Hui Xia (Sonja) 

ABSTRACT

　　The Trinity, i.e., one God in three persons (Father, Son, and Holy Spirit), is the core doctrine of Christianity. It confesses that God truly exists as one, and the three persons truly exist each in themselves. The seemingly paradoxical doctrine was from the beginning of the Church imprinted on the popular faith witnessed in the New Testament, the liturgy, especially the rite of baptism, and the catechetical practice. (Kelly, 1960/1968, pp. 88-90) Yet it took four centuries of controversies and synods to transform the initial faith into a doctrine. The main achievements were made in the 4th century: first, the Ecumenical Council of Nicaea I in 325 acknowledged the common substance of the Trinitarian persons by accepting the Greek term homoouios (homo means same, and ousios means being, substance, or essence); second, in the decades after Nicaea I, the common substance of the three and the distinctiveness of each person are expressed as “mia ousia, treis hypostaseis” (one substance, three persons).

　　The following reflections are meant to clarify the development of the distinction between ousia and hypostaseis, given the fact that the two terms were quite often interchangeable, even among Christian authors, though with some semantic variations (Stead, 1998, pp. 178-180; Prestige, 1964, pp. 168-169). As I hope to show, the situation was only changed when two Church Fathers and brothers, Basil of Caesarea and Gregory of Nyssa, from Cappadocia (nowadays Turkey) in the 4^th century separated the two terms by coining the Trinitarian formula “mia ousia, treis hypostaseis”. This paper will delineate the Cappadocians’ distinction between ousia and hypostasis in Trinitarian theology against the terminological framework provided by philosophy, and then explicate the theological significance of the distinction.

Ousia and Hypostasis in Greek Philosophy

　　Ousia is the noun form of the verb einai (to be). It means being, essence, or existence. Greek philosophy arises from asking the question of ousia, i.e., “What really exists/is.” Aristotle approached the question by examining how the word ousia is used and talked about in daily life. He then concluded four senses in which ousia is used:

The term ‘substance’ [ousia] is used, if not in more, at least in four principal cases; for both the essence and the universal and the genus are held to be the substance [ousia] of the particular, and fourthly the substrate (to hypokeimenon). (Aristotle, 1933/1989, Z. 3, 1028b 34-36)

　　Aristotle singled out the fourth sense, the substrate, as a special kind. The Greek word for substrate to hypokeimenon means literally that which is placed under (Marx, 1977, p. 21). In the present context, it means the thing to which all predications point, “while it is not itself predicated of anything else.” (Aristotle, 1933/1989, Z. 3, 1028b 36-37) In other words, the substrate refers to the object itself, of which we can talk about its essence, genus, and species. Thus, it emphasizes the unique existence of an object, i.e., its individuality. The other senses of ousia refer to the universal aspect of an object, by which an object is defined or categorized. They anchor on what an object has in common with other objects. Aristotle sees that the 4^th sense, the individual sense, is the truest or the primary sense of ousia, because only individual things as “this thing” or “that thing” actually exist. (Aristotle, 1933/1989, Z. 3, 1028) The other senses, which locate an object in its universal aspect, are derived secondarily. However, the secondary senses are essential, since each thing exists as that thing, a table as a table and a chair as a chair, only in its universal Form. That means, there is a tension in Aristotle’s understanding of how a thing is, whether in its individuality or its universality. (Stead, 1977, p. 79; Marx, 1997, pp. 21f)

　　The tension does not simply exist in Aristotle’s ontology, but it reflects the two aspects from which we identify an object. So, philosophers after Aristotle continued to use ousia versatilely. (Stead, 1977, pp. 134ff) This laid a burden on Christian theology, since the Trinity entails two sides which are both expressed with ousia, the common nature of the three persons, and the individual being of each. Thus, philosophies at that time could not grant any well-formed concepts to catch the two sides of the Trinity.

　　However, there is another term, hypostasis, in the discussions following Aristotle. Hypostasis primarily means that which is placed under. (Stead, 1998, p. 174). It is a synonym for hypokeimenon. (Lampe, 1449b) So, the Stoics used it to mean something similar to Aristotle’s primary ousia, i.e., what denotes the actual existence of an object. (Stead, 1998, pp. 175f) Neoplatonism in the 3rd to 4th centuries identified each level of being as hypostasis. However, neither of them contrast ousia and hypostasis. (Stead, 1998, pp. 175-177) Nevertheless, at least the Neo-Platonists popularized a term that is linked to, yet detached from, ousia, namely, hypostasis. (Hammerstaedt, pp. 1007ff)

