoyment and sensual satisfaction, on this point Confucius encourages us to learn from Yan Hui: “With a single bamboo dish of rice, a single gourd dish of drink, and living in his mean narrow lane, while others could not have endured the distress, he did not allow his joy to be affected by it.” (*Confucian Analects*, 6.11) According to Confucius, “*junzi*” pays more attention to action, that is, acts diligently, speaks carefully: “The superior man wishes to be slow in his speech and earnest in his conduct.” (*Confucian Analects*, 4.24) or “He acts before he speaks, and afterwards speaks according to his actions.” (*Confucian Analects*, 2.13) However, even if he does not speak, in his mind there is always a principle he follows in his action. So Confucius says: “The superior man bends his attention to what is radical. That being established, all practical courses naturally grow up.”

Then what is the radical? How are we to understand its social implications? Confucius goes on: “Filial piety and fraternal submission—are they not the root of all benevolent actions?” (*Confucian Analects*, 1.2) According to the Confucian principle of “*Shu*” (恕, reciprocity, or, considering others in one’s own place), this root is not confined within a family, but is widely social. Recall the words of Mencius: “Respect your own elders and extend such respect to those of others; cherish your own young and extend such cherishment to those of others.” (*Mencius*, 1.7) Memorable and very typical is what Confucius says: “Wishing to be established himself, he seeks also to establish others; wishing to be enlarged himself, he seeks also to enlarge others.” (*Confucian Analects*, 6.30) Therefore, from a cultivated root a lifelong principle emerges. This principle is evident in the guidance given by “*junzi*” and saints as well as the spiritual representatives of different civilisations, which strengthen our capacities for carrying on

exchange, communication and co-ordination. The “*junzi*” does not strive for worldly recognition. If there should be contention, then it is a friendly competition, before which each is polite to the other, while during the process of competition, each is friendly to the other, focusing on win-win. After the competition, the rival friends will have a drink. (*Confucian Analects*, 3.7).

The nature of the Confucian “*junzi*” can be summarised as the four characters of “*li*” (礼, propriety), “*yi*” (义, righteousness), “*lian*” (廉, honesty), and “*chi*” (耻, shame) that are traditionally considered in China as the “four cardinal principles of the country.” The first three characters have been involved in the above description of the “*junzi*”. Here the fourth character “*chi*” should be clarified. The Chinese ethical culture is very different from the Western “guilt” culture. The Chinese may not know what guilt means in the Western culture, but like the Japanese (who have been influenced greatly by the Confucian culture), as described by Ruth Benedict, they hold that “*chi*” or shame is “the root of virtue. A man who is sensitive to it will carry out all the rules of good behaviour.” (Benedict, p. 224) From the perspective of moral understanding, a comparison of “*chi*” and “guilt” can establish the possibility of a consensus, a united front against the acts that violate the common basic spiritual principle.

To go further into the spiritual wealth of the ancient China, we find more ideas that relate to this spiritual principle. Mozi’s “*jianai*” (兼爱, universal love), an idea that is often associated with Christian notions of fraternity, means “to treat the states of others as one’s own, to regard the houses of others as one’s own, and to treasure the bodies of others as one’s own” (*Mozi*, Chapter 15); his “*feigong*” (非攻, the condemnation of war) forms part of the spiritual legacy of non-violence advocated by great men such as Jesus, Leo Tolstoy, Gandhi, and Martin Luther King; his idea of “*jiyong*” (节用, economising expenditure) already anticipates modern thinking regarding the importance of practicing thrift in managing resources well so as to realise sustainable development, corresponding to the objectives upheld by the United Nations’ Sustainable

Development Goals, (United Nations, 2019).

CONCLUSION

We need to reach a key common view that the universality of the spiritual principle indispensable for the “community” is above suspicion, because it originally exists in various cultures. But great efforts will have to be made to carry it out in mind and in action. Especially on the issue of the “community”, not only a shared spiritual principle is needed, but also we need the ethical attitude and decision to carry out the principle perseveringly. In the final analysis, whether to take the initiative of the “community” as a political strategy or a spiritual principle with universality, it is the key to decide if the BRI can bring in the long run a sustainable benefit to the people along the zone of the BRI, even of the world.



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IS THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE IN AFRICA SUSTAINABLE?

“一带一路”倡议在非洲能否持续?

Francis C. Nwachukwu

ABSTRACT

In 2000, the China-Africa relationship was further strengthened with the establishment of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). The FOCAC offers a platform for consultation and cooperation mechanisms aimed at deepening diplomatic, security, trade and investment relations between China and African countries. Later came the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013, an international trade network initiated by China that connects the three continents of Asia, Europe and Africa. The BRI focuses on the following key areas: cultural exchange; policy coordination; facilities connectivity; trade and investment; and financial integration. The BRI shares development objectives similar to those of the United Nations' Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). In fact, the BRI implements part of the SDGs and provides a practical mechanism to strengthen the Sino-Africa relationship, which Africa can leverage to meet its Sustainable Goals. Africa is linked through the "Road" of the BRI plan and has received infrastructural projects funded by China to facilitate trade and integration of the national economies along the trading route. Through the establishment of Economic and Trade Zones which attracts investments from Chinese companies, and building infrastructures such as sea ports and railways, China through the BRI framework is helping Africa meet UN SGD Goal 9 concerning industry, innovation and infrastructure. A practical effect is that the BRI is helping African countries overcome the

摘要

2000年，中非合作论坛成立，中非关系进一步加强。中非合作论坛为深化中非外交、安全、贸易和投资关系提供了磋商与合作机制的平台。随后，中国于2013年发起了“一带一路”倡议，这是一个连接亚洲、欧洲和非洲三大洲的国际贸易网络。“一带一路”重点关注以下几个领域：文化交流、政策协调、设施连通、贸易和投资，以及金融一体化。“一带一路”的发展目标与联合国可持续发展目标是高度契合的。事实上，“一带一路”落实了一部分联合国可持续发展目标，为加强中非关系提供了切实可行的机制，非洲可以利用这一机制来实现其可持续发展目标。非洲通过“一带一路”实现了互联互通，并接受了中国投资的基础设施项目，为沿线国家贸易和经济一体化提供便利。通过建设吸引中国企业投资的经贸合作区，建设港口、铁路等基础设施，中国通过“一带一路”框架，正帮助非洲实现联合国可持续发展目标中关于工业、创新和基础设施建设的第九项目标。实际效果便是，“一带一路”正在帮助非洲国家克服基础设施差距，创造就业机会，获取技术，并促进国家间的融合。

infrastructure gap, create jobs, acquire skills and promote integration between countries.



IS THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE IN AFRICA SUSTAINABLE?

In 2013, China announced the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) development strategy and in the same year, the United Nations announced its Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (Shah, 2016). The BRI encompasses two corridors – the

that capture most attention are the growing investments from Chinese entrepreneurs. According to Feng and Pilling (2019), the volume of Chinese investments in Africa was 2 percent of the US level in 2000, rose to 55 percent of that level in 2014, and now is on track within a decade to surpass the US levels. There is increasing Chinese presence in Africa, which is evidence of growing Sino-Africa relations. Africa’s inclusion in BRI opens opportunities for development projects and investments from China which may enable Africa to meet its 2030 Agenda for a socially fair, prosperous and secure environment.



