Yves Vendé
Abstract
This article examines service-learning as a pedagogical response to the ethical and educational challenges posed by the Anthropocene. Whilst recent scholarship in the Francophone context emphasises virtue ethics as a necessary framework for ecological transition, the concrete means of cultivating moral dispositions in students remain insufficiently specified. Drawing on the Aristotelian distinction between intellectual and moral virtues, the paper argues that ethical formation requires not only conceptual instruction but also experiential engagement capable of shaping habits and affective dispositions. The first part revisits Aristotle's account of self-cultivation, highlighting the central role of courage, habituation, and community in the development of moral character. The second part analyses contemporary service-learning practices in higher education, with particular attention to student testimonies. These empirical observations support the claim that structured encounters with vulnerability, when accompanied by critical reflection, foster the integration of action, emotion, and judgement required for virtue formation. The article concludes by situating service-learning within a broader reconsideration of the university's relationship to knowledge, arguing that such pedagogy contributes to the formation of responsible agents able to navigate the moral complexity of the Anthropocene.
Keywords: service-learning, virtue ethics, Anthropocene, higher education
In the French-speaking world, several pedagogical approaches are emerging to address the Anthropocene era. Some are devoted to analysing the intellectual foundations of this new era, exploring its theoretical implications, often with a nihilistic tone: nothing would be possible in the face of the challenges posed. Others adopt a militant stance, producing committed discourse, sometimes at the expense of the daily compromises that "normal" life imposes. A third option is to examine the ethical dispositions necessary to navigate this period and explore how to cultivate them.
For example, Jean-Philippe Pierron draws inspiration from Pierre Hadot's perspective on philosophy as a practice of "spiritual exercises" (Hadot, 2002). He emphasises the importance of temperance, humility, and hospitality as key skills to develop in the Anthropocene era (Pierron, 2023). Another author, Corinne Pelluchon, also considers Virtue Ethics as a prerequisite for ecological transition (Pelluchon, 2020). She argues that dispositions such as sobriety and justice, should become habits that facilitate an environmentally friendly lifestyle. Criticising guilt-inducing approaches, Pelluchon emphasises the importance of proposing practices that can be applied in ordinary life, aligned with the daily experience of small decisions orientated towards the common good, a good that must be built. Finally, François Prouteau emphasises the importance of developing the disposition of courage in education (Prouteau, 2024).
In all these approaches, reflecting on the necessary virtues for the Anthropocene moment means considering ways to integrate ecological concerns with other requirements, such as the mobility inherent in certain professions or the use of Artificial Intelligence, which consumes significant energy. The purpose here is to foster processes that equip students with such dispositions, to build their moral character (la personnalité) and enable them to be a unique person (la personne) as well as an actor in a community (le personnage).
Whilst there is a consensus on the Virtue Ethics approach, the methods for implementing it often remain unclear. For example, some schools teach concepts such as interculturality, vulnerability, and the impacts of the energy crisis, but do not provide students with concrete experiences that help them embody these concepts. However, as Aristotle points out at the end of the first book of Nicomachean Ethics, whilst intellectual virtues, which are theoretical in nature and can be transmitted through teaching, moral virtues, which are linked to concrete behaviours, require not only rational reflection, but also the engagement of the individual's emotional, sensitive, and even physical dimensions.
In this paper, I will first examine, according to the Aristotelian tradition, how the experience of situations is necessary for the acquisition of inner dispositions. I will then show how service-learning pedagogy, implemented across various training programmes, places students in situations that involve taking risks. It will then become clear that service-learning, when it incorporates critical reflection, is effective for preparing students for the Anthropocene. This will allow me to conclude with a few remarks on the relationship to knowledge.
Self-cultivation and Aristotelian education
In ancient Greece, ethical reflections were not isolated from a context shaped by the laws (nomoi) of a city and the decrees of nature (physis). With the Sophists, the question of the relativity of city norms arose, and Greek philosophers subsequently became concerned with how to live a good life in relation to a cultural and natural context. Against the Sophists, Plato developed his theory of Ideas in the Republic to establish a just city. One of Plato's limitations, however, was that he developed a system orientated towards an ideal good rather than a good that concerns me in everyday life. Plato's student, Aristotle, not only changed the method of investigating the good (Nicomachean Ethics, hereafter NE 1095b) but also questioned Plato's vision of virtue, based mainly on intellectual activity and, therefore, on theoretical knowledge. According to Aristotle, the ideal of human life is a life that unfolds in all directions, which requires the use of concrete external goods, and there is a hierarchy between activities and dispositions (NE 1098a25).