　　Christians found hypostasis unique, since the great apostle St. Paul describes the Son as “the exact representation of his [the Father’s] being (hypostasis).” (Heb. 1,3, NRSV) Though Christian authors quite often interchanged ousia and hypostasis in their writings, some did try to identify the three persons as three hypostaseis, such as the theologian, Origen of Alexandria in the 3rd century. (Zachhuber, 2020, pp. 19-22) A tendency to use ousia universally and hypostasis individually is also somewhat discernible in Christian writings. (Stead, 1998, 179) However, due to the lack of systematic distinction between the two terms, Christian authors were quite often inconsistent in the terminology they used, and were easily accused of heretical interpretations of the Trinity. (Prestige, 1964, pp. 180-188) Accusations usually fall into the following two types: (Zachhuber, 2020, pp. 19-32)

1)　Those who emphasize the three persons having the same nature would be accused of undermining the individual personhood of the three.
2) Those who emphasize the unique characteristics of the three persons would be accused of undermining the common nature of the three.

In short, lacking is a theological articulation of how the common and the individual sides of the Trinity relate. To do so, we need conceptual separation, and new theological articulation to demarcate the two senses of ousia in Aristotle. Eventually, the Cappadocian brothers accomplished the task by distinguishing ousia from hypostasis in their Trinitarian formula “mia ousia, treis hypostaseis.”

The Cappadocians’ Distinction between ousia and hypostasis

　　Basil of Caesarea first proposed the Trinitarian formula “mia ousia, treis hypostaseis”. He and his brother Gregory of Nyssa have substantially developed its theological meaning. The best text clarifying their efforts is a letter to their brother, Peter, the bishop of Sebaste. Despite the uncertainty over which of the two brothers is its author (Silvas, 2007, pp. 247f), the letter provides a profound insight into the mystery of the Trinity.

　　The Letter to Peter (LTP) starts by identifying the essential issue in the Trinitarian doctrine as the lack of distinction between the common ousia and “the principle of the hypostases.” (Silvas, 2007, p. 249) To distinguish ousia and hypostasis, LTP first makes a distinction between nouns that express the common nature of numerically diverse things, e.g., the word “man,” and nouns that designate an individual being, e.g., the word “Paul” or “Timothy.” Such a distinction echoes the distinction between ousia as the universal and ousia as the particular in Aristotle’s philosophy. Similarly, Gregory and Basil regarded the difference between ousia and hypostasis as the difference between the universal and the particular. As Basil says in Letter 236: “The distinction between Οὐσία and ὑπόστασις is the same as that between the general (to koinonν) and the particular (to kath ekaston).” (6.1-22) Thus, for the first time in history, the two senses of ousia are distinguished by two different terms, ousia and hypostasis.

　　However, the relation between the universal and the particular is generic, which means that several objects belong to the same species, such as several men belonging to the same species of human being. In this case, they share the same nature, while being independent from one another. The Trinitarian relationship should be radically different from this.

　　LTP explores the Trinitarian relationship by looking at how we come to know God as one and three. God is only known in His revelation. He does not reveal Himself simply as one God, nor simply as three distinctive persons, but as three persons who are always in unity with one another. Adopting this approach, LTP explicates the distinctiveness of the Father in the following way:

Now, a good way to trace out this argument seems to me to be as follows: We say that every good which comes upon us by God’s power is an operation of the grace which works all things in all (1 Cor 12.6), as the apostle says: But all these are the work of the one and the self-same Spirit who distributes to each as he wills (1 Cor 12.11). If we ask whether the supply of the good which comes to the worthy in this way takes its origin from the Holy Spirit alone, again we are guided by Scripture to believe that the author and cause of the supply of the good things which are worked in us through the Holy Spirit is the Only-begotten God (Jn 1.18), for we are taught by Holy Scripture that through him all things came to be ( Jn 1.3) and subsist in him (Col 1.17). (4a.-4b.)

Grace comes from God the Father. Yet we receive the grace from the Holy Spirit, who sends us the grace which is provided by the Son of God. In receiving the grace, we experience the collaborative work of the three persons. LTP uses the same approach in the part of the Son’s distinctiveness and that of the Holy Spirit. It conveys the idea that the primary experience of the Father cannot be separated from the experience of the other two persons, and vice versa. In other words, we always encounter the three persons all together simultaneously, each in their distinctive circumscription. No one of them can be known without the other two being known.