Figure 1. The Belt and Road Routes (Yamada & Palma, 2018)

Silk Road Economic Belt (referred to as “Belt”) and the 21st-century Maritime Silk Road (referred to as “Road”). There are about 60 countries linked to the BRI trading route reaching about 63 percent of the global population and amounting to 29 percent of global GDP (Solmecke, 2016). China aims to build a trade network that connects three continents - Asia, Europe, and Africa - while building land and maritime infrastructures that integrate the economies of the countries on the trading routes (Shah, 2016; Solmecke, 2016). In Africa, beyond the massive BRI projects

THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE

The Silk Road Economic Belt was announced by the Chinese president Xi Jinping in 2013 at Nazarbayev University in Kazakhstan. A month later in October of the same year Xi announced the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road during a speech at the Indonesian parliament (Solmecke, 2016). The historic “Silk Road” which dates before the Common Era (BCE) highlights organised trade and exchange among peoples

“一带一路”倡议在非洲能否持续？

2013年，中国宣布“一带一路”发展战略，同年，联合国宣布其可持续发展目标（SDGs）（Shah, 2016）。“一带一路”包括两条走廊——“丝绸之路经济带”（简称“带”）和“21世纪海上丝绸之路”（简称“路”）。与“一带一路”贸易路线相关的国家约有60个，约占全球人口的63%，占全球GDP的29%（Solmecke, 2016）。中国的目标是建立一个连接亚洲、欧洲和非洲三大洲的贸易网络，同时建设陆地和海洋基础设施，使贸易路线上的国家经济一体化

存在日益增多，这是中非关系不断发展的有力证据。非洲参与“一带一路”建设，为中国的发展项目和投资提供了机会，有助于非洲落实联合国2030年可持续发展议程，实现社会公平、繁荣和安全的环境。

“一带一路”倡议

2013年，中国国家主席习近平在哈萨克斯坦纳扎尔巴耶夫大学宣布建设“丝绸之路经济带”。一个月后，同年10月，习在印度尼西亚国会发表演讲，宣布建设“21世纪海上丝绸之路”（Solmecke, 2016）。古代丝



图1 “一带一路”路线 (Yamada & Palma, 2018)

(Shah, 2016; Solmecke, 2016)。在非洲，除了宏伟的“一带一路”项目备受瞩目外，中国企业家的投资也在不断增长。根据Feng和Pilling(2019)的研究，中国在非洲的投资额在2000年是美国的2%，2014年上升到了55%，现在有望在10年内超过美国。中国在非洲的

绸之路可追溯到公元前，主要以各国人民之间有组织的贸易和交流为主，他们的商队从中央王国(现在的中国)的城市(大连、厦门、天津、广州、武汉、上海等)出发，途经中亚各国，到达古代波斯帝国，最后抵达欧洲 (Etemad, 2016)。这些商队用骆驼或马驮着

whose caravans travelled the long-range trade routes starting from the cities of the Middle Kingdom (present-day China) such as Dalian, Xiamen, Tianjin, Guangzhou, Wuhan, Shanghai and many more, through the countries of Central

foreign trade. China's geostrategic objective is to reduce dependence on the Malacca Strait, which carries over 90 percent of China's sea borne trade, and to guarantee an uninterrupted supply of raw materials (Koboević, Kurtela, & Vujičić, 2018).



Figure 2. UN 17 Sustainable Development Goals

Asia to the ancient Persian Empire and onto Europe (Etemad, 2016). The caravans carried their goods on camels or horses and made stops at designated locations called “*Caravansera*” to rest, re-stock food and water and set-off again till they reach a trading city where goods were exchanged through barter (Etemad, 2016). The BRI seeks to reestablish the historical Silk Road characterised by the caravan traders now using modern transportation systems, building upon new or upgraded infrastructures to support the integration of the BRI countries (Shah, 2016).

The 21st-century Maritime Silk Road corridor is a maritime route that links China with South and Southeast Asia, with connections to East and North Africa and Europe. The “Road” encompasses seas and oceans such as the South China Sea, Indian Ocean, Arabian Sea, Strait of Malacca, Red Sea, Persian Gulf and Gulf of Bengal. Although the “Belt” offers new possibilities, the volume of transport and the costs of overland travel makes the maritime “Road” an indispensable component to China’s

Referred as the “Malacca Dilemma,” China considers it risky to rely exclusively on the Straits of Malacca, and is addressing this risk by building ports in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), as in Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Myanmar (Koboević et al., 2018). China is also building

The BRI ushers in a different form of China’s engagement with Africa in which a core objective is to promote trade through investments and building infrastructures.

transport infrastructures essential to enhance maximum use of these port facilities. The BRI projects will facilitate China’s international trade cooperation, and aims to create the world’s largest platform promoting trade, financial collaboration, social and cultural cooperation among countries

他们的货物，在被称为“Caravanserai”的指定地点停下来休息，重新储存食物和水，然后再次出发，直到到达一个贸易城市，在那里通过以物易物的方式交换货物(Etemad,

目的是减少对马六甲海峡的依赖（中国90%以上的海运贸易都由此运输），同时保证原材料供应不会中断(Koboević, Kurtela & Vujičić, 2018)。中国认为完全依赖马六甲海



图2 联合国17项可持续发展目标

2016)。“一带一路”倡议旨在重建以商队商人为特征的古代丝绸之路，以全新的或提升的基础设施为基础，使用现代化交通运输系统，支持“一带一路”国家实现融合(Shah, 2016)。

“21世纪海上丝绸之路”走廊是连接中国与南亚、东南亚、东非、北非和欧洲的海上通道。这条“路”覆盖了中国南海、印

度洋、阿拉伯海、马六甲海峡、红海、波斯湾和孟加拉湾等海洋。尽管“一带一路”中的“带”提供了新的可能性，但其运输量和陆路运输成本使海上之“路”成为中国对外贸易不可或缺的组成部分。中国的地缘战略

“一带一路”在非洲的可持续性

2015年9月，世界各国领导人在联合国峰会上通过了《2030年可持续发展议程》，该议程于2016年1月1日正式生效(联合国, n. d.)。17个可持续发展目标旨在全球实现经济增长、社会包容和环境可持续性。对于非洲国家来说，实现联合国可持续发展目标需要重新考虑经济政策，并与发展机构和私营部门建立新的伙伴关系。由于基础设施不完善、技术不足和缺乏生产能力，非洲迄今对全球贸易的贡献微乎其微。为了减少

“一带一路”倡议开启了中国与非洲交往的新模式，其核心目标是通过投资和基础设施建设促进贸易。

on the trade route.

SUSTAINABILITY OF BELT AND ROAD IN AFRICA

The 2030 Agenda for the United Nations' Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) was adopted by world leaders at the UN Summit in

Africa is in need of a cooperative development model that is supportive of the UN's SDGs. China has the potential to help Africa fulfill its needs. The BRI provides a framework to enhance a strategic partnership between China and Africa that fosters socio-economic cooperation. During a visit to South Africa by President Xi, the Forum

BAGAMOYO SEZ MASTER PLAN




Figure 3. Bagamoyo Special Economic Zone (Barnes, 2014)

September 2015, and came into effect on January 1, 2016 (United Nations, n.d.). The 17 SDGs aim globally to achieve economic growth, social inclusion and environmental sustainability. For African countries, achieving the UN SDGs requires a rethinking of economic policies and new partnerships with development agencies and the private sector. Africa's heretofore insignificant contribution to global trade stems from inadequate infrastructure, skills and lack of capacity for production. To reduce poverty and enhance Africa's competitiveness in global trade would require Africans to adopt a local development model that maximises their national resources. The abundance of human and natural resources when properly harnessed, will support Africa's sustainable development. To this end

of China-Africa Cooperation pledged "(to) actively explore the linkages between China's initiatives of building the Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road and Africa's economic integration and sustainable development agenda" (Chen, 2018). Given China's interest in promoting the BRI, Africa should leverage the opportunities to meet its strategic needs.