In other words, several activities are necessary conditions for seeking the more complete good referred to by Aristotle. To speak of activity is to emphasise the necessity of a process ("For one swallow does not make a spring, nor a day," NE 1098a). For Aristotle, the pursuit of happiness is not just a matter of logic or theory; there is also a practical dimension. The pursuit of happiness takes place in a city where leaders continue to be transformed by the exercise of their responsibilities. Consequently, at the end of Book I of Nicomachean Ethics, the term "virtue(s)" (arête) is used in the plural and refers to praiseworthy inner states; these are dispositions that qualify the wise person. Whilst intellectual virtues can be taught, moral virtues cannot. This second type of virtue is the result of habit; it does not arise from nature. Nature only provides a possibility, but virtue is a seed that must be cultivated (NE 1103a30).
Aristotle then uses several metaphors to show how virtue prompts us to seek a happy medium between extremes (NE, 1106b15). When an agent is able to moderate these extremes, they open up the field of fruitful actions in the name of virtue. The general definition of virtue thus makes it an intermediate state that guides decision-making. This quest aims to achieve a noble end by mobilising appropriate dispositions; it is an art similar to that of steering a ship, where the captain knows how to interpret the signs, adjust the speed, and steer the course of the ship, all according to the weather conditions and the skills of his crew. In this sense, virtue stems from the ability to live within certain limits (NE, 1106b30). This definition must be confirmed by its application to the particular virtues that Aristotle then examines.
For Aristotle, responsibility for vice and virtue lies with us: virtue is within our reach (NE, 1113b5); we can desire it, and the will is involved in decisions (when there is deliberation, see NE, 1139a21-b5), provided that bad habits have not deeply rooted themselves and stifled the foundations of virtue. In this sense, Aristotle's reflections suggest that responding to the challenges of the Anthropocene requires a certain degree of freedom and, above all, the courage to initiate transformation. Whilst other virtues are important, courage is essential for undertaking the process of inner and political transformations (this expectation is essential).
From this perspective, Greek heroes, such as Socrates and Achilles, the former behaved courageously, whilst the latter did not. According to an Aristotelian perspective, Socrates acted courageously when he drank the poison because he hoped that it would bring about change in Athens. He hoped that his fellow citizens' attitude towards injustice would change, which prompted him to face death with courage (Rogers, 1994). On the other hand, during the siege of Troy, Achilles, driven by anger and vengeance for the death of Patroclus, was not concerned with the welfare of the Greek forces. He was not guided by temperate reason, nor did he have a higher goal in mind; his actions cannot, therefore, be described as courageous.
Passionate courage leads to action driven by strong emotion rather than rational thinking. Finding the appropriate disposition implies that one has already cultivated the habit of relying on the rational part of the soul. Only habit, or the repetition of virtuous actions, allows one to find the balance between recklessness and cowardice. For Aristotle, this courageous disposition requires a certain stability acquired through repetition.
Therefore, the scope of courage should not be limited to the battlefield, but should extend to other situations: "Asking young people to put their lives on the line frequently and systematically seems dangerously foolish. Instead, it seems more plausible to begin by asking them to take social and emotional risks, as well as lesser physical risks, frequently and systematically." (Vigani, 2017, p. 320). These considerations on courage and self-cultivation show that, according to Aristotle, education begins with the courage to limit intemperate behaviour. By helping someone free themselves from the grip of the apparent pleasures associated with the nutritive and sensitive parts of the soul, courage, in the educational process, provides access to a second level of pleasures—intellectual ones—that offer greater consistency between means and ends. Courage is therefore necessary from the outset and throughout the process of cultivation, but it must be framed by limits in order to avoid excesses.
Today, in the Anthropocene era, Aristotle's invitation to limit superficial pleasures and practise simplicity echoes the recommendations of Pierron and Pelluchon, who promote temperance, simplicity, and humility.
A second lesson is the recognition that we cannot become fully human on our own. For Aristotle, being human implies belonging to a community (Politics, 1243a30). The political dimension is omnipresent in the analysis of "individual virtues" in Nicomachean Ethics because Aristotle is preparing future legislators (NE, 1095a5) to assume public responsibilities. The latter must understand the virtues if they are to prepare themselves to train good citizens who respect the law (NE, 1102a10) and, in turn, propose laws that promote good habits (NE, 1103b5).
Today, this means responses to the challenges of the Anthropocene must be both individual and collective. This ties in with one of the concerns of educators who implement service-learning pedagogy: the challenge of service-learning is certainly to provide a space where courage and empathy can be cultivated and where students can become accustomed to taking emotional risks, but above all it is about preparing students to be leaders who are capable of empathising with the situations they encounter and capable of changing structures: the latter are not immutable, on the contrary.
Service learning
From 2021 to 2024, I have been in charge, together with other professors at my University, of promoting service-learning in connection with Uniservitate (https://www.uniservitate.org/). This network promotes service-learning, a teaching method that integrates service-learning into bachelor's and master's degree programmes. This approach aims at "self-transformation" by combining the acquisition of "professional skills" with "hands-on service experience."