　　This unique experience distinguishes the encounter with God from other experiences. In this uniqueness, we come to apprehend the three as one. Suppose we encounter the three divine persons separately, one each time, in their respective uniqueness. In that case, the primary experiences will point to three independent substances, just like encountering three persons: Jane, Mary, and John. Then, this experience would be of no difference from other experiences, and the mystery of the Trinity would be taken away.

　　When we encounter the three persons all at once, we also experience their relationship with one another, otherwise, the encounter would not present me with three distinctive persons. In other words, it is their relationship that sets them apart from one another. That is why LTP defines the three persons with the circumscriptions relating to their relations in the following way: (4d.-4f.)

1)　The Father is the Father of the Son, and is the one who is unbegotten and uncaused.

2)　The Son is begotten and the only begotten from the Father, and thereby is the one through whom and with whom the Spirit is issued from the Father.

3)　The Holy Spirit is from the Father, after the Son and with the Son, who transmits the good things from God to creation.

These distinguishing marks that define their individual hypostaseis refer mainly to their relationship, which lies in our primary experience of the Trinity. Thus, the Trinitarian hypostasis is defined in a relationship, and hypostasis is thereby a relational concept.

　　Now the two Greek terms, ousia and hypostasis are formally distinguished: ousia designates the essential content that makes a thing what it is, i.e., the principles that determine the transcendent being which is shared by the three, while hypostasis designates the specific mode of being of each. The two conflicting senses of ousia, the universal sense, and the particular sense, in Aristotle’s philosophy, are now distinguished as ousia and hypostasis in the Trinitarian context. The Cappadocians are able to do so, since they emphasize the hypostasis of each being relationally, and the hypostasis of each can only subsist in relations. This relational understanding of the three persons brought LTP to identify the Trinitarian relationship with a unique Christian concept: communion.

The Idea of Communion with and within the Trinity

　　LTP several times uses the word communion, koinonia in Greek, to refer to the relationship among the Trinitarian persons. It derives from koinos, which means common. (Lampe, 761) In the letter, there is another word meaning common, community (koinotes), but LTP uses it only when referring to the common nature of the three. It can be concluded that LTP sees communion as different from community, indicating the uniqueness of the relationship among the Trinitarian persons. (Turcescu, 2005, pp. 58ff) The uniqueness of communal relations can be read in the following paragraph:

There is apprehended among these three a certain ineffable and inconceivable communion [koinonia] and at the same time distinction, with neither the difference between their persons [hypostaseon] disintegrating the continuity of their nature, nor this community of substance confounding the individual character of their distinguishing notes…. We devise a strange and paradoxical sort of united separation and separated union. (4.83-91)

Communion is not a mere assembly of the three hypostaseis. It is neither the common ground of the three. It designates the kind of union that brings all into a real oneness, while not canceling the distinctiveness of each. It is a special kind of relationship that the natural world cannot provide. According to the law of nature, in a unity, either two or more keep to be themselves, so that the unity is a composition, such as a bag of candies and biscuits, or two or more merge with one another, to turn into something else, such as cheese coming from milk mixed with acid. Communion is neither. As Corrigan puts it: “The Trinitarian communion that the Cappadocian Fathers search to give an expression for is a commixed form of hypostasis that is neither composite nor a ‘third over two elements.’” (Corrigan, 2008, pp. 121-22) Thus, the communion is supernatural or transcendent. It is a mystery that primarily can only be found in God Himself.

　　Communion has primary importance for Christians. While meaning common, communion extends to mean association, mingling, or fellowship. It can also mean sharing, participating in, and contributing. (Lampe, 762-764) Initially, the New Testament and Church Fathers used communion with regard to the Christian community and Christians’ relationship with Jesus Christ. At the heart of being a Christian is their communion with Jesus Christ, sharing and participating in His life. Subsequently, by being in Christ together, Christians bind with one another in communion. (La Soujeole, 2014, pp. 453-455).

　　Now in identifying the Trinitarian relationship as communion, the Cappadocians contribute to the coining of the idea of communion by emphasizing that communion means union in multiplicity. They explicate that such a kind of communion derives from the relational existence of hypostasis. It brings to light that communion can only be realized when we live not primarily in ourselves, but in our relationship with one another. Indeed, it is only truly possible in God Himself. In Thomas Aquinas’s terms, Trinitarian persons are “relations that subsist”, while human beings are subsistences that have relations. Yet in participating in Jesus Christ, we can imitate the Trinitarian relationship, so that we can ever be closer to them in living out for one another.

Hui Xia (Sonja), is Assistant Professor of the Faculty of Theology and Religious Studies at University of St. Joseph, Macau, China.

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