Africa is in dire need of infrastructural development (Leke, Chironga, & Desvaux, 2018). China is funding infrastructure projects and investments that have long-term economic impact and this is crucial for Africa's sustainable development. Some of the existing infrastructure in Africa was built during the colonial era and is mostly dilapidated with little or no maintenance

贫困和提高非洲在全球贸易中的竞争力，非洲各国必须采取一种能够最大限度地利用本国资源的地方发展模式。充分利用好丰富的人力资源和自然资源，将有助于非洲的可持续发展。为此，非洲需要一种支持联合国可持续发展目标的合作发展模式。中国具备帮助非洲满足这种需求的潜力。“一带一路”

或实现现代化，使得继续运作日益困难。影响非洲基础设施发展的问题源于缺乏政治意愿来发起现代项目以满足城市化所产生的需求，再加上各种形式的腐败，导致项目要么成本过高，要么在某些情况下被放弃。其结果是，由于在运输货物和服务方面遇到困难，非洲在非洲内部贸易或与世界的贸易方

埃塞俄比亚	亚吉铁路	由中国进出口银行提供40亿美元贷款
肯尼亚	内罗毕—蒙巴萨马达拉卡快线	由中国进出口银行提供32亿美元贷款（计划建设到达乌干达、刚果民主共和国、卢旺达、布隆迪、南苏丹和埃塞俄比亚的铁路网）
吉布提	Doraleh多功能港	由中国进出口银行提供2.94亿美元贷款
吉布提	Damerjog 牲畜港	由中国进出口银行提供5100万美元贷款
吉布提	多功能自由贸易区	由中国招商银行提供1.5亿美元信贷

为加强中非战略伙伴关系、促进社会经济合作提供了框架。在习主席访问南非期间，中非合作论坛承诺“积极探讨中方建设‘丝绸之路经济带’和‘21世纪海上丝绸之路’倡议与非洲经济一体化和实现可持续发展的对接，”（Chen, 2018）。鉴于中方有兴趣推动“一带一路”建设，非洲应抓住机遇，满足其自身战略需求。

非洲急需基础设施建设（Leke, Chironga, & Desvaux, 2018）。中国正资助具有长期经济影响的基础设施项目和投资，这对非洲的可持续发展至关重要。非洲现有的一些基础设施是在殖民时期建造的，大部分已经破旧不堪，几乎没有或根本没有维修

面都表现不佳。

“一带一路”倡议开启了中国与非洲交往的新模式，其核心目标是通过投资和基础设施建设促进贸易。非洲城市化发展迅速，预计将成为世界上城市化发展最快的地区（Leke et al., 2018）。中国支持的基础设施项目和能力建设将帮助非洲建设和维护应对城镇化压力所需的基础设施。以下是“一带一路”在非洲的一些相关项目：

表1中“一带一路”相关项目帮助东非国家实现了联合国可持续发展目标中针对基础设施投资的第九项目标，以及针对为所有人提供交通和基本服务的第十项目标。埃塞俄比亚-吉布提电气化铁路提供连接内陆埃

or modernisation, making continued operation increasingly difficult. Issues that affect Africa's infrastructural development stem from a lack of political will to initiate modern projects to keep up with needs arising from urbanisation, compounded by forms of corruption which leaves projects either with bloated costs or in some cases abandoned. The consequence is that Africa has not performed well in either intra-African trade or trade with the world, due to difficulties encountered in transporting goods and services. (Ubi, 2018).

Here are some examples of BRI related projects in Africa:

The BRI linked projects in Table 1 have helped East African countries achieve UN SDG Goal 9 which targets investments in infrastructures and Goal 11 which targets provision of transport and basic services to all. The Ethiopia - Djibouti electrified railway provides both passenger and freight services connecting landlocked Ethiopia to the port of Djibouti. The Kenyan Madaraka Express, a standard gauge rail connecting the capital Nairobi to Mombasa cut the travel time

Ethiopia	Addis-Djibouti SGR	US\$4 billion loan financed by China Exim bank
Kenya	Nairobi- Mombasa Madaraka Express	US\$3.2 billion loan financed by China Exim bank (with rail network plans to Uganda, Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Burundi, South Sudan and Ethiopia)
Djibouti	Doraleh Multipurpose port	US\$294 million loan financed by China Exim bank
Djibouti	Damerjog Livestock Port	US\$51 million loan financed by China Exim bank
Djibouti	Multipurpose Free Trade Zone	US\$150 million credit from China Merchants

The BRI ushers in a different form of China's engagement with Africa in which a core objective is to promote trade through investments and building infrastructures. Africa's urbanisation is growing rapidly and predicted to be the fastest in the world (Leke et al., 2018). Chinese backed infrastructural projects and capacity building will help Africa build and maintain infrastructure needed to meet the pressure from urbanisation.

by more than half, offering an alternative to a bumpy bus ride on potholed highways that have caused fatal accidents (Sow, 2017). These projects are financed by loans and, with mounting debt issues, there are risks of debt sustainability and an inability by governments to address other social needs due to limited funding. Nevertheless, the projects do have positive social impact, especially in the area of transport and trade.

巴加莫约经济特区总体规划




图3 巴加莫约经济特区(Barnes, 2014)

塞俄比亚和吉布提港口的客运和货运服务。肯尼亚马达拉卡快线是一条连接首都内罗毕和蒙巴萨的标准轨距铁路，它将出行时间缩短了一半以上，人们不用再乘公交在坑坑洼洼的高速公路上一路颠簸，这些坑坑洼洼的道路已经造成了不少致命事故(Sow, 2017)。这些项目由贷款提供资金，随着债务问题日益加剧，债务可持续性存在风险，并且由于资金有限，政府无法满足其他社会需求。然而，这些项目确实具有积极的社会影响，特别是在运输和贸易领域。

吉布提的战略位置吸引了与“一带一路”相关的重大基础设施项目，如多功能港、自由贸易区、中国电信数据中心和中国首个海外海军基地(Chen, 2018)。中国在吉布提的商业和军事利益为亚丁湾的社会经济发展和反海盗行动提供了便利。

关键要素与挑战

“一带一路”倡议着眼于中国的战略利益，包括建立广泛的产品出口贸易网络。拥有多样化的陆地和海上航线网络，确保充足的资源供应，也符合中国的利益。然而，在非洲方面，有些国家没有进行适当的调查就

开始进行项目，这可能会导致负面后果，从而损害政府的最初利益。例如，图3显示了巴加莫约经济特区，这是一个位于坦桑尼亚的与中国和阿曼合作的价值100亿美元的项目，于2013年签署(Tairo, 2017)。由于坦桑尼亚政府无法履行其对该项目的承诺（价值2800万美元），招商局国际有限公司（CMHI）将融资来填补缺口。其结果是，坦桑尼亚政府将失去其所持有的控股权和这一长期项目带来的利益。将如此具有巨大经济潜力的庞大项目的完全所有权让给一家中国公司，可能不符合坦桑尼亚的国家利益。巴加莫约港建成后将成为东非最大的港口，预计将于2020年至2021年开始运营。

“一带一路”相关投资的好处

“一带一路”倡议旨在加强各国间的融合，促进经济增长。这为中国提供了一个出口商品和使中国基础设施企业国际化的市场准入机会——一个缓解产能过剩的机会(Chen, 2018)。其中一些好处包括：

- 工业生产能力——受“一带一路”影响，中国企业正在非洲国家开展业务。这些企业将提高非洲产品的工业

Djibouti has attracted major infrastructure BRI linked projects as a result of its strategic location, such as a multipurpose port, Free Trade Zone, China telecoms data centre and the location for China's first-ever overseas naval base (Chen, 2018). The Chinese commercial and military interests in Djibouti provide socio-economic development benefits and counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden.

KEY ELEMENTS AND CHALLENGES

The BRI addresses China's strategic interests such as building an extensive trade network for exporting its products. It is also in China's interest to have a diversified network of land and sea routes that guarantee an adequate supply of resources. On the African

The BRI is intended to increase the integration of different countries and boost economic growth. This offers China a market access opportunity to export its goods and internationalise Chinese infrastructure firms - an opportunity to offshore excess capacity (Chen, 2018). Some of the benefits include:

- Industrial capacity – Chinese companies influenced by the BRI are establishing business operations in African countries. These companies will improve the industrial capacity of African products with spillover effects on employment, capacity building and balance of trade.
- Infrastructure – Africa is in need of infrastructural development. BRI projects, such as ports and railways, will boost

There is a concern regarding the sustainability of these debt-based projects. Debts must be repaid and as interest mounts, money used for debt servicing could have been used for other development projects.

side, however, there are cases where countries embark on projects without due diligence that may result in negative consequences thereby eroding the initial benefit to the government. For example, Figure 3 shows the Bagamoyo Special Economic Zone (SEZ), a US\$10 billion project in Tanzania in partnership with China and Oman signed in 2013 (Tairo, 2017). Since the Tanzanian government was unable to fulfill its own commitment to the project, valued at US\$28 million, it will proceed with China Merchants Holdings International (CMHI) financing the shortfall. The consequence is that the Tanzanian government will lose its ownership stake and the benefits that accrue to this long-term project. It may not be in the national interest of Tanzania to cede to a Chinese entity the complete ownership of such a gigantic project with huge economic potential. The Bagamoyo Port when completed will be the largest in East Africa and is expected to start operation between 2020 and 2021.