Depending on the institution, different types of fieldwork are offered, tailored to the skills targeted by the courses that use this teaching method. For example, some students taking the "immigration law" course volunteer with NGOs in Calais every week to meet migrants and provide them with assistance and information about their rights. In these contexts, students develop legal skills by addressing complex situations under the guidance of immigration law specialists. At the same time, they have meaningful human experiences and practise interculturalism in the field.
The various elements of the programme—field exposure, acquisition of professional skills, academic knowledge, and personal and critical reflection—distinguish service-learning from student volunteer work or internships. Service-learning promotes genuine personal transformation in the context of learning a profession (a social role). This is reflected in the students' accounts.
During the final evaluation of a project management course incorporating service-learning, a young woman in charge of academic support at an NGO stated:
"I'm going to talk about how I felt before my first meeting with the team and the children. I had a lot of fears at first. I wondered, will the team and the children like me? Will I be able to help them? [...] When I left my first volunteer assignment, I was surprised by the kindness of the group, my ability to supervise a child whilst treating them as a responsible person, and the time I was able to spend there, because, after all my fears, I realised I enjoyed it. [...] The following Mondays, the atmosphere was the same: always pleasant to help the children and see them having fun. [...] I noticed that a bond had formed between the children and me. [...] Since the beginning of this new experience, I have been able to discover a new side of myself. [...] It is important to help others by giving them the best of your abilities, but it is even more important to be able to receive as much in return."
Another student from a school focussed on innovation and digital technology, after accompanying a person with a disability for a year, describes his activity as follows:
"Even though I was quite uncomfortable at first, and didn't really know how I was going to communicate with him. But I soon realised that it was actually very easy. So, after seeing how enthusiastic he was, his mother and his personal assistant also agreed to welcome me into the association with [X]. So, I was going to become his friend and do different activities with [X] every week. I came back the following week, and we started by playing board games. This activity allowed me to get to know [X] better and get used to him (and vice versa) through play. [...] But I really want to emphasise that what has truly changed in me is my ability to better understand others and to gain confidence that we can communicate even with those who are very different from us in terms of language or abilities. To conclude, I would say that [X] is not just a disabled person; he is a cultured 27-year-old boy with a supportive network, who has a temperamental body, but he is a person in his own right and is now a friend."
Several elements emerge from these accounts of service-learning activities:
- A feeling of discomfort before the first exposure to a situation of vulnerability, whether perceived in the people encountered or felt internally.
- An unexpected joy arises in the unstable context, without erasing the deeply unsettling nature of the experience.
- A lasting bond was forged between the "helper" and the "helped" or strengthened amongst the various actors in the field, including the target audience and third-party partners such as NGOs.
- A reversal of the dynamics of aid, where the helper and the helped become friends and learn from each other, leading to a subversion of assumed hierarchies.
- A reconfiguration of the image of oneself and others, with a renewed perception of the "disadvantaged person," now recognised as a person in their own right.
- In addition, participants develop the ability to stop letting fear govern them, whilst remaining aware of the risks—the assessment of the "learning zone," located between the comfort zone and the risk zone, remains the responsibility of the trainers.
These transformations—in the way participants view themselves, their own uncertainties, and vulnerable people—reflect a process that integrates action, feeling, and reflection. This process engages the whole person. Many educators could share these observations worldwide.
These observations actually raise a more fundamental question about our relationship to knowledge: how can we educate people to be open-minded, to transform themselves, to become (more) human, whilst maintaining the scientific standards that are essential to academic and professional training?
Questioning our relationship to knowledge
We live in an age where immediate access to information is enabled by the speed at which information circulates on the Internet. Over the last thirty years, we have witnessed a new phenomenon: access to knowledge from anywhere in the world, without the mediation of the communities that are its custodians. In other words, the work that classical humanism undertook, namely the formation of a common sensibility through education in taste, is being called into question by the reduction of education to the acquisition of technical skills (particularly those that enable access to and dissemination of content), forgetting that when it comes to education, it is not all about technique and logical knowledge (Stanchina, 2025).
In 1918, students at the University of Córdoba (Argentina) revolted against their university's administration. They protested against the content of the education they were receiving and the way in which professors related to knowledge:
Our university system—even the most recent one—is anachronistic. It is based on a kind of divine right: the divine right of university professors. This right creates itself; it is born and dies within itself. It maintains an Olympian distance. The University Federation of Córdoba is rising up to fight against this system and intends to put an end to it. It calls for a strictly democratic government and maintains that the university's sovereignty and the right to govern itself belong primarily to the students. The concept of authority that corresponds to and accompanies a director or teacher in a university student residence cannot be based on the force of disciplines that are foreign to the very substance of studies. Authority in a student residence is not exercised by commanding, but by suggesting and loving: by teaching. If there is no spiritual bond between the teacher and the learner, all teaching is hostile and therefore fruitless. All education is a long labour of love towards those who learn. [...] The souls of young people must be moved by spiritual forces. The worn-out springs of authority that emanate from force are not in tune with what modern sentiment and conception of universities require (Del Mazo, Gabriel, 1941).