BENEFITS OF BRI LINKED INVESTMENTS

infrastructure. Some of these projects have been years in the planning stage of African governments while lacking the financial capacity to execute them. China through the BRI is supporting African countries with finance to execute the projects. The rail network in East Africa financed by China will integrate the countries within the region and facilitate movement of people, goods, and services.

- Economic growth - Both industrial capacity and improved infrastructure contribute to economic growth. Local manufacturing with an efficient network of transport facilities connected to the port will facilitate trade. BRI financed industrial park, railways, roads, and ports will boost economic activities.

CHALLENGES

The BRI has also brought to Africa its own level of fears and concerns, such as:

生产能力，对就业、生产能力建设和贸易平衡产生溢出效应。

- 基础设施——非洲需要基础设施建设。港口、铁路等“一带一路”项目将促进基础设施建设。其中一些项目已经多年一直处于非洲国家政府的规

目会影响当地社区，并可能造成负面的环境后果。在启动这些项目时，应考虑到对气候变化的认识。根据联合国可持续发展目标，应当把气候变化放在优先考虑的位置，该目标对环境可持续性给予了适当关注。非洲各国

这些负债型项目的可持续性令人堪忧，债务必须偿还，随着利息的增加，用于偿债的资金本可以用于其他发展项目。

划阶段，但缺乏执行这些项目的财政能力。中国通过“一带一路”为非洲国家提供资金支持来实施这些项目。中国出资建设的东非铁路网，将使东非各国实现一体化，促进人员、货物和服务的流动。

- 经济增长——工业生产能力和改善的基础设施都有助于经济增长。本地制造业拥有了与港口相连的高效运输设施网络后，将进一步促进贸易。“一带一路”资助建设的产业园区、铁路、公路和港口将促进经济活动。

挑战

“一带一路”也给非洲带来了自身的恐惧和担忧，例如：

- 贸易不平衡——如果没有明确的战略，非洲国家将没有多少杠杆来平衡与中国的贸易。为重大基础设施项目提供资助，使中国在贸易谈判中具有竞争优势。非洲市场将继续会有中国商品不断涌入，因为开放市场准入可能是中国为项目提供资助的先决条件。
- 债务增加——“一带一路”在非洲的相关项目大多是由贷款或债务融资资助的(见表1)。这些负债性项目的可持续性令人堪忧。债务必须得偿还，随着利息的增加，用于偿债的资金本可以用于其他发展项目。同样令人担忧的还有违约的后果，因为一旦贷款无法偿还，中国将接管这些项目。对非洲国家来说，长期基础设施项目构成了国家安全问题。
- 环境——港口、铁路和工业园区等项

政府和中国企业应以联合国的目标为指导，确保项目从长期来看对东道国产生积极的影响。

- 影响力——需要确保“一带一路”项目不单是在战略上符合中国的经济和政治利益。需要进行适当的评估，以确保这些项目将对接受国的经济产生积极影响，而不应增加政府官员腐败的可能性。非洲急需基础设施建设、经济转型和尖端技术。满足这些需要的项目将促进可持续发展。可以公平有效地协商适当的补偿，以尽量减少受影响社区的问题，包括适当和及时的重新安置计划。最重要的是，“一带一路”项目应连接各国经济，促进经济增长和发展，实现中国和非洲国家之间的互利共赢。

结论

“一带一路”倡议是非洲国家可以利用的一个机会，来帮助其实现《2030年可持续发展议程》。联合国可持续发展目标要求与私营部门开展国际合作和协作，以实现这些目标。中国在非洲的投资和发展项目正不断深化，这就有必要了解这些项目对可持续发展的社会和经济影响，通过跨文化交流加深相互了解，确保不存在腐败，确保环境保护和执行受到认可的劳工标准。



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Translated by 翻译: Ke Xuexing 柯学星

- Trade imbalance - without a clear strategy, African countries will have little leverage to balance trade with China. Financing major infrastructure projects gives China a competitive edge during trade negotiations. African markets will continue to witness an influx of Chinese goods as opening market access may be a precondition for China to finance projects.
- Rising Debt – the majority of BRI linked projects in Africa are supported by loans or debt-based financing (see Table 1). There is a concern regarding the sustainability of these debt-based projects. Debts must be repaid and as interest mounts, money used for debt servicing could have been used for other development projects. There is also a concern regarding the consequences of default, as China takes over the projects when the loans cannot be repaid. For African nations this emerges as a national security issue for long-term infrastructure projects.
- Environment – projects such as ports, railways, and industrial parks affect local communities and may create negative environmental consequences. An awareness of climate change should be factored in while initiating these projects. Such a priority is in accordance with the UN SDG Goals, which give appropriate attention to environmental sustainability. African governments and Chinese companies should be guided by the UN Goals, to ensure projects have a positive impact on the host communities in the long run.
- Impact – there is a need to ensure that BRI projects are not only strategically aligned with Chinese economic and political interests. Proper assessment is required to ensure these projects will positively impact on the economy of the receiving countries and should not increase the potential for corruption by government officials. Africa is in great need of infrastructural development,

economic transformation, and cutting-edge technologies. Projects that respond to these needs will enhance sustainable development. Adequate compensation may be negotiated fairly and effectively to minimise the problems of affected communities, including appropriate and timely resettlement schemes. Most importantly, the BRI projects should connect national economies and boost economic growth and development that are mutually beneficial to both China and African countries.

CONCLUSION

The Belt and Road Initiative provides an opportunity which African countries can leverage to contribute towards the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development Goals. The SDGs require international cooperation and collaboration with the private sector to achieve these goals. As China deepens investments and development projects in Africa, there is a need to keep abreast of the social and economic impact of these projects towards sustainable development, deepen mutual understanding through cross-cultural exchanges, ensure no corruption, ensure environmental protection and the enforcement of acceptable labour standards.



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INTERVIEW WITH PROFESSORS MARGIT OSTERLOH AND BRUNO S. FREY

MARGIT OSTERLOH教授和BRUNO S. FREY教授专访

Stephan Rothlin 罗世范 interviews Margit Osterloh & Bruno S. Frey

STEPHAN ROTHLIN: You both have made impressive contributions to the field of Economics in which you have enriched the social sciences by exploring the integration of economics and politics, and achieved challenging results, often taking a stand against conventional views. You have introduced new insights into economics from a psychological perspective, which allowed you to address issues such as the transformation of anomalies, the nature of intrinsic motivation and the consequences of crowding effects. Your exploration of the relationship of Happiness and Economics is both original and widely discussed. In your public lecture at the University of Saint Joseph, Macau, on 8 May 2019 you have challenged the audience again with your suggestion of a new policy to address the pressing migrant crisis. You stayed in Macau for 5 full days in January 2019 exploring a wide variety of different aspects of this our beloved city. What particular aspects impressed you in the city of Macau?

FREY/OSTERLOH: We greatly enjoyed our stay in Macau because it offers two totally different aspects of life. On the one hand, a most lively city with beautiful buildings dating from the Portuguese period as well as several modern high-rise buildings. On the other hand, Macau is engaged in casinos where huge sums of money are involved and change hands.

罗世范博士：您二位在经济学领域做出了突出的贡献，通过对经济和政治融合的探索，丰富了社会科学的内涵，取得了富有挑战性的成果，而且您二位的观点经常与传统观点背道而驰。二位从心理学的角度引入了经济学的新见解，以阐述诸如异常现象的转变、内在动机的性质和挤出效应的后果等问题。您们对幸福和经济之间关系的探索也十分新颖，引发了广泛讨论。2019年5月8日，在澳门圣若瑟大学的演讲中，您们提出了关于解决紧迫移民危机的新政策建议，并再次在听众中引发讨论。2019年1月，二位在澳门停留了整整5天，探索了这个城市的方方面面，澳门的哪些方面给二位留下了特别深刻的印象呢？

FREY和OSTERLOH：我们非常享受这次澳门之行，因为澳门向我们展现出了生活截然不同的两面。一方面，它充满活力，有着葡萄牙时期的美丽建筑和现代化的高层建筑。另一方面，澳门的赌场十分发达，巨额资金在这里易手。

罗世范博士：二位不仅对澳门的历史古迹印象深刻，对澳门的当代建筑也颇有兴趣，您们甚至建议应该把像被当地人称为“吸血鬼”的葡京大饭店(Grand Lisboa)这样的建筑列入世界遗产，为什么？

FREY和OSTERLOH：从建筑学的角度来看，

STEPHAN ROTHLIN: You were impressed not only by the historic sites of Macau but also by the contemporary architecture so much so that you suggested that buildings like Grand Lisboa, nicknamed by the locals as “The Vampire,” should be listed as World Heritage, why?

FREY/OSTERLOH: Some of the modern buildings in the city of Macau are interesting from an architectural point of view as they present quite extraordinary features. One of them is indeed the Grand Lisboa which once dominated the old city but has a unique shape never seen anywhere else in the world. Moreover, it perfectly symbolises a cultural artefact of these times: how leisure industry and great architecture have merged

STEPHAN ROTHLIN: On the other side the image of the “Vampire” as a symbol of unrestricted greed may also reveal another aspect which came to light quite strongly in the current World Economic Forum in Davos, namely, a mounting concern about the ever-widening gap between the rich and the poor. The Gini index of Hong Kong for example is alarmingly high with 0.532. What is your key recommendation to overcome this gap?

FREY/OSTERLOH: We recommend that the conditions for persons who today have little chance of getting a higher income in the first place receive an education enabling them to raise their income in the future. Such a policy reduces the discrepancy in incomes reflected in a high Gini-Coefficient most effectively in the middle and long run.

STEPHAN ROTHLIN: You may like to share your take on the view of the Dutch philosopher Rutger Bregman who captured the attention by strongly focusing on raising taxes on the rich. We have discussed the effectiveness of the heritage tax: what is your take on it?

FREY/OSTERLOH: We think that it is not a particularly good idea to fight income inequality by trying to raise the tax rates of the rich. In our

view this is a rather trivial approach. There are several reasons why this will not work in the way expected:

- In countries in which citizens have low democratic rights to effectively participate in political decision making, the rich find many subtle (and not-so-subtle) means to influence government policy in order to protect their wealth. Examples are big investments like road construction and national defence projects which are contracted in a non-competitive way, favouring the established rich.
- Higher taxes usually lead to a higher government share in GNP. This strengthens bureaucracy and furthers corruption in many countries.
- The wealthy usually find innumerable legal and illegal possibilities to evade taxes. To give an example: If there is a high inheritance tax, the wealth will be given to children and grand children as gifts during their life-time. Thus, taxes on gifts have to be raised accordingly. This results in wealthy and powerful people transferring their wealth in even less visible ways.
- High taxes on additional incomes (marginal taxes) induce the wealthy to migrate to countries with lower tax rates.
- It might be that high taxes lower the incentives to work hard and to invest in the future.

As a result, the tax revenue may be smaller than expected, curbing the possibilities to finance collective goods such as infrastructure and education. Therefore it makes more sense to consider the reasons how to avoid the discrepancy of market incomes before taxes and transfers that tend to widen in many countries and regions. One measure is, as already mentioned, a good affordable public education for everybody. Another is to improve the infrastructure with the goal to enable people of lower income to have better economic opportunities, for example improving public transport so that lower income people are in a better situation to compete with persons of higher income.

澳门的一些现代建筑很有意思，因为它们极具个性。其中之一就是曾经统治着老城区的葡京大饭店，它不仅造型世界罕见，还是一个时代文化产物的完美象征，象征着休闲产业和伟大建筑是如何融合在一起的。

罗世范博士：另一方面，“吸血鬼”作为不受限制的贪婪形象的象征，也可能揭示出当前达沃斯世界经济论坛上相当引人注目的另一个方面，即对日益扩大的贫富差距的担忧。以香港为例，香港的基尼指数高得惊人，已经达到了0.532。您们有什么建议来缩小这个差距？

FREY和OSTERLOH：我们建议，对于那些现在几乎没有机会获得更高收入的人来说，他们应该接受教育，使他们能够在未来增加收入。这种政策在中长期内可以最有效地减少高基尼系数所反映出的收入差距。

罗世范博士：二位或许愿意分享一下对荷兰哲学家Rutger Bregman观点的看法，他因为强烈主张对富人征税而引发关注。我们讨论过遗产税的有效性，您们对此有何看法？

FREY和OSTERLOH：我们认为，通过提高富人税率来对抗收入不平等不是一个特别好的主意。在我们看来，这个方法相当微不足道。以下几个原因可以解释为什么这个方法不会像预期的那样奏效：

- 在公民拥有的民主权利有限，有效参与政治决策程度较低的国家中，富人有许多微妙(和不那么微妙)的手段来影响政府政策，以保护自己的财富。例如，公路建设和国防项目等大型投资项目以非竞争性的方式签订合同，这对富人十分有利。
- 高税收通常会提高政府在国民生产总值中的比重，这使得许多国家的官僚作风更为严重，并进一步导致腐败。
- 富人通常能找到无数合法或非合法的机会进行避税。比如说，如果遗产税很高，富人就会在有生之年将他们的财富以馈赠的形式赠与他们的儿孙。因此，赠与的税收也必须相应提高。结果是，有钱有势的人会以更隐蔽的方式转移他们的财富。
- 对额外收入征收高额税收(边际税)会

促使富人移居至税率较低的国家。

- 高税收还可能会降低人们努力工作和投资未来的动力。

因此，税收收入可能低于预期，从而限制了为基础设施和教育等集体资产投资的可能性。因此，更有意义的是考虑如何避免许多国家和地区所面临的税前市场收入和转让收入差距不断扩大的情况。我们刚刚前面提

其理念是发展FOCJ，即功能覆盖型竞争性辖区。FOCJ针对问题产生，并以有效和民主的方式组织起来应对相应问题。

到过，一个办法是为每个人提供良好的、可负担的公共教育。而另一个办法是改善基础设施，使低收入者有更好的经济机会，例如改善公共交通，使低收入者有更好的条件与高收入者竞争。

当然，投资教育和基础设施建设需要掌握资源。要实现公民(富人和不那么富有的人)缴纳相应税款的目标，必须满足以下先决条件。首先，他们能够参与税收使用的决策过程。其次，他们认为公共资金得到了有效利用，而且没有腐败。第三，他们受到尊重和公平的对待。在这种情况下，富人也更愿意为集体利益做出贡献。而对于不那么富裕的人而言，只要他们认为，与大规模转移支付政策相比，他们在这种情况下会生活得更好，那么合理的收入差距也是可以接受的。关键是，基本收入(即税前和转让前收入)并不是高度不平等的(反映在税前和转让前的高基尼系数上)。

瑞士是一个很好的例子。通过半直接民主加上各州及公社的政治权力下放，瑞士的公民能够参与公共资金使用的决策过程。瑞士不仅是世界上最富有的国家之一，而且是基本收入基尼系数最低的国家之一。与大多数其他国家相比，瑞士的不平等状况在过去几十年内没有加剧。此外，政府在国民生产总值中所占的比例相对较低，这意味着税收得到了有效使用。最后要补充的是，瑞士人的生活满意度在全球也高居前列。

总而言之，重点不应该是

Of course, resources are needed to pay for education and infrastructure. To attain the goal that (wealthy as well as not-so wealthy) citizens pay their tax-share the following preconditions must be fulfilled. First, they are able to participate in the decisions how the tax revenues are spent. Second, they experience that the public money is used efficiently and without corruption. Third, they are treated in a respectful and fair way. Under these conditions also the wealthy are more ready to contribute to the collective good. The not-so-wealthy accept reasonable inequality of incomes as long as they experience that they fare better with it compared to a policy of big transfers. What matters is that primary income (i.e. income before taxes and transfers) is not highly unequal (as reflected in a high Gini coefficient before taxes and transfers).