This text denounces teaching that distances itself from the "reality" of students and the process of self-transformation—a "labour of love," a term later used by Paulo Freire—in which students are immersed. It emphasises a necessary fraternal bond between the learner and the teacher, reminding us that neither side in a dialogue or debate can avoid questioning its own relationship to knowledge. A teacher who believes they have mastered their subject matter is merely demonstrating a rigid relationship with it, an attitude that leads to a form of authoritarianism.
The student movement in Córdoba was part of a broader context of social change in Argentina. It encouraged teachers and students to engage with the realities surrounding the university. From that moment on, a series of solidarity-based learning experiences developed throughout South America. This movement gradually gained credibility amongst institutional leaders (some of whom also opposed it). Thus, in Mexico in 1945, laws were passed requiring that a portion of social services be included in educational standards. Mentioning this historical origin of service-learning shows that it is a means of questioning our relationship to knowledge and "training" and their purposes.
This institutionalisation of service-learning is reflected in its adoption by the Catholic Church and its promotion in Catholic universities. In his encyclical Veritatis Gaudium (2017), Pope Francis invites Catholic universities to "broaden reason" (§2), which can be achieved in two ways. The first is to connect knowledge in order to unify it through values and goals for each individual and each culture. The second echoes the Second Vatican Council's call for "integral development," which is itself explained in the recent Global Compact on Education (Congregation for Catholic Education, October 2021).
Providing the means to forge bonds and develop the human person is precisely the goal of service-learning, which aims to foster an attitude of vigilance in action and a space for relationships where empathy becomes solidarity. Service-learning is, therefore, not just an educational tool but a form of mediation that aims to encourage greater openness. It is through thoughtful and critical experience, made possible by encountering the vulnerable and confronting the demands necessary for acquiring scientific skills and knowledge, that good men and women develop and prepare themselves to fulfil their roles as responsible members of society.
Ultimately, the challenge of developing concrete means for deploying a virtue ethic is to revive the desire for a good life, regulated by just institutions, whilst taking the environment into account. According to Jean-Philippe Pierron, this challenge marks a phase in which a new civilisation is emerging. In this context, our behaviours and the way we reflect on them interact with our natural environment. When it comes to ecology, scientific knowledge is not neutral; it has psychological and spiritual repercussions on human beings. We are both active agents in the face of the transformations of the Anthropocene and passively affected by them. In the Anthropocene era, the challenge is to convert ecological information into ecobiographical events: how do we govern our attention and where do we direct it? It is about paying attention to the environment, rather than allowing our attention to be altered by taking it into account. This implies a reorganisation of our hierarchy of values: how do we prioritise the objects, relationships, and activities to which we give our attention? In the West, this challenge arises in pluralistic and postmodern societies that are both mentally and physically exhausting. Mentally, because many individuals oscillate between different communities and traditions, leaving it up to each individual to determine what kind of human being "I" want to be. Physically, because this culture of burnout depletes natural, linguistic, and emotional resources.
Rediscovering the desire for a good life and freeing ourselves from contemporary constraints requires a detour through exploration, adventure, and situations that challenge established knowledge. This detour allows us to rediscover inner capacities and dispositions suited to the current situation and it helps to contrast perspectives that dissociate the body from the soul and humans from nature.
Yves Vendé, Faculté de théologie, Université Catholique de Lille, Faculté de philosophie, Facultés Loyola Paris.
REFERENCES
- Hadot, P. (2002). What is ancient philosophy? Belknap Press.
- Pelluchon, C. (2020). Réparons le monde: Les humains, les animaux, la nature. Rivages.
- Pierron, J.-P. (2023). "Temperance, humility and hospitality: Three virtues for the Anthropocene moment". Philosophies, 9(5). https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies9010005
- Prouteau, F. (2024). Anthropology of the Anthropocene: Ideas for a courageous education. Springer Nature Switzerland.
- Rogers, K. (1994). "Aristotle on the motive of courage". The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 32, 303–313.
- Stanchina, G. (2025). The art of becoming infinite: Mou Zongsan's vertical rethinking of self and subjectivity. Open Book Publishers.
- Denise Vigani, "Aristotle's account of courage," History of Philosophy Quarterly, 2017 (October), vol. 34, no. 4, pp. 313–330.
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