An example is provided by Switzerland. Semi-direct democracy combined with political decentralisation in cantons and communes allows citizens to participate in decisions how public money is spent. Switzerland not only is among the richest countries of the world, it also has one of the lowest Gini-coefficients of primary incomes. In contrast to most other countries, inequality has not risen during the last decades. In addition, the government share in GNP is relatively low, which means that taxes are spent effectively. It may finally be added, that the Swiss regularly belong to the countries with the highest level of life satisfaction.

To sum up, the major emphasis should not be to impose higher taxes on the rich but to improve democratic participation rights and affordable public education for everybody. This may or may not lead to higher taxes for the rich. What matters is that the bulk of the population is better off.

STEPHAN ROTHLIN: I vividly recall our discussions on executive pay during the 90's. Surprisingly we had already then agreed that the astronomical high pay of executives would not only not be justified at all but would also crowd out intrinsic motivation. What do you suggest are effective measures to cut the high pay of executives down to reasonable levels?

FREY/OSTERLOH: We suggest some rather unconventional approaches. The first is to rotate the CEO position among the group of top-managers. The second is to select managers and the board of directors from a pool of well-endowed lower managers by lot. Both approaches work against the hubris of the now common

The idea is to develop FOCJ, i.e. Functional, Overlapping and Competing Jurisdictions. They form in response to problems, and are organised to deal with the corresponding issues in an efficient and democratic manner.

single CEOs who tend to think that they are unique and endeavour to impose their views on the whole corporation. In addition, single CEOs today have the power to – directly or indirectly – determine their own compensation. It is therefore not surprising that they often fix an astronomical pay for themselves because they sincerely (but wrongly) believe that they deserve such huge pay.

STEPHAN ROTHLIN: Europe seems to be shaken by a profound crisis: the chaos around Brexit and the uproar of the Yellow Jackets in France are only a few symptoms of a broader malaise. As you are working on a new book on Europe would you like to share your insights on some key elements out of the crisis given the fact that you, Bruno, have been consistently pointing out some of the shortcomings of the European Union?

FREY: Along with my colleague Reiner Eichenberger who serves now as Dean of the Faculty of Economics of the University of Fribourg I am proposing a totally new way to develop a lively, efficient and at the same time humane and democratic Europe. The idea is to develop FOCJ, i.e. Functional, Overlapping

税收，而应该是提高民主参与权，让每个人都能负担得起公共教育。这可能会导致富人缴纳更高的税收，也可能不会，重要的是大多数人的生活变得更好。

罗世范博士：我清楚地记得我们在90年代针对高管薪酬所进行的讨论。令人惊讶的是，当时我们已经一致认为，高管们天文数字般的高薪酬不仅毫无道理，而且还会排挤掉内在动机。二位认为应该采取哪些有效措施将高管的高薪酬降至合理水平？

FREY和OSTERLOH：我们所建议的方法与传统方式颇为不同。一个是让高层管理人员轮流担任CEO。另一个是从一群有能力的低层管理者中抽签挑选经理和董事会成员。这两种方法都与如今常见的单一CEO的方式不同，单一的CEO往往会认为自己是独一无二的，并努力将自己的观点强加于整个公司。此外，单一的CEO如今拥有直接或间接决定自己薪酬的权力。因此，他们给自己定一个天文数字般的薪酬也就不足为奇，因为他们真心(但错误地)认为自己应该得到这么高的薪酬。

为了让我们的制度更加人道，我们建议，希望从贫穷国家移居到富有国家的人们一旦在该国就业，就能获得该国公共财富的一部分，并从中受益，就像获得合作社或信用社的股份一样。

罗世范博士：欧洲似乎面临着一场深层次的危机。英国脱欧和法国“黄背心”运动所反映出的只是这些更大范围不适的几个症状。布鲁诺，您正在撰写一本关于欧洲的新书，鉴于您一直在指出欧盟的一些缺点，您是否愿意分享一下对此次危机的一些关键因素的看法？

FREY：我正与我的同事、现任弗里堡大学经济学院院长Reiner Eichenberger一道，提出一种全新的方式，来建设一个充满活力、高效而且人道、民主的欧洲。其理念是发展FOCJ，即功能覆盖型竞争性辖区。FOCJ针对问题产生，并以有效和民主的方式组织起来应对相应问题。这与欧盟那种在民族国家基础上建立欧洲的现有方式完全不同。欧盟的

结果是在效率(严重的官僚主义)和民主(由上而下强有力管理，忽视公民的利益)方面出现了根本性的问题。毫不奇怪，欧盟现在所获得的支持率相当低，而且更重要的是，数字还在不断下降。还有一个想法是在政府中引入偶然因素。也就是说，一些委员会甚至一个额外的议会应由随机选出的公民组成。这一思想源于古希腊时期，亚里士多德对其进行了广泛的传播，有助于与官僚主义和精英政府作斗争。这将有助让普通民众和“黄背心”们发出自己的声音，同时提高他们的责任心。

罗世范博士：二位最近在澳门圣若瑟大学就欧洲移民危机所作的讲座非常发人深省，深受好评。关于如何解决移民危机，能概括一下二位建议的主要内容吗？

FREY和OSTERLOH：问题的关键是，移民要能够通过合法途径进入我们的国家，并快速得到就业机会。如果是这样的话，就不会出现有人冒着生命危险通过人贩子非法移民的情况。为了让我们的制度更加人道，我们

建议，希望从穷国移居到富国的人一旦在该国就业，就能获得该国公共财富的一部分，并从中受益，就像获得合作社或信用社的股份一样。乍一看，让想要移民的穷人先买一股股票，然后再进入一个国家，似乎有些奇怪。但是，这必须同目前这种移民向人贩子支付巨资的情况进行比较。此外，我们的建议为他们提供了一个可以自己决定自己未来的机会，而不必冒着死亡和受虐的危险。根据我们的提议，接收移民的国家获得资金后可以利用这些资金使这些移民融入社会，而政治难民则可以得到资金返还。

这一提议与教宗方济各的要求一致，即要为移民提供更多合法的机会进入西方国家。我们同意方济各教宗最近访问摩洛哥时所说的，即“移民问题永远不会通过设置障碍、煽动对他人的恐惧或拒绝向那些合法地

and Competing Jurisdictions. They form in response to problems, and are organised to deal with the corresponding issues in an efficient and democratic manner. This totally differs from the existing effort to build Europe on the basis of nation states as is the case with the European Union. The result of the EU is a fundamental deficit with respect to efficiency (it is heavily bureaucratic) and democracy (it is governed strongly from above, neglecting the interests of the citizens). Not surprisingly, the support for the European Union as it exists is quite low, and – even more importantly – is waning. A second idea is to introduce aleatoric elements into the government. This means, that some committees

a country's communal wealth from which they benefit once they work in the country. This is analogous to acquiring a share in a cooperative or credit union. At first it seems odd to ask poor would-be migrants to first buy a share, and then to enter a country. However, that must be compared to the existing situation in which such migrants pay considerable sums to people smugglers. Moreover, our proposal offers them a perspective to decide autonomously about their future without running the danger of dying and being mistreated. With our proposal, the country receiving the immigrants get the funds they can well use to integrate them. Political fugitives receive the money back.

To reach a more humane system, we propose that persons wanting to emigrate from poor to rich countries acquire a share in a country's communal wealth from which they benefit once they work in the country.

or even an extra parliamentary chamber should consist of citizen that are randomly selected. This idea, which has its historic roots in Ancient Greece and has been propagated by Aristotle would help to fight against bureaucracy and the government by an elite. It would help to give ordinary people as well as the Yellow Jackets a voice and at the same time would raise their responsibility.

STEPHAN ROTHLIN: Your recent lecture which took place at the University of Saint Joseph, Macau, relating to the migration crisis in Europe was most thought provoking and was very well received. Could you summarise the key elements of your proposal on how to fix the migration crisis?

FREY/OSTERLOH: The most important issue is that the migrants can enter our countries in a legal way, and to offer them quick employment opportunities. If that is the case, the murderous travel where migrants rely on people smugglers is avoided. To reach a more humane system, we propose that persons wanting to emigrate from poor to rich countries acquire a share in

This proposal agrees with Pope Francis' demands to offer migrants more legal possibilities to migrate into Western countries. We agree with what Pope Francis recently said during his visit in Morocco namely "The issue of migration will never be resolved by raising barriers, fomenting fear of others or denying assistance to those who legitimately aspire to a better life for themselves and their families." But we do not think that an unrestricted migration into Western countries would be a good solution. From an economic viewpoint one could argue, that free migration would raise the wealth of all nations. But there would be winners and losers. For example, the rich can afford better schools for their children whereas the poor must share the classrooms with the children of the immigrants. Therefore the winners would have to compensate the losers to maintain social justice. Since in most countries we cannot expect such a compensation and – as argued – the wealthy are in a better position to avoid taxes and transfers than the poor, the latter understandably oppose unrestricted migration. As a consequence, the position of anti-migration movements and nationalistic parties in our

希望自己和家人过上更好生活的人提供援助来解决”。但我们也不认为无限制地向西方国家移民是一个好办法。从经济学的观点来看，人们可能会说，自由移民将增加所有国家的财富。但有赢家就会有输家。例如，富人可以为他们的孩子负担更好的学校，而穷人必须与移民的孩子共享教室。因此，赢家需要对输家进行补偿，以维护社会正义。由于在大多数国家，我们不能指望得到这样的补偿，而且正如所争论的那样，富人比穷人更能避免税收和进行收入转移，所以穷人反对无限制的移民是可以理解的。受此影响，各国的反移民运动和民族主义政党的势力将得到加强。因此，我们必须考虑移民进入我们国家的更佳法律可能性，以此超越不受限制的移民。我们的建议就是为了帮助达成这一目标。

罗世范博士：你演讲的回应人、前香港申诉专员(1994-1999)及亚洲信用联合会创办人 Andrew So 先生对您的贡献给予肯定。他强调，二位所提出的将移民和难民与信用合作社联系起来的建议，除了能够帮助难民获得物质上的好处之外，还能让他们得到尊严和自尊。对此二位怎么看？

FREY和OSTERLOH：So先生对我们的建议作出如此积极的评价，这对我们来说是件好事。尤其是他曾经担任过申诉专员，在此方面知识和经验丰富，能够支持我们的想法我们非常感激，感谢他充实了我们的观点。他认为，为成为信贷联盟或合作社的成员支付费用不仅有助于移民安全抵达我们的国家并得以谋生，而且还能让他们获得尊严和尊重，这也有助于这些移民能够更好、更快地融入目的地国。

罗世范博士：对于您的建设性观点，著名经济学家 Paul Collier 和其他一些同事的反应非常微妙。在众多其他观点中，他提出了贫穷国家的破坏性人才外流情况，即有能力的人被吸引离开了自己的祖国，而这些国家恰恰急需这些人才。考虑到大量的反对意见，您认为可能会令您的建议无法实施的主要障碍究竟是什么？

FREY和OSTERLOH：正如我们现实中所不断经历的那样，我们知道，新思想总是难以得

到接受和认可，因为它们与现有的观点和利益相冲突。把一项新提议变成现实往往需要很长时间，我们只能希望在不久的将来会出现这种情况。

罗世范博士：二位都是总部设在苏黎世的拉达尼协会的会员。作为一位倍受尊敬的中国观察家，二位认为拉兹洛·拉达尼·S.J.(1914-1990)最重要的洞见是什么？

FREY和OSTERLOH：拉兹洛·拉达尼·S. J. 对于我们来说是一个很好的范例，向我们展示了中国在当今和未来的重要性。他还教导我们了解中国文化并抵制各种文化帝国主义有多么重要。



Margit Osterloh & Bruno S. Frey, 苏黎世经济、管理和艺术研究中心 (CREMA), 瑞士巴塞尔大学

Translated by 翻译: Zhang Xi 张希

countries would be strengthened. Therefore we have to think about better legal possibilities to immigrate into our countries beyond unrestricted migration. Our proposal exactly wants to contribute to this goal.

STEPHAN ROTHLIN: The respondent of your lecture, Mr. Andrew So, former Ombudsman of Hong Kong (1994-1999) and founder of the Asian Confederation of Credit Unions has positively valued your contribution. He highlighted above all the fact that your proposal to connect migrants and refugees with credit unions would give them also a sense of their own dignity and self respect on top of the other material advantages they may gain. What did you learn from Andrew So?

FREY/OSTERLOH: It is wonderful for us that Mr. So evaluates our proposal in such a positive way, and we are most grateful that he supported our idea in light of his extensive knowledge and experience as Ombudsman. We appreciate very much that he has enriched our argumentation with the idea that to pay for becoming a member of a credit union or a cooperative not only helps migrants to arrive at our countries safely and to make a living, but also gives them dignity and self respect. This will also enable them to become integrated better and faster into their countries of arrival.

STEPHAN ROTHLIN: The well known economist Paul Collier and other colleagues have responded to your constructive proposal in a most nuanced way. However, among a host of other arguments does he point out the damaging brain drain from poor countries which are precisely in dire need of those capable people who would be attracted to move away from their home countries. Taking into account the broad feedback of objections to your proposal: What do you consider after all a key road block which may make it impossible that your proposal would be implemented?

FREY/OSTERLOH: As we have experienced over and over, we both believe that new ideas always have difficulties gaining acceptance, because they clash with existing views and interests. It often

takes a long time to have a new proposal turned into reality. We can only hope that this will be the case sometime in the near future.

STEPHAN ROTHLIN: You are both members of the Ladanyi-Association, based in Zurich. What do you think have been the key insights of Laszlo Ladanyi S.J. (1914-1990) who was greatly respected as a China watcher?

FREY/OSTERLOH: Laszlo Ladanyi S.J. for us is a great example showing us the importance of China today and in the future. He also has taught us how important it is to learn about Chinese cultures and to resist all kinds of cultural imperialism.



MARGIT OSTERLOH & BRUNO S. FREY, CREMA, Center for Research on Economics, Management and Arts, Zurich, and the University of Basle, Switzerland

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1. MANUSCRIPT PREPARATION GUIDELINES (ENGLISH AND CHINESE)

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Manuscript length: 6,000 – 8,000 Chinese characters (not including citations or footnotes)

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2. MANUSCRIPT SUBMISSION REQUIREMENTS

All manuscripts are to be submitted by email to the following address: mrijournal@riccimac.org

Before submitting your contribution, please ensure you include a title, subtitle (if applicable), abstract and list of keywords. Any article lacking one or more of these items will be automatically rejected and will require re-submission.

Once submitted to the above email address, your manuscript will be acknowledged as received by one of our co-editors, and put under review.

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- The manuscript's arguments are presented in a well-structured, logically-sound and easy-to-follow manner.
- The manuscript complies with prevailing standards of written English or Chinese presented in a clear and concise structure.

- All empirical evidence in support of the manuscript's arguments should be based on a clear and robust methodology and data and analysis that meets established research methods.
- The writing of the manuscript adheres to relevant ethical standards regarding, e.g. plagiarism, various forms of conflict of interest, research on human subjects, etc. Consult our website for discussion of these standards and specific policies: [HERE](#)

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Software: Microsoft PowerPoint

Length: 10 slides

To streamline the transition from one presentation to the next, we are requesting that all presentations use Microsoft PowerPoint. This requirement is to maximise the presentation time for each author, and to minimise interruptions due to the use of different software or the switching in and out of personal laptops. Once you have submitted your slides, we will develop them in a common format for all conference presentations, and distribute them for use in the symposium packets.

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原稿篇幅：2000 — 3000个单词（不包括引文和脚注）

引文格式：APA (American Psychological Association) 指南——[点此查阅摘要](#)

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We at the MRI regret to inform you that our library, an invaluable resource for local and visiting researchers and scholars, has been destroyed. During typhoon – HATO – which resulted in the death of at least 16 people and caused havoc in Macau on 23 August 2017, the MRI lost its entire collection of books due to flooding, including 23,376 unique books and periodicals of philosophy, psychology, religion, the human sciences, language, natural and applied sciences, art, literature and history, as well as a total of MOP 106,656 worth of electronic equipment. While we may never rebuild the MRI's library to its original condition, we are determined to recover as much of what was lost as possible. Your help in this process is much needed and highly appreciated. Please consider a donation to help restore the MRI library.

我们的图书馆对于当地和来访的研究人员和学者来说，是宝贵的资源。然而，非常遗憾，我们的图书馆已被毁坏。2017年8月23日，台风“天鸽”席卷澳门，致使至少16人丧生，并造成极大破坏。在这次台风中，澳门利氏学社由于洪水丢失了所有的藏书。我们在天鸽台风损失了超过23,376本珍惜书籍和出版物，包括哲学与心理学，宗教，人文科学，语言，自然与应用科学，艺术，文学和历史。除了书籍外，我们还损失了价值\$106,656澳门元的电子设备。尽管我们可能永远无法将澳门利氏学社图书馆重建至以前的规模，我们决心尽可能地恢复丢失的图书。在此过程中，我们非常需要也会非常感激您的帮助。敬请考虑献上一份捐款，帮助恢复澳门利氏学社图书馆。

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SYMPOSIUM TO HONOUR THE 20TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE MACAU RICCI INSTITUTE

“IN ACTIONE CONTEMPLATIVUS” CONTEMPLATION, MISSION AND MARTYRDOM

A symposium organised by the Ricci Institutes of Macau, Taipei and the University of St. Joseph, Macau
Thursday and Friday, October 17 and 18, 2019
Gratia Hall, St. Joseph Seminary, Largo de Santo Agostinho, 5, Macau

SYMPOSIUM SCHEDULE

THURSDAY, 17 OCTOBER 2019

8:00AM - 9:00AM: REGISTRATION

9:00AM - 9:30AM: OPENING CEREMONY
Bishop Stephen Lee Bun-sang, Diocese of Macau
Rev. Peter Stilwell, Rector, University of St. Joseph
Stephan Rothlin SJ, Director, Macau Ricci Institute

9:30AM - 10:30AM: FIRST KEYNOTE SESSION: Rev. Stephen Morgan, Dean of the Faculty of Religious Studies of the University of St. Joseph: Contemplation in a world of action: the English Benedictine tradition of mental prayer, its debt to Ignatius and the changing nature of Christian witness in the monastery and on the mission

10:30AM - 11:00AM: COFFEE/TEA AND GROUP PICTURE

11:00 AM - 12:30PM: FIRST PLENARY SESSION: MARTYRDOM AND MEMORY
Gerhold K. Becker (Karl Rahner and Alfred Delp), Dennis McCann (Bonhoeffer), Joseph Lee Tse-Hei on Watchman Nee, Memorializing Martyrs (Hagiography and the Ambiguity of Witness)

12:30PM - 2:00PM: LUNCH

2:00PM - 3:45PM: SECOND PLENARY SESSION: ENVISIONING MISSION IN THE DIGITAL AGE
Rafael Mathando Hinganaday SJ on MCM in a Pluralistic Society; Mark Pufpaff on Leisure (Joseph Pieper) and Contemplation; Bambang Irawan SJ on Ignatian Examen (Overcoming Fake Information); Chang He on Architectural Design of Contemplative Spaces

3:45PM - 4:15PM: COFFEE/TEA

4:15PM - 5:45PM: THIRD PLENARY SESSION: CONTEMPLATION THEORY AND PRACTICE

SESSION A: WELLSPRINGS OF CONTEMPLATION: Bishop Rev Anton Jamnik, Archdiocese of Ljubljana, Slovenia, on Mysticism Contemplation, Christian Life; Alessandro Andreini on “Put into Deep Water” (Contemplative Practices); Antoine Ren on Mission and Obedience

SESSION B: PERSPECTIVES ON CHINA: Zhang Quan Yi on National Identities, Wojciech Rybka on Biblical Roots of Meditation and Examples of Their Influence in the History of the Catholic Church in China; Joseph Khor on Contemplation and Gestalt Group Therapy

FRIDAY, 18 OCTOBER 2019

8:30AM – 9:45AM: SECOND KEYNOTE SESSION: Contemplation, Mission and Martyrdom in El Salvador: 30th Anniversary of their Martyrdom

Keynote Speakers: Martin Maier, and Paul-John Wang: The Message of the Martyrs of El Salvador

9:45AM – 10:15AM: COFFEE/TEA

10:15AM – 12:00 NOON: FOURTH PLENARY SESSION: WHAT OUR HISTORIES HAVE TO TEACH US

Cristina Osswald on Japanese Martyrs; Claudia von Collani on the commemoration of the Japanese Martyrs; Francesco Vossilla on the Florentine Franciscan Exhibit of the Capella Bardi; Olivier Lardinois on the Jesuit Directories

12:00 NOON – 1:15PM: LUNCH

1:15PM – 2:15PM: SPECIAL SESSION ON THE MRI JOURNAL FOR EDITORS AND CONTRIBUTORS

Editorial Team (Stephan Rothlin SJ, Dennis McCann, (Mike Thompson), and Mark Pufpaff) will present the recently published issues of the MRI Journal, the processes of its creation, and inform prospective contributors about what to expect in the editorial and peer review processes leading to publication. The session will also provide an opportunity for feedback and constructive criticism on the three issues of the MRI Journal.

2:15PM – 2:45PM: COFFEE/TEA

2:45PM – 4:15PM: FIFTH PLENARY SESSION: REDEFINING MISSION GLOBALLY

Stephan Rothlin SJ on Contemplation and a new concept of Mission; Jaroslaw Duraj on Yves Raguin and Interreligious Dialogue; Edmund Eh on Confucian Contemplation in Action

4:30PM – 5:00PM: CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS: Rev. Stephen Morgan, Paul-John Wang SJ, Martin Maier SJ, Stephan Rothlin SJ

EVENTS AND PUBLICATIONS

新闻活动与出版物

EVENTS 新闻活动:

“IN ACTIONE CONTEMPLATIVUS” - CONTEMPLATION, MISSION AND MARTYRDOM SYMPOSIUM
Organised by the Ricci Institutes of Macau, Taipei and the University of St. Joseph, Macau
October 17/18, 2019

PUBLICATIONS 出版物:

VOLUME II: THE *ACTA PEKINENSIA* - OR HISTORICAL RECORDS OF THE MAILLARD DE TOURNON LEGATION
Kilian Stumpf S.J., Brill Publishing House, 2019

50 GREAT MASTERS OF CHINESE BUDDHISM (CHINESE TRANSLATION)
Christian Cochini, Religious Press Beijing, 2018

MACAO'S COLLEGE AND CHURCH OF ST. JOSEPH
César Guillén Nuñez, Instituto Cultural and Macau Ricci Institute, 2017

VOLUME I: THE *ACTA PEKINENSIA* - OR HISTORICAL RECORDS OF THE MAILLARD DE TOURNON LEGATION
Kilian Stumpf S.J., Macau Ricci Institute, 2016

INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS ETHICS: FOCUS ON CHINA
Stephan Rothlin S.J., Dennis P. McCann, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2016

50 GREAT MASTERS OF CHINESE BUDDHISM
Christian Cochini S.J., Macau Ricci Institute, 2015

RESPONSIBLE ENTREPRENEURSHIP: HOW TO WRITE A BUSINESS PLAN
Stephan Rothlin S.J., Mike Thompson, Thomas Myers, UIBE Press, 2015

PORTRAIT OF A JESUIT: ALESSANDRO VALIGNANO
Artur K. Wardega S.J., Macau Ricci Institute, 2014

PLAYING BACH IN FRANCE AND IN CHINA: AN ENCOUNTER OF MUSICIANS IN MACAU
Philippe Charru S.J., Yuan Sheng, Macau Ricci Institute, 2011

PORTRAIT OF A JESUIT: MATTEO RICCI
Artur K. Wardega S.J., Macau Ricci Institute, 2010

GUIDE TO BUDDHIST TEMPLES OF CHINA
Christian Cochini S.J., Macau Ricci Institute, 2009

To inquire about our events or publications, please contact us at: info@riccimac